The new political settlement in Iraq:An examination of the role of Shi’a NGOs by Aljabiri, Janan
        
University of Bath
PHD
The new political settlement in Iraq








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. May. 2019
 1 
The new political settlement in Iraq:  









A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
University of Bath 
 











Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A 
copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must 
not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of 
the author. 
 
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and 














Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 11 
Part 1 ............................................................................................................................. 13 
Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 13 
1.1 The NGOs in the Western context: motivation and roles......................................... 13 
1.2 The NGOs in the Islamic context: motivation and roles ........................................... 15 
1.3 My positioning in the field ........................................................................................ 17 
1.4 The aims and objectives of the research .................................................................. 18 
1.5 The contentions and findings of the research .......................................................... 20 
1.6 The organisation of the thesis ................................................................................... 22 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................. 25 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 25 
2.2 An introduction to NGOs in the developed and developing contexts ...................... 25 
2.2.1 NGOs: Definition and tasks ................................................................................ 28 
2.3 Introducing religious NGOs ....................................................................................... 32 
2.4 Islamic NGOs: Islam, charity and politics .................................................................. 35 
2.4.1 Political Islam ..................................................................................................... 36 
2.4.2 Islamisation ........................................................................................................ 38 
2.5 Islamic Sunni NGOs in the Middle East ..................................................................... 39 
2.6 Islamic Shi’a NGOs in the Middle East ...................................................................... 44 
2.6.1 Hezbollah linked NGOs ....................................................................................... 44 
2.6.2 Bonyads: Social welfare organisations in Iran ................................................... 46 
2.7 The thesis theoretical framework ............................................................................. 49 
2.8 Religious NGOs and clientelism ................................................................................ 52 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 3: Approaching Shi’a NGOs - Methodology ................................................... 56 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 56 
3.2 Ontological approach ................................................................................................ 56 
3.3 Epistemological approach ......................................................................................... 57 
3.4 The research methodology ....................................................................................... 58 
3.5 Access and the researcher’s position: insider and outsider ..................................... 60 
3.6 Data collection .......................................................................................................... 67 
3.7 Data analysis.............................................................................................................. 69 
3.8 The trustworthiness of the research ......................................................................... 73 
3.9 Ethical considerations for conducting the research ................................................. 75 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 76 
Part 2 ............................................................................................................................. 77 
Chapter 4: Iraq, a country profile ................................................................................... 77 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 77 
4.2 The demographic structure of the country ............................................................... 77 
4.3 The post war new political settlement ..................................................................... 79 
 3 
4.4 The post war political economy ................................................................................ 86 
4.5 Post war state social policies .................................................................................... 89 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 90 
Chapter 5: The emergence of Shi’a NGOs in Iraq......................................................... 92 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 92 
5.2 Who are the Shi’a? .................................................................................................... 93 
5.2.1 The revival of the Shi’a ....................................................................................... 97 
5.2.2 Quietism and Activism ....................................................................................... 98 
5.3 The new political opportunity and the formation of NGOs .................................... 100 
5.4 Shi’a NGOs’ sources of funding for their activities ................................................. 113 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 117 
Chapter 6: Social services activities of the Shi’a NGOs .............................................. 118 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 118 
6.2 Sponsoring widows and orphans - or Kafalat al-Yateem ........................................ 119 
6.2.1 Kafalat al-Yateem (sponsorship of orphans): Religious justification .............. 119 
6.2.2 The religious motivation for social provision .................................................. 120 
6.3 The Kafala provision to protect the family and the wider society .......................... 121 
6.3.1 The Shi’a NGOs Kafala provision and other support ...................................... 124 
6.3.2 Khums, the main financial source of Kafala provision .................................... 128 
6.3.3 The criteria for Kafala provision ...................................................................... 130 
6.3.4 The procedures to identity entitled widowed families ..................................... 133 
6.4 Collective wedding ceremonies .............................................................................. 135 
6.5 The Shi’a NGOs’ social welfare activism influence on the poor and wider 
society ........................................................................................................................... 142 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 147 
Chapter 7: Disciplining moral behaviour through education and raising 
awareness ......................................................................................................................... 149 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 149 
7.2 The significance of religious ethics teaching for the Shi’a NGOs ............................ 149 
7.3 Education through Madares:  Education in line with Islamic ethics ....................... 152 
7.3.1 Madares al-Imam Ali ........................................................................................ 154 
7.3.2 Collective ceremonies for reaching the age of religious responsibility: 
Sin al-Takleef al-Shari .............................................................................................. 155 
7.3.3 Self disciplining of emotional and sexual behaviour for secondary 
school female teenagers ............................................................................................ 160 
7.4 al-Thabat’s disciplinary role through mourning sessions of Majalis al-
Hussain .......................................................................................................................... 162 
7.4.1 Accessing the site of women Shi’a rituals organised by al-Thabat ................. 166 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 173 
Chapter 8: Shi’a NGOs political role in promoting the Shi’a led state ..................... 175 
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 175 
8.2 The leading role of al-Marja’iyya in the elections in Iraq ....................................... 176 
8.3 The Activist role in the elections: The case of al-Mehrab ....................................... 178 
8.4 The Quietist role in the elections: the CDF and al-Thabat ...................................... 182 
8.5 The Shi’a NGOs electoral campaign discourse for political mobilisation ............... 185 
8.6 Voting for the new constitution .............................................................................. 188 
8.7 The Shi’a NGOs’ role in building citizens who respect the state ............................ 191 
8.8 The NGOs as a fifth authority or as a state’s twin .................................................. 193 
 4 
8.9 The Shi’a NGOs strategic planning in protecting the future of the Shi’a-led 
State .............................................................................................................................. 195 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 198 
Chapter 9: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 200 
9.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 200 
9.2 Shi’a NGOs in Iraq compared to NGOs in the Western context ............................. 201 
9.3 Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq and Sunni NGOs ............................................................ 202 
9.4 Shi’a NGOs in Iraq: Activism and Quietism ............................................................. 204 
9.4.1 The Activist trend: al-Mehrab .......................................................................... 206 
9.4.2 The Quietist trend: the CDF ............................................................................. 207 
9.4.3 The grassroots Quietist NGO: al-Thabat.......................................................... 209 
9.5 Islamisation or Shi’aisation ..................................................................................... 211 
9.6 Limitations ............................................................................................................... 214 
9.7 Future research ....................................................................................................... 215 
Final thoughts ............................................................................................................... 217 
References ................................................................................................................... 218 
Appendix 1: Iraqi national election results 2005, 2010 and 2014 ..................................... 251 
Appendix 2: List of interviews used for this research ...................................................... 253 
Appendix 3: Interview topic sheets ................................................................................ 255 
Appendix 4: Topic sheet about the research ................................................................... 264 






























This thesis is a true embodiment of the notion that a PhD research is a joint project 
produced by a student and his or her supervisors; the time and efforts that I have 
received from my main supervisor, Dr. Rana Jawad, and my second supervisor Dr. 
Joe Devine, has been tremendous. I want before any thing else, to thank them, for 
their patience and perseverance; acknowledging their guidance, support and 
kindness, and their continuous constructive criticism. My thanks also go to my 
supervisor at the University of Kent Professor Peter Taylor-Gooby.  
I want to thank my upgrade committee Dr. Emma Carmel, and Dr. Graham Brown, 
for their valuable comments in my transfer from Mphil to Phd.  
 
My thanks, of course, go to the ESRC who funded this thesis for three years. 
 
My thanks go the Shi’a NGOs, and other participants in Iraq for their kindness and 
cooperation, as well as to all the friends who put me in contact with their friends 
who enabled me to reach my interviewees. Without their contribution, I could not 
have undertaken this research.  
 
My thanks go to my mentor in my second year at the University of Bath, Dr. Tara 
Bailey; thank you Tara for talking to me about the one thing that a PhD thesis has to 
be about. I would also like to thank my proof-reader Max Harris for his support. 
 
I want to thank my family who have supported me in so many different ways. My 
thanks to my brother Ahmad, who was with me the whole journey through its ups 
and downs. My thanks to my cousin Assad Talib who was of great help whenever I 
needed him; yes, doing a PhD is a family business! And of course my thanks to my 
son, Rawand, who survived with me through the journey with his support, kindness, 
and hugs.  
 
My thanks to my friends in Baghdad who hosted me kindly in their house during my 
stay whilst carrying out the fieldwork.  
 6 
 
My thanks go to my longstanding friend, Professor Abdelsalam Noureldin who has 
been a great source of encouragement and support all the way through my PhD 
journey. 
 
My respect to my friend Azad Ahmad; I wish he was here, as he encouraged me to 
go ahead and undertake this research. Azad was killed in Iraq on 30th October 2013.  
 
Since I started this research endeavour, many significant events have taken place in 
the Middle East, starting with the Arab Spring in 2010 and most recently the ISIS 
attack on Iraq in 2014. Many of my friends supported the first and condemned the 
second; my apologies for not being able to join you in your activities. Now, I am 
back.  
 
Finally, thanks for all my friends in London for providing great support and 
encouragement. 
 
It is amazing to see how one piece of work is in fact a joint work of so many people.  
 
















NGOs have become well established in the West since the 1980s following the 
adoption of neoliberal policies, and despite the existence of Islamic NGOs in the 
Middle East since that time, this phenomenon only emerged in Iraq after the 2003 
invasion that toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein.  A proliferation of NGOs, in 
particular, within the Muslim Shi’a populated areas has been witnessed over the 
last decade and this thesis considers these NGOs in the context of what has been 
termed the Shi’a revival in Iraq (Nasr, 2006). More specifically, the aim is to explore 
and explain their role in re-fashioning state-society relations in terms of their 
objectives and functions in “human building” (Literal translation of words used in 
Arabic by my research participants to denote the role of NGOs in influencing human 
behaviour and Iraqi cultural values) and state building in the new post war political 
settlement. Davis and Robinson’s (2012) contention that religious NGOs have a 
multipronged interconnected agenda, which involves: providing for their 
community; sacralising it, and attempting to influence the law of the state, is drawn 
upon to construct the analytical framework. 
 
An interpretive approach is used to investigate the roles of three Islamic Shi’a 
NGOs, for this researcher holds with the perspective that the participants and the 
researcher construct the knowledge about these roles. The main research tool 
employed is collecting interview data from members of the Shi’a NGOs, government 
representatives and specialists in this field, including: international and local 
organisations, some of which are secular NGOs. Documents and correspondence 
with academics concerned with social policy in Iraq are also drawn upon for the 
analysis.  The first Shi’a NGO in the study is linked to the Shi’a religious 
establishment or al-Marja’iyya, being an umbrella NGO titled the ‘Civil Dialogue 
Forum’ and the second ‘al-Thabat Women’s Organisation’, with a focus on 
supporting widowed families and organising Shi’a ritual mourning sessions is one of 
its affiliates. The third NGO ‘al-Mehrab Foundation for Islamic Preaching’ is linked to 
a political group: the ‘Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’. 
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The key findings of the thesis are that the Shi’a NGOs employ a comprehensive 
strategy involving three connected, inseparable dynamics: social service provision, 
theological persuasiveness and having a political role, which they employ to exert 
influence on the state and society to varying degrees, according to their position in 
the religious or political landscape. Furthermore, it emerges from the analysis that a 
culture of clientelism has evolved, whereby the Shi’a NGOs have played a social 
welfare role which has enabled them to secure political support from the poorer 
classes. Moreover, sometimes these NGOs also use their political influence with the 
middle class through their education provision to persuade them to vote for their 
preferred elections candidates.  
 
Another key finding is that the Islamic Shi’a are divided into two trends of thought 
governed by consideration of the role clergymen should play in the politics of the 
state. On the one hand, the Activists believe in direct political involvement and have 
actively campaigned for their linked political party to gain power, whereas the 
Quietists do not accept that the religious authorities should be directly involved. 
However, they did quite openly support Shi’a parties at the time of the first post 
war general election in 2005 and still have the intention of influencing the state and 
society indirectly through their programmes. Thus, it is concluded that these two 
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Adl   Justice in the practice of law. 
Ahl-al-Bayt  Descendents from Mohammad’s family.  
Ajr/Thawab  Religious rewards and incentives, in life and afterlife. 
A'lamiyat  Superiority in learning. 
Al-Mohassassa Power sharing based on ethnic and sectarian division.  
Ashura   The first 10 days of Muharram. 
Caliphate  Successor or leader of Islamic state in Sunni doctrine. 
Dawawin  Guest room of a sheikh and tribal members. 
Du’a   Non-obligatory prayer, or supplication. 
Fatwa   A religious order. 
Fiqh   Islamic jurisprudence. 
Hawza   Shi’a school teaching Shi’a doctrine. 
Hadith   Talks and words of Mohammad. 
Hijab   Religious headscarf. 
Hoqoq   The poor Muslim’s right to the rich’s money. 
Hussainaia  Buildings dedicated to Shi’a mourning ceremonies. 
Ijtihad   The independent interpretation of an Islamic law. 
'ilm   Knowledge, or knowledge of Islamic law. 
Imamate  System of Islamic leadership succeeding Mohammad. 
Imam In the Shi’a context, a religious leader descending from 
Mohammad’s family. 
Iman   Faith. 
Jihad   Islamic struggle and war.  
Kafil   A sponsor or donor of an orphan. 
Kafalat   The sponsorship and donation. 
Khums Religious tax of a fifth of the surplus of one’s annual income, 
practised by Shi’a followers. 
Majalis al-Hussain Shi’a mourning sessions for the life of al-Hussain, the third 
Imam.        
Makfol   The person supported by the Kafil. 
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Maqasid Al-Shari’a The purposes and objectives of Shari’a law. 
Marja’   Higher ranking religious scholar. 
Marja’iyya  Higher religious institution for the Shi’a denomination. 
Mathlomiyat al-Shi’a The grievance and oppression of the Shi’a sect. 
Mobalgheen  Preachers. 
Mojatama Salih Good society. 
Mosque  Muslim place of worship. 
Muharram  First month of the Islamic calendar. 
Mullaya  The ceremony leader for women’s mourning sessions. 
Sadaqqa  Islamic voluntary charity. 
Salih   Good deed. 
Sayyid   A male descendent of Mohammad’s family. 
Shafa’ah  Intercession. 
Shari’a   Islamic Law. 
Shura   Decision making process through consultation for Muslims. 
Sin Al-Takleef al-Sharie The age of religious duty. 
Sirat al-Mostaqim The right path. 
Sofoor   Unveiled. 
Tahsheed  Mobilisation. 
Talih   Bad deeds. 
Takaful Support for one another between Muslim community 
members. 
Taqleef  Religious duty.                
Taqlid   Emulation of religious Marja’iyya. 
Ummah  Muslim nation. 
Wakil (Wokala) The trustee(s) that implements the work of the Marja in the 
community.  
Wara   Refraining from what is unlawful and forbidden. 
Welayat al-Faqih Jurist guardianship. 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Following the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime on 9th 
April 2003, a novel major change in state-society relations took place, which was 
the emergence of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that were able to act 
freely and publicly. Different groups, both secular and religious, were formed by 
local Iraqis or others who had returned from abroad with experience in this form of 
organisation. The NGOs, or sometimes called in Iraq, ‘civil society organisations’, 
became appealing to some, because they differed from the mass organisations 
present in Iraq prior to 2003 aimed at reinforcing state power. Some of these 
organisations had international donors who were willing to fund programmes 
regarding the promotion of democracy, human rights, and gender equality amongst 
other issues.  
 
To introduce my thesis subject it is useful to contextualise the emergence of Shi’a 
NGOs in a wider context of NGOs world, by looking at economic and political 
background behind the NGOs prominence in particular from the 1980s onwards. 
Then I turn to other groups of NGOs, that is, the Islamic ones in particular. This 
chapter is organised in the following order.  Section 1.1 introduces NGOs in the 
Western context, where the concept of NGOs originated; section 1.2 introduces 
Islamic NGOs in the Middle East, whether from a Sunni or Shi’a sect; section 1.3 
explains my positioning in the field, my motivations, while section 1.4 presents the 
aims and objectives of the research. Section 1.5 presents, in brief, the main 
contentions and findings pertaining to this research, and, finally, in section 1.6, I set 
out the contents of the thesis.  
 
1.1 The NGOs in the Western context: motivation and roles 
 
NGOs emerged in Western countries as far back as the eighteen century with aim of 
defending human rights (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and they became formalised in the 
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United Nation’s Charter in 1945. However, it was not until the 1980s that they really 
attracted the attention of academia. This interest was stimulated by a new change 
in the state-society relations, whereby many countries in the West began to reduce 
their role in social welfare, tasking the community and the private sector to become 
more involved in providing for those in need. This change came as a result of the 
adoption of the neoliberal agenda, which advocated privatisation of the public 
sector and the establishment of NGOs to fill the gap left by the state. This policy 
perspective was pioneered by the Thatcher administration in the UK and Reagan’s 
in the USA during the 1980s and has been widely adopted across the Western 
world. The newly formed NGOs were sometimes funded or contracted by the state 
or run based on the voluntary contributions of the public. Their main objective was 
to work for poverty reduction, regarding which they established programmes aimed 
at empowerment, sustainable development, and addressing social and economic 
concerns (Hulme and Edwards, 1997:14). Some NGOs engaged in social welfare, 
providing services such as in health and education, whilst others took part in 
development projects with the goal of helping those who were unable to satisfy 
their needs through the market.  
 
In sum, the NGOs were established in the West to complement the state’s role in 
social welfare, development and poverty reduction in order to fill the gap left by 
retrenchment of the public sector. The call for the establishment of NGOs was 
echoed in other parts of the world, in particular in countries that were ruled by one-
party political systems, such as in Eastern Europe and the Middle East where the 
state had dictatorial control over economic and social polices (Bosch, 1997).  In 
these countries, these organisations promoted the values of democracy, human 
rights and advocacy. That is, these NGOs formed counterweights to the state 
political power by providing a platform for political expression, channels for 
participation and communication for their constituency through training the public 
on how to be active citizens (Hulme and Edwards, 1997).  
 
These organisations variously called NGOs, charity organisations, non-profit 
organisations or civil society organisations, have been defined and characterised in 
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the literature as formal organisations that have self governance; are independent 
from the state; are apolitical; are non-violent; do not use their activities to gain 
profit for their organisers; and aim to serve the public good (Uvin and Weiss, 1998; 
Martens, 2002; Lewis, 2009). Some have a secular agenda, whilst others have a 
religious mission. Those driven by a religious agenda have been defined as Faith 
Based Organisations (FBOs), being inspired by religious values that are evident in 
their operations, discourses, choice of programmes, and their intended outcomes 
(Sider and Unruh, 2004). However, not all religious NGOs have been formed solely 
to serve the faith, for some have the goal of instigating change in the state and 
society driven by a religious-political agenda. This is the case with the Islamic ones 
in the Middle East and next, I briefly introduce the political background of the 
formation of this type of NGO.  
 
1.2 The NGOs in the Islamic context: motivation and roles 
 
Islamic NGOs came to prominence in the 1970s-1980s and their formation has been 
commonly linked to political shifts in countries where they are based. Regarding 
which, Benedetti (2006) pointed out that the formation of Islamic NGOs took place 
following the defeat of the Arabs in the war with Israel in 1967, in Afghanistan in 
1970s and Muslim Brotherhood linked NGOs were established following the arrival 
of political openness in Egypt in the 1980s with the aim of assisting the political 
movement to reach out to the wider community (Kandil, 1997). In Lebanon, the 
political party Hezbollah has formed its own linked NGOs that are engaged in social 
service provision, on the one hand and serving the political aim of resistance to 
Israel, on the other (Jawad, 2009). In Iran, a new group of NGOs or Bonyads were 
established, some of which were linked or formed by the highest religious authority 
in Iran following the 1979 revolution, such as Emdad, whilst others were state-
organisations, such as Behzisti (Messkoub, 2006). Despite their origins, both types 
are not only active in social welfare and poverty reduction, but also have the aim of 
integrating religion with the state. Davis and Robinson (2012) have explained that 
organisations linked to religious-political movements are motivated by three 
connected objectives: serving the needs of their community by providing for the 
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poor; exercising ethical and moral influence on their community in order to make 
them act in line with the religious order; and they have the intention to influence 
the law of the state so that is in line with the religion.  
 
However, Islamic NGOs are not a homogenous group, being divided into two main 
sects: Sunni, and Shi’a. The vast majority of the available literature has focused on 
organisations from within the Sunni sect (Ahmed, 2009:426; Benedetti, 2006: 855; 
Wiktorowicz, 2004; Duh, 2014) and consequently, there has been a tendency to 
consider the terms Islamic NGOs, Islamic social movement and political Islam as 
referring solely to the Sunni. This is perhaps not surprising, given that this sect 
comprises the substantial majority of the population of Middle Eastern countries. 
The literature shows that Islamic NGOs were formed to open up for the Islamic 
movement new channels to influence society at the grassroots level, to educate it in 
line with the teachings of Islam and where appropriate, break the ban on political 
parties by utilising NGOs to mobilise new recruits to their political movement 
(Kandil, 1997). They are present in Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, and 
work in opposition to the state aiming to Islamise from the bottom up (Esposito, 
1997, Roy, 1994; Zubaida, 1997). These NGOs, in order to provide for their 
communities in relation to social services, education, medical centres, mosque 
building and organising collective wedding ceremonies, in line with their religious 
values to help the poor, use alms collected from a variety of sources. Their key 
motivation for these activities is to show their constituency what life would be like if 
they were to gain political power (Davis and Robinson, 2012).  
 
While the Sunni form the majority in the Middle East, in Iraq and Iran this is the case 
for the Shi’a, and in the Lebanon they comprised 40 percent of the population in 
2009 (Hazran, 2009: 3). As mentioned above Hezbollah in the Lebanon and the 
senior clerics in Iran have established strong Islamic NGOs, which have received the 
attention of academia. In Iraq, despite Islamic Shi’a NGOs in this country coming to 
the fore over the last decade, there has been no explicit acknowledgement of the 
existence of this particular group of NGOs in the extant literature and hence, little is 
known about their motivation and the impact their activities are having on the state 
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and society. Consequently, there is a gap in the literature that needs to be 
addressed, which is of particular importance given the revival of the Shi’a since the 
war finished in 2003 and their holding governmental power unbroken after the 
2005 elections. This is because these particular NGOs are perceived by this 
researcher as having played a crucial role in helping the Shi’a obtain power through 
mobilising people for supporting these elections and the current constitution, which 
many believe to be very much in line with this sect’s religious doctrine.    
 
1.3 My positioning in the field  
 
I had not heard about NGOs until I arrived in the UK during the late 1990s. Once in 
this country, I gradually became aware of these organisations and their role in 
advocating for people across a wide range of issues. In particular, my attention was 
caught by those groups that were defending women’s rights. As an Iraqi woman, I 
was intrigued by the numerous publications and magazines as well as the 
conferences, workshops and meetings being held that focussed on women’s issues, 
in general, and those specifically addressing women’s issues in the Middle East. As a 
result of my interest, I joined with other Iraqi and Middle Eastern women to form 
women’s groups in the UK. In particular, have been concerned about the violation 
of women rights in countries that are ruled by Islamic governments, where: females 
from the age of nine in countries are forced to wear Hijab against their personal 
will; there is legalisation of polygamy; women are deprived of the right to obtain a 
divorce; and stoning of women in countries, such as Iran, being permitted. This 
increasing awareness of the hardships of Muslim women in certain countries 
motivated me to understand the goals and objectives of Islamic groups in the 
Middle East. 
 
Following the collapse of the previous regime, I visited Iraq in 2004. During this 
time, when I travelled to the southern part of Iraq, I often saw billboards at the 
gateways to cities which announced, in Arabic: ‘al-Mehrab Foundation welcomes 
you’. Such notices had replaced the earlier versions that usually only showed the 
name of the city. This experience initially prompted me to find out whether there 
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were NGOs operating in Iraq, and if so, what they were doing.  In my further visits, I 
became aware of these organisations’ support for widowed families, but it was their 
role in the elections that appeared to attract the attention of the public more than 
their social welfare provision. Thus, my motivation in carrying out this research 
stems from my desire to understand fully the nature and the role of Islamic NGOs in 
Iraq, post 2003. My personal experience means I am familiar with the Shi’a 
community, in terms of their culture, traditions, rituals, links, religious 
establishments, and social relations. Furthermore, my social network has enabled 
me to access NGOs that are known for their links with either the religious 
establishment or with political groups.  In sum, as an Iraqi woman with insider 
knowledge of NGOs, awareness of Islamic traditions and with clear understanding 
of the position of the Shi’a in that country’s past, I am of the belief that my 
background knowledge places me in an ideal position for carrying out this essential 
research. 
 
1.4 The aims and objectives of the research  
 
This thesis addresses the gap in the literature regarding understanding about 
Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq. Although the phenomenon of Islamic NGOs, whether 
from the Sunni or the Shi’a sect, has been present in the Middle East and has been 
active since the 1970s-1980s, little is known about these organisations in the 
context of Iraq. Thus, in this study, the goal is to make the Shi’a NGOs visible, clarify 
their role and examine how they behave in this specific setting. The objectives of 
this thesis are: 
 
- To offer an explanation for the new and very prominent role which Shi’a NGOs 
now occupy in Iraq; 
- To examine the significance of Shi’a NGOs’ role in the reforming of the Iraqi state 
and society in the post 2003 era. 
 
It has to be noted that the Iraqi law governing NGOs does not classify them 
according to their mission, be it secular, or religious. Moreover, Shi’a NGOs reject 
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having their organisations labelled as religious bodies. Instead, they prefer to call 
themselves simply NGOs or civil society organisations (CSOs) with no reference to 
religion, because this could give the impression that they are sectarian, which is not 
a public face they wish to show (Yeginoğlu, 2010). Not withstanding this contested 
terminology, in order to meet the objectives of this research, the following research 
questions are posed: 
 
1. Why have Shi’a NGOs risen to prominence in social and political life in Iraq after 
the regime change of 2003?   
2. What are the main social services, religious, or political activities that they are 
engaged in?  
3. What has been the significance of these services and activities in the 
reformation of state and society in Iraq post 2003?  
 
 
In order to fulfil the research objectives and address the research questions, a 
qualitative methodology is adopted for this investigation. The data is collected 
through holding semi-structured interviews with representatives from Shi’a NGOs 
as well with a number of representatives from state and international organisations 
and other local secular NGOs. Further, an inductive interpretive approach is 
undertaken for analysis of the data. More specifically, thematic analysis is used so 
as to bring the experiences of the Shi’a NGOs to the surface.  
 
It is evident that, since 2003, the Shi’a NGOs have been operating in a new political 
environment. Therefore, to establish the backdrop to this research it has been 
necessary to explain the post war political settlement. Moreover, the Shi’a NGOs 
appear to be very important organisations that work to advance the role of Shi’a in 
the post Saddam political settlement. To probe this effectively, my theoretical 
framework draws upon my literature review outcomes. That is, in line with the 
perspective of Davis and Robinson (2012), the Shi’a Islamic NGOs investigated for 
this research are assumed to engage in three connected roles which all serve their 
ultimate aim of forming a state and society that act in line with Islam, something 
explained and justified in detail in chapter 2.  
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1.5 The contentions and findings of the research 
 
The outcomes of this research offer a new dimension regarding our understanding 
of NGOs, for it appears that definitions originating in a Western context fail to 
capture the substance of the Shi’a Islamic organisations that are religiously 
motivated and are linked to political groups or religious authorities.  The Shi’a NGOs 
were formed with political objectives in mind; they have been funded, guided, and 
tasked with influencing the morals of individuals and/or the state so as to bring 
these in line with Islam. In other words, it emerges through the course of this study 
that Shi’a NGOs are engaged in various ways in politics, whether through their links 
to elections or through their activities that seek to modify individuals’ ways of 
thinking and thus, they cannot be considered as being apolitical in nature, as has 
been assumed in other arenas with regards to other NGOs. Moreover, the concept 
of FBOs is not useful in this discussion pertaining to the Shi’a NGOs because the 
empirical evidence demonstrates that these are concerned with more than just 
faith, for they have become an integrated part of the process of political 
transformation of the state and society.  
 
The Shi’a NGOs investigated in this study, despite their having different affiliations, 
share the same goal, which is to protect society through supporting poor families, 
as well as enhancing the role of Shi’a in the post war era . This involves 
manufacturing individuals who are devoted socially and politically to the Shi’a sect, 
whether this is through the NGOs helping families that have lost their male 
breadwinner, or through enhancing the religious values of the family and the wider 
society. The two trends of the Shi’a, namely Activists and Quietists, work to achieve 
their ultimate goal of influencing citizens by pursuing two paths. While the former 
have an explicit political role in supporting their own party and supporting the state, 
latter exerts an implicit political influence, for it is not linked to any political party, 
but communicates with the state through the NGOs. Moreover, whereas the 
Activists on the whole openly promote for their direct links with political parties, 
the Quietists use their association with the higher religious authority to gain access 
to sate institutions.  In sum, evidence shows that both trends wish to Islamisize the 
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state and society, but through differing strategies, as will become clear in chapters 6 
to 8.  
 
The outcomes of this work extend our understanding about the motivations 
underpinning the social services provided by Islamic NGOs. More specifically, the 
data gathered with respect to the Shi’a organisations indicate that these 
motivations differ from those linked to social movements in other Arab speaking 
countries. That is, the Shi’a NGOs do not seek to compete with the state or to 
replace it, as has been argued by Davis and Robinson (2012) and Wiktorowicz 
(2004) with regards to other Islamic NGOs. To the contrary, because the Shi’a 
obtained power in 2005 and have held on to it since then, these Islamic NGOs have 
considered it their duty to defend the state even to the extent of deterring civil 
society from becoming involved in political activity common in countries, such as 
demonstrations, thereby restricting their involvement simply to voting in elections. 
Moreover because many Shi’a feel obliged to vote for Islamic political parties owing 
to it being considered a religious duty, in essence they have no free vote to 
influence the fortunes of the state or society. As such, these NGOs differ 
substantially from Islamic Shi’a NGOs in the Middle East. For instance, in the 
Lebanon (Jawad, 2009) they take the role of providing for the minority for in line 
with the Shi’a let down by the central state through an ideology of resistance to 
Israel, and have no intention of obtaining state power. Whilst in Iran, influential 
NGOs were established on behalf of the state by the religious leaders, being tasked 
with providing for the poor so as to maintain political stability.  
 
The Islamisation process that is often discussed in the Islamic Sunni context, takes 
on a very different shape with respect to the Shi’a NGOs where a specific process of 
Shi’aisation can be observed. This refers to the spreading of the Shi’a values, rituals 
and doctrine that dates back to the time of the schism between the two main sects 
of Islam, which are used symbolically to enhance the discourse of the Shi’a in both 
the private and public spheres. This process is carried out top down, through the 
NGOs’ work to Shi’aisize the state, through the citizens voting for a constitution that 
complies with this doctrine and electing Shi’a candidates for state office. It is also 
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carried out bottom up through NGO representatives having daily interaction with 
their constituency as go about delivering their aid to those in need. 
 
1.6 The organisation of the thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part 1 comprises this introductory chapter 
(chapter 1), chapter 2 and 3. In chapter 2, the literature review for this thesis is 
presented. Three important areas are covered: the definition of NGOs in Western 
contexts, the concept of political Islam, and Islamic NGOs. Drawing on the work of 
Davis and Robinson (2012), the theoretical framework is set out that considers 
Islamic Shi’a NGOs as having multifaceted roles that are inseparable, and, as such, 
constantly feed into each other.  
  
The methodology of this research is explained and justified in chapter 3. This 
includes the ontological and epistemological assumptions for the study; the 
methodology for conducting the research; and the methods for collecting and 
analysing the data. In brief, the ontological assumption underpinning thesis is 
constructionist and the epistemological approach is interpretive as I am  of the view 
that the there is not one reality, but many, and these are constructed by the 
participants of the research alongside the researcher. The data collection relies on 
semi structured interviews supported with relevant documents, information 
gathered from key organisations’ websites, as well as correspondence with 
academics located inside and outside Iraq.  The data analysis is explained and 
justified and there is a discussion of the trustworthiness of this study. My access to 
the field and the ethical issues concerning the research procedures are explained.  
 
Part 2 contains the empirical chapters.  In chapter 4, a profile of the country and a 
picture of the new changes in Iraq post 2003 are created. In detail, the demographic 
structure, the post war political settlement, the political economy, and a brief 
review of the social policies in Iraq are presented. In this chapter it is argued that 
despite the efforts of international organisations to reform Iraq’s economic and 
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social policies in line with neoliberal agendas, there remains powerful resistance to 
such changes. 
 
The Shi’a NGOs are introduced in chapter 5 and to this end; the explained how the 
Shi’a came to be a sect. The pertinent literature related to Iraq is reviewed and the 
concepts of the Shi’a revival, and Quietism and Activism are introduced. The 
literature on NGOs in Iraq is very limited and none of this literature, to date, has 
referred to Shi’a led NGOs specifically as being Shi’a organisations. The chapter 
discusses the emergence of Shi’a NGOs as a distinct entity post 2003, looking at 
Shi’a their sources of funding for their activities. The data gathered for this chapter 
was collected from interviews with state and non-state organisations and provides 
evidence regarding how NGOs were perceived by the state ministries, international 
organisations, academics, and the NGOs themselves, some of which are religious 
and others secular. This chapter serves as a point of entry that facilitates deeper 
study of the objectives and roles of the Shi’a NGOs in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 6 addresses the Shi’a NGOs’ first objective of protecting the family as a 
means to protect society at large. This objective is realised through social service 
provided to widows and orphans as these form the main group targeted by the 
NGOs. The provision of social services by NGOs from both Shi’a trends is examined 
and analysed and it is demonstrated that social services or financial support can do 
more than just address the needs of the poor; theycan also secure political support 
to the service providers.  
 
In chapter 7 there is analysis of the religious influence of this group of NGOs 
regarding disciplining their constituency’s social behaviour, in particular, that of girls 
and women. There is a discussion of how the Shi’a authorities consider themselves 
responsible and legitimate actors that are well positioned to inform personal 
behaviour. The activities carried out by two Shi’a NGOs are explained, and the 
conclusion is drawn that they have not only had an influence on both widowed 




The political influence of the Shi’a NGOs is considered in more detail in chapter 8 
starting with the contextualisation of the experience of the Shi’a NGOs in the 
sectarian violence and the emergence of the religious authority or al-Marja’iyya as a 
critical political force in Iraq. Also, the varying strategies that these NGOs use to 
mobilise people to vote in elections and to influence their constituency’s political 
choices so that they are consistent with Islamic mission are explored.  
 
Chapter 9 contains a synthesis of the findings by considering these in light of the 
reviewed literature and also addresses the research questions. To begin with the 
strategies employed by the Activists and Quietists are compared and contrasted. 
Subsequently, the differences between Islamic Shi’a NGOs in other Middle Eastern 
countries are highlighted, which leads to discussion on the notion of the Shi’aisation 
of Iraq and the NGOs’ role in this project.  Moreover, the chapter contains reflection 
on the culture of clientelism that has been encouraged by the Shi’a NGOs. Following 
this, the limitations consideration and suggestions put forward for future potentially 





















This chapter is devoted to the literature review and identifies the research problem 
and research questions, drawing up the theoretical framework and setting up “the 
scene for the coming chapters” (Silverman, 2013: 343). This review is organised in 
the following order; section 2.2 introduces the emergence and roles of NGOs in 
both the developed and the developing context by presenting definitions and their 
main characteristics. Section 2.3 introduces religious NGOs and discusses faith and 
religion in them. Section 2.3 reviews the existing literature on Islamic NGOs 
shedding light on these and political Islam, with the aim of explaining their position 
in relation to social movements of Islamic activism in the Middle East and 
highlighting their main roles. Section 2.4 focuses on the literature pertaining to 
Islamic NGOs, which oven discusses their role in charity provision and politics. 
Section, 2.5 covers work on Islamic Sunni NGOs in the Middle East, whereas section 
2.6 concentrates on Islamic Shi’a NGOs in the region. Section 2.7 introduces the 
theoretical framework of the thesis and finally there is the chapter conclusion.  
 
 
2.2 An introduction to NGOs in the developed and developing contexts 
 
The role of NGOs has increasingly attracted the attention of academia in a range of 
different disciplines including sociology, development studies, political sciences, 
anthropology and religious studies. Despite the fact that NGOs are not a new 
phenomena as some organisations emerged in the eighteenth century in Western 
countries with respect to issues, for example, related to the abolition of the slave 
trade (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and, in 1863, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross was founded to help those affected by war (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 4). In 
addition, the Congress of International Associations held in 1910 and attended by 
132 bodies, addressed a variety of issues, such as public health and agriculture 
(Lewis, 2009: 3). Other organisations appeared during this era, such as Save the 
Children that was founded in 1919 to address the resultant traumas of the First 
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World War (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 4). The increasing interest in NGOs is 
attributed to their resurgence in the 1980s serving economic and political, social, 
and cultural objectives.   
 
A distinct thread in the literature notes the resurgence of these organisations in the 
1980s taking the form of what Clarke and other authors have described as an 
“associational revolution” (Clark, 2008: 3; Salamon and Anheier, 1998:x) in the face 
of the political and economic changes that occurred in the post Cold War era. The 
rise of NGOs was not, according Hulme and Edwards, an “accident” nor did it 
emanate from voluntary initiatives of the public or certain groups (Hulme and 
Edwards, 1997: 5), but rather it was necessitated by these new developments. 
Lewis explains the revival of NGOs as the result of efforts of the supporters of 
neoliberal policy agendas to roll back the state and bring them into the social 
welfare arena (Lewis, 2009:3). Under the neoliberal agenda, NGOs serve as a 
complementary if not alternative to public sector service delivery, aimed at helping 
to achieve “good governance” by working with governments, the market, and the 
third sector to achieve the desired outcomes (Lewis, 2009: 4).  
 
Changes surrounding neoliberalism marked a transformation in state-society 
relationships in developed countries, in particular the USA and the UK, as evidenced 
by privatisation and other market reforms. At the same time, this offered civil 
society organisations, such as NGOs, the opportunity to take part in social welfare 
issues in response to the state’s retreat (Carothers, 2000:19) and this would appear 
to form the first and key objective for the encouragement of the establishment of 
these organisations. The structural adjustment programmes and economic reforms 
adopted in line with neoliberal policy assigned to NGOs the role of contributing to 
poverty reduction (Hulme and Edward, 1997:21); providing for the public (Lewis, 
2009: 5) at local, national or international levels. This role for NGOs in social 
development was pushed by international organisations, such as the World Bank, 
which embraced the notion that they were realistic vehicles to achieve these goals, 
in line with the neoliberal policy agenda (Harmsen, 2008: 20). 
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The second objective is that NGOs promote democracy in some countries by 
providing a platform for the political participation of civil society (Bosch, 1997: 232). 
That is, this function served by NGOs as identified in the literature is to meet the 
demands calling for democracy to counterweigh state political power by giving civil 
society a powerful voice. This can be achieved through the roles played by NGOs in 
supporting democratisation, political participation (Bosch, 1997: 232) and 
promoting pluralism (Hawthorne, 2004:3). Under this lens, in the late 1980s the 
NGOs appeared to offer a platform for political representation and to help in the 
transition to democracy (Carothers, 2000: 19; Blair, 1997) particularly in countries 
where the state played a key role in welfare provision, but was also considered to 
be an authoritarian regime (Clarke, 1998: 25).  
 
These two connected roles of NGOs have appeared strongly in Eastern Europe and 
the developing world gaining the prominence from the late 1980s onwards. In fact, 
in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America there was a fascination with 
NGOs as they appeared very appealing and attracted attention, in particular from 
advocacy groups who aimed to defend human and women's rights, who were 
concerned about watching over government performance and monitoring the 
progress of anticorruption measures (Carothers, 2000: 19). This dimension covered 
in the literature indicates a third objective of NGOs, that of carrying out advocacy 
work through influencing public policy (Blair, 1997) and addressing issues related to 
such matters as gender or ethnic biases (Clark, 1997:43). The aim is to involve the 
poor and their communities in development decision making and resource 
allocation (ibid) as well as monitoring state performance in relation to social welfare 
and political rights. In brief, it emerges that the roles of NGOs in their work 
regarding economic and political issues and for advocacy have contributed to the 
refashioning of the relation between the state and society. This has resulted in a 
proliferation of NGOs in recent years (Lewis, 2009:5). Given their importance 
outlined in this introduction, in the following subsection the literature pertaining to 




2.2.1 NGOs: Definition and tasks 
 
There is a consensus in the literature that NGOs existed long before the 1980s and 
that the United Nations has formalised and normalised the terms of reference for 
non-government organisations (NGOs), post-World War II, in Article 71 of the 
United Nations Charter of 1945 (Berger, 2003, Martens, 2002). Although initially the 
UN focused on international organisations and their consultative role for promoting 
their own purposes, national and regional NGOs have become recognised by the UN 
(Berger, 2003; Martens, 2002: 271).That is, since the 1980s, the term NGO has 
become popular at both the national and international levels for organisations 
inside and outside the UN framework (ibid) and is used by both academics and 
activists when referring to these organisations. However, despite the increasing 
levels of interest and scholarship on the subject, NGOs have not yet been defined in 
a comprehensive manner with a variety of features being attributed to them. For 
instance, Clarke defined NGOs as: “private, non-profit, provisional organisations 
with distinguish legal character, concerned with public welfare goals” (1998, 2-3)  
 
The NGOs in the literature have been defined as not for profit NGOs, that are 
organised around the voluntary initiatives of citizens, and are self governed. They 
have also been attributed with having aim of serving the public good (Willetts 1996, 
5; Vakil, 1997: 2060 Martens, 2002:282). According to the World Bank, NGOs are 
defined as private organizations 
 
 “characterized primarily by humanitarian or cooperative, rather than 
commercial, objectives… that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote 
the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social 
services, or undertake community development in developing countries” 
(cited in Werker and Ahmad, 2007: 3).  
 
Salamon and Anheier highlighted the importance of a robust “structural / 
operational definition” (1992, 1) and set five core structural or operational 
characteristics in relation to capturing the features of this type of organisations, 
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namely, that they are “formally constituted, nongovernmental in basic structure, 
self governing; non-profit distribution; and voluntary to some meaningful extent” 
(ibid). Other scholars, Martens (2002), Uvin and Weiss (1998) and Lewis (2009), 
assert that the main characteristics of NGOs are:  
 
a) Formal, which means the NGOs have the minimal required organisational 
structure that enables them to conduct their operations, for example, a 
constitutional framework, legal statutes and staff members (Martens, 2002: 
282). They are also institutionalised in the sense that they have formal and 
regular meetings for governance and some organisational permanence. 
 
b) Not for profit: given the aim of the NGO is to serve the pubic good, 
therefore, the aim of its governors is not to make profit for the organisation, 
even if there is a financial surplus from its operations. 
 
c) Independent from the state: NGOs are defined as societal actors emanating 
from the public, formed by individuals and they are understood to not 
include official members, such as government servants (Russett, 1996, p. 67 
cited in Martens, 2002). They are independent financially as the 
membership contributions form a source for their funding, and even if 
governments fund them, they are not under their control.  
 
d) Not political: NGOs are understood to be apolitical organisations that do not 
seek political power and are not interested in promoting candidates for 
political office. In this way, they are non-political organisations (Uvin and 
Weiss, 1998: 213).  
 
e) Non-violent: NGOs are non-violent organisations and this is a distinguishing 
feature that separates them from those who are using violence, such as 
Jihadist or radical groups. 
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f) Self-governance and voluntary support: NGOs have the capacity to control, 
manage and supervise their affairs independently (Lewis, 2009). Even 
though they might employ paid staff, there is also voluntary participation in 
governing the NGOs by the trustees or the management (Lewis, 2009).  
 
The above definitions and characterisations hold that NGOs are formal 
organisations formed by individuals based on their voluntary initiatives, aimed at 
serving the public good and they are not for profit. These organisations are 
apolitical, nonviolent and independent from the state and self governed.  
 
However, the assertion that NGOs are non-political is rather naïve, for there is 
substantial evidence that many have the political intention to make social change 
through unifying the efforts around shared social meanings, drawing on shared 
values regarding the distributing of resources and carrying out activities to influence 
resource distribution (Clarke, 1998: 195).  
 
The literature shows that religious NGOs in America as well as European countries 
have undertaken various roles in shaping their societies, state, and individual 
behaviour on particular issues in relation to such matters as: the family, abortion, 
and same sex relationships. In fact, many Christian religious organisations driven by 
their critical and defensive agenda against modern socio-political developments 
(secularisation, feminism, the sexual revolution) see these as a serious threat, not 
only to religion, but to society as a whole. That is, they believe that the stability of 
society depends on traditional moral values and a patriarchal social order, framed 
as “family values”. These values are conceived as absolute moral standards laid 
down in pre-modern sacred texts or authoritative religious teachings (Vic et al, 
2013: 4). 
 
These Evangelicals strive to form a religious movement across Protestant 
denominations, predominantly Baptist and Pentecostal ones, setting themselves in 
opposition to the modern liberal theology of “mainline” Protestantism emphasizing 
the final authority of Scripture and individual salvation through a personal 
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relationship with Jesus, often through a conversion experience”(ibid) The recent 
history of the American Christian NGOs provides a vivid example of how these 
organisations allied with the Republican Party have been advocating the ‘New 
Christian Right’ agenda, in particular, in relation to the sexual and reproductive 
health and rights (SRHR). The Salvation Army operating extensively in the United 
States, as well as in other parts of the world, is one of the largest charity 
organisations that emphasises divinely ordained strict rules on cultural matters. This 
organisation has played an active part in shaping the family, community and 
society’s behaviour in line with the strict religious order, building institutions to 
sacralise individuals as well as society along with assisting in the creation of a 
massive network of faith based organisations as alternative institutions to the state 
(Davis and Robinson, 2012: 142). Comunione e Liberazzione, the orthodox 
movement in Italy, also has the goal of establishing a Christian presence in that 
nation and further afield promoting the Catholic Church’s stance on divorce and 
abortion, whereby they believe it should be the law of the state. Furthermore, 
Francois, Paquette, and Bergeron explain that some Christian organisations are 
motivated by either a missionary or proselytising role, which involves attempting to 
change one’s belief in line with fundamental religious teaching (Francois et al., 
2012: 296).  
 
Other literature reveals that NGOs in countries such as those in the Middle East are 
linked to political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz, 2004; 
Robinson, 2004), and are playing a significant role in shaping the state and society in 
line with Islam. This they are pursuing bottom up through the Islamisation of the 
society and top down through Islamising the laws and legalisation in accordance 
with Shari’a law. Moreover, Islamic NGOs linked to Islamic movements have 
become active players in politics (Clarke, 1998: 23). These religiously motivated 
organisations, as Davis and Robinson indicate, are often active in serving a wide 
range of areas related to one or more aspects of social welfare, advocacy and 




2.3 Introducing religious NGOs  
 
The NGOs in developing and developed countries fall into two distinct groups 
according to their mission: secular and religious. This is an important distinction as 
the religious NGOs have the objective of influencing individual behaviour in line 
with the religious teachings (Davis and Robinson, 2012). Here, I shed light on the 
emergence of the religious form of these organisations as this group forms the focal 
interest of this thesis. There is a substantial and extensive history linked to church 
welfare provision as well as to Islamic provision of welfare through Waqf or Zakat 
(Singer, 2008; Jawad, 2009). The modern resurgence of religious NGOs or faith 
based organisations (FBOs) in Western countries, such as the USA and the UK, can 
be traced back to the 1980s and is in accord with neoliberal policies, as mentioned 
above, aimed at shifting the role of the state away from being the sole provider of 
welfare and expecting the community to take care of its needs with individuals 
supporting each other (Bretherton, 2010:32). The turn towards religious 
organisations was attributed to the Reagan administration in the USA that claimed 
that religious organisations were more effective than the state and other secular 
NGOs in welfare provision (Yeginoğlu, 2010: 1). In the 1990s, in the UK there was a 
shift towards a communitarian approach to social welfare (Bretherton, 2010), which 
enhanced the view that FBOs could offer a good fit with the community playing an 
important part in social welfare (Bretherton, 2010:33). Reagan’s policy was echoed 
in the UK by Thatcher’s policies of calling for rolling back the frontiers of the state 
and increased emphasis being placed on the role of the citizen in society (Billis and 
Harris, 1992). FBOs also serve political objectives and the literature in particular 
highlights the growth of Christian right wing organisations to secure political 
support for Reagan’s new economic plans inside and outside the USA, in opposition 
to communism (Clarke, 2008:19). This mobilisation of religious groups and 
organisations with a numerical strength amounting to millions was translated into 
political power (Clarke, 2008:19).  
 
Secular organisations that are concerned with development or providing charity are 
newcomers in comparison to religious charity organisations, as the latter have a 
 33 
well-established traditional role in providing for the poor. However, there is a 
dearth of studies that scrutinised the difference between FBOs and NGOs (Davis et 
al, 2011: 17). The very limited available literature indicates mainly the mission as a 
distinguishing feature or dividing line between the two groups of NGOs along with 
the space they seek to occupy in the public sphere (Davis et al., 2011). Davis et al. 
(2011) state that there is a perception in the developed and developing world that 
religious organisations have advantages over secular ones, because they are able to: 
draw on moral and spiritual values; mobilise believers estranged by a secular 
development discourse; create links at the grassroots level; have a high degree of 
legitimacy; have international links that enable them to secure funds, thus 
safeguard their autonomy; and are trusted in their reaching out to rural areas 
(Davis, 2011: 6). These advantages emerge from the perception that faith or the 
religious factor has an added value for these organisations (James, 2009: 11), which 
motivates them to go beyond the secular organisations in terms of aiming for long 
term change. Whether FBOs have been more or less effective in their welfare 
provision is not empirically supported (Davis et al., 2011:16; Melville and McDonald, 
2006: 77). In relation to this, Peuraca (2003) claimed that beneficiaries make no 
distinctions between various secular and faith-based organisations in terms of their 
impact and effectiveness, for they point to deeds rather than mission statements 
(2003:5), which means that what matters for poor people is “their socio-economic 
survival and not bulked up ideology” (Harmsen, 2008:410). The difference between 
the secular and religious NGOs cannot be put down to one form being more 
effective than the other as there are no data to support this, but rather the religious 
mission of the latter. Regarding which, the risk of proselytisation during their charity 
work is considered by some as an unwelcome side effect (Davis et al., 2011).  
 
The question to be posed here therefore, is what does faith or religion mean and 
what is its significance to the service users or the wider community. To understand 
the mechanisms and dynamics of how and in which way the faith informs the FBOs, 
and how it is deployed by them. Sider and Unruh (2004) proposed a typology of 
religious FBOs in the USA context. They studied the position of faith in the 
organisation. The key issue that the authors investigated is the degree of religiosity 
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and the deployment of religion in these organisations’: mission statements; 
founding boards; affiliations; controlling boards; their management; staff; support; 
and their personal religious practices. This was studied by them in both the 
organisation as a whole, and in specific programmes carried out by it. Sider and 
Unruh’s analytical framework for understanding faith in FBOs investigates the 
extent to which the religious content is integrated into the organisation’s 
programmes. According to these authors, the more an FBO becomes imbued with 
faith, the stricter it is, in particular, regarding the explicitness of its religious 
message it the programmes that it runs (2004: 120).  
 
The other angle that these researchers adopted to investigate the role of faith is 
through the organisations’ programmes. They considered four aspects: the 
environment in which the programmes were executed; whether the programme 
had religious meaning; the symbols that were used in the place or even in the 
programme’s name; and the content of the conducted programme, that is, whether 
it was focused on or combined with religious activities, such as religious teachings 
or prayer; the degree of the integration of the religious components in their 
programmes, and finally, the outcomes of the conducted programmes and the 
“expected connection between religious content and the desired outcome” (Sider 
and Unruh, 2004:124).  
 
This analytical framework presented by Sider and Unruh is useful for understanding 
the faith or religiosity of religious NGOs, but it is Western orientated, mainly 
focusing on Christian organisations. As such, it has failed to consider two key issues 
regarding Islamic organisations. Faith in these authors’ context is not separated 
from religion, whilst under Islam the Iman or faith, means belief in God; it means 
the submission to God’s will; “trusting and relying on Allah, contentment and 
pleasure with the will of Allah, and delegation and turning over (the affairs) to 
Allah” (Shirazi, 2008: 90), whereas religion is concerned with organising the way of 
life according to God’s teachings. That is, it involves organising the relation between 
the believer and other co-religious people, such as the relation between Muslims 
and their community as the latter “do not stand alone but are part of the Ummah—
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the Muslim community” (Harrsion, 2006: 6). Melville and McDonald pointed out 
that the reference to “the ‘faith based’ for organisations that provide services for 
the local community...is essentially the language for American welfare reform” 
(2006: 70). In a similar vein, Jawad (2009), using the experience of the religious 
welfare organisations in Lebanon, rejected the term FBOs as unsuitable for the 
Islamic context. She argued that the term faith based to describe religious NGOs is 
narrow and does not elucidate the role of Islam, as faith and religion (Jawad, 
2009:65). That is, faith is only one facet of religion, in particular, in societies such as 
Islamic ones, where religion is concerned with the social order. 
 
A second shortcoming in Sider and Unruh’s framework is that it has ignored the 
political dimension of religious NGOs, which is an important feature of Islamic 
organisations. Islam, for the Muslim NGOs, is a system for living and is inseparable 
from all aspects of life, be it personal, social, or even political, because it, as 
repeatedly affirmed in the literature, is a political religion (Rizvi, 2010). Thus, it is 
necessary to understand the different roles and characteristics of Islamic or Muslim 
NGOs and to focus on the literature that addresses this group of organisations.  
 
2.4 Islamic NGOs: Islam, charity and politics  
 
The scholarship that has probed the role of Islamic or Muslim NGOs comes from 
four threads in the literature: international development, social policy (Jawad, 
2009) political sciences; and anti terrorism. While a very limited amount of 
literature focuses on the first, more attention has been paid to the political role of 
Islamic or Muslim NGOs. Even Alterman and Hipple’s work “Understanding Charity 
Organisations” (2007) has focused on Islamic NGOs and their links to political 
groups (Petersen, 2012). This slant might stem from the interest of academia in the 
politicisation of NGOs following the events of 9/11 regarding understanding the 
nature of the link between charity organisations and political groups, in particular, 
whether the NGOs are politically moderate or radical (Petersen, 2012).  
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Amy Singer’s (2008) book about Islamic charity organisations addressed mainly past 
experience rather than the current Islamic charity organisations. Jawad (2009) also 
probed religious welfare organisations, showing the importance of social welfare 
provision in Lebanon as the state role is weak, because it is divided along sectarian 
lines. Ozkan (2012) highlighted the crucial role of the Muslim NGOs in poverty 
reduction in particular within immigrant communities through providing aid, 
investment and setting up projects (2012: 467). Islamic NGOs’ social welfare 
provision is strong in places where the state’s role is weak, thus being seen as filling 
the gap that the latter is unable to breach (Jawad, 2009).  
 
Most of the literature that has studied Islamic or Muslim NGOs has analysed them 
as the charity arm of Islamic political movements linked to Islamic Sunni 
organisations in particular those of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz, 2004; 
Zubaida, 2005; Robinson, 2004). These NGOs have been described in the literature 
as transmitting belts of the Islamic political movement responsible for linking the 
political groups to their constituency, (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Robinson, 2004). This 
literature attributes the emergence of these NGOs with the resurgence of political 
Islam as a political movement that advocates the return to an Islamic state and thus 
it is central to the current research to review the literature relating to this 
phenomenon, a matter addressed next.  
 
2.4.1 Political Islam 
 
A number of authors have defined political Islam as a religious-political 
phenomenon which aims to bring societies to the path of Islam with the ultimate 
aim of integrating religion in individual and community lives as this is perceived as 
being the answer to political and societal challenges (Fuller, 2003: xi).). That is, Islam 
is presented by Islamic organisations as a ‘solution’ that can provide an alternative. 
The political motivation for the emergence of the Islamic Sunni movement in 
countries such as Egypt demonstrates the failure of the Arab nationalist movement 
and secular states in responding to both economic and political challenges. The 
political oppression of Islamic parties, despite the relative political openness to take 
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part in elections, has led these political movements providing social work at the 
grassroots level in order to increase their standing in society (Mclarney, 2010:131). 
The social work includes social welfare, education provision, emergency 
intervention, health projects and other social services. The literature indicates that 
these endeavours are carried out through NGOs for furthering Islamic objectives, 
whether in the Sunni context, such as in Egypt, or Shi’a, such as in Iran (Messkoub, 
2006; Wiktorowicz, 2004: Esposito, 1998; Saeidi, 2004).  
 
The revival of political Islam in modern times became highly visible in the Middle 
East during the 1960s and 1970s, attracting the attention of academia following the 
revolution in Iran in 1979 and the formation of an Islamic state in the country 
(Badran, 2013: 115). The literature shows that the emergence of political Islam 
began even earlier in those Arab countries (Ayubi, 1991) that were secular and 
adopted a pan-Arab nationalist identity, whether liberal or socialist in nature (for 
example, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq and the Yemen), in the 1950s and1960s 
(Esposito, 1997). This emergence has been identified in some of the literature as a 
response from certain political groups that upheld Islam as their political ideology as 
a way to resolve the “gap between the rich and poor, to halt widespread 
corruption, to liberate Palestine, and to resist western political and cultural 
hegemony” (Esposito, 1998, 216). 
 
The second factor refers to a new political environment that began in the 1980s 
which opened up an opportunity for political parties, including Islamic ones, to 
contest elections held in the 1980s and 1990s, but which led to their political 
activities being oppressed. Kandil explained that political oppression of the Islamic 
movement in Arabic countries, such as Egypt, forced some political groups to seek 
alternatives so as to reach out to their community, for example, by carrying out 
apolitical activities such as entering the arena of social welfare provision (Kandil, 
1997: 362; Mclarney, 2010: 131). Political Islam as a scheme carried by political 
groups is based on the notion that both public and political life should be informed 
guided by Islamic teaching with followers of this using for their political motto the 
claim that “Islam is the solution” (Ayubi, 1991). Further, they advocate that their 
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striving for an Islamic state will be led by the orders set by the Prophet, with Islam 
as their ideology and the Quran serving as their constitution (Karam, 2004: 4). In 
addition, this movement has announced that it wants to implement Shari’a as 
opposed to secular law, as they consider the former “as the comprehensive 
blueprint for society” (Esposito, 1998, 216). The Islamists assert that Islam can 
provide a political alternative and a comprehensive ideology or framework for 
Muslim society and not only beliefs and rituals (Esposito, 1998, 217). In this sense, 
this movement, which is in opposition to the state (Ayubi, 1991), aims to establish 
universal religious rule at both the state and society levels, a process that is 
explained in detail in the following subsection.  
 
2.4.2 Islamisation  
 
Islamisation means bringing about changes in a society that result in a closer 
relationship with the teachings of Islam. Idris defines the Islamisation project as a 
means to make society: 
 
 “wholeheartedly committed to the teachings of Islam in their totality and 
striving to abide by those teachings in its government, political, economic 
and social organizations, its relation with other states, its educational system 
and moral values and all other aspects of its way of life” (Idris,1976 cited in 
Ousman; 2012: 7).  
 
Islamisation entails deepening Muslims’ knowledge and understanding of Islamic 
principles and improving their religious practices (Kaag, 2008); converting non-
Muslims to Islam; increasing the visibility of Islam in public space (LUCIs Conference, 
2012); and  reasserting Islamic characteristics for individuals and society, in private 
and in public (Maskielly, 1984: 15). Strategically, Islamisation involves teaching and 
instructing Muslims throughout society on how to think, act and conduct their daily 
life in line with Islam. The aim is to replace secular values with Islamic ones; as 
those promoting Islamisation perceive the former as unacceptable morally, whether 
conducted by individuals, the state or society. (Berger, 2010:27). The absence of 
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Islamic values is blamed on society (LUCIs Conference, 2012) and/or on the political 
system.  
 
Islamisation is a “complex process” (Kaag, 2008: 11) and it is impossible to be 
carried out by one group, for it has to be facilitated through a wide network of 
social and political actors, such as religious authorities, political parties, civil society 
organisations, and pious Muslims. The experience of the Islamisation processes in 
different parts of the world, such as Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt, shows that this 
process can be initiated by formal and informal institutions as well as state and non-
state organisations. Islamists use a variety of tactics to achieve their goals for 
example instead of declaring their adoption of Shari’a law they announced that all 
laws and rules should be compatible with Islam, which “ultimately amounts to the 
same”, i.e. the adoption of the Shari’a law (Berger, 2010: 27) without an outright 
statement. The Islamic groups introduce their message as calling the people to the 
right bath. It can be top down or vertical Islamisation where the intention is to 
integrate Islam into government institutions (Abbott and Pippas, 2010) or installed 
from below, a strategy conducted by Islamic NGOs such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, Horizontally, Islamisation is exercised through converting non Muslims in 
which has been commonly employed by a number of transnational Muslim 
organisations (Petersen, 2012). The process of Islamisation is realised through 
education, charity provision, political actions, ritual activities, and in “its 
conventional hiding places” (Petersen, 2012: 34), whereby the religious discourse 
migrates “into spaces not formally constituted as ‘religious’ – such as NGOs and aid 
provision” (Mandaville, 2007a: 327 cited in Petersen, 2012: 34).  
 
2.5 Islamic Sunni NGOs in the Middle East  
 
A number of authors have defined Islamic NGOs as non-governmental organisations 
that drive their mission from a religious tradition or faith. Their members share the 
same religious ideology, relying for their funding on religious resources and their 
programmes and operations are inspired and driven by religious tenets. They 
usually mobilise members from their own religious community (Petersen, 2012: 
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130; De Cordier, 2009: 609; Clarke and Jennings, 2008: 6; Ragan, et al., 2003: 32). 
From this, the shared threads are that these organisations drive their mission from 
religious traditions. Moreover, they are initiated by Muslims, they operate on a 
voluntary basis and their aims and objectives are to serve the public good in line 
with their core principles.  
 
From their studies of Islamic NGOs, Benthall and Billion – Jourden,  (2003), 
Benedetti (2006), Petersen (2012), Berger (2003) noted that Islamic NGOs are not 
homogeneous. Clarke and Jennings (2008) classified religious NGOs into four groups 
reflecting the most important focus of each, i.e. whether they: are motivated by 
charitable purposes for those in need; operate have political objectives; have 
missionary goals of spreading the message beyond the faithful; or are terrorist 
organisations engaged in illegal acts. Benedetti (2006) divided Islamic NGOs 
according to whether they were militant or moderate and the criteria used to 
distinguish these two groups were: their mission, service users, financial resources, 
employment of staff; and their references to the Ummah (Muslim nation). The first 
group, the militant ones are strictly Islamic, employ only Muslims and use only 
Islamic banking, whilst the second group, those termed moderate, are less 
ideological in their operations, employ skilled workers and serve the wider 
community, regardless of religion. An example of a moderate organisation is Islamic 
Relief, which is based in the UK (Petersen, 2012), whereas NGOs that are linked to 
al-Qaeda, for example, are considered radical.  
 
Esposito confirms that Islamic NGOs aim to change society socially through gradual 
transformation or Islamisation (Esposito, 1998: 218). This changing comes “through 
long term education, social action, constituency building, and advocacy, whereby 
increasing numbers of people become ‘followers’ and eventually espouse the 
political ideology –cum-social action package” (Karam, 2004: 7). Idris (1997) 
asserted that Islamisation refers to bringing new change in the socio-political field, 
at both the private and public levels, influenced by the ethics and values of Islam. In 
this process Islamic NGOs play a key role. That is, the Islamic movement and its 
NGOs attempt to influence individuals, family, and the wider society from below in 
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order to reform the state (Esposito, 1998; Kaag, 2008). Regarding this, Harmsen 
provides a summary of the ethos of one of the most prominent Islamic social 
movements in the Arab world: the Muslim Brotherhood, explaining that this 
organisation aims to achieve the following: 
 
1) The creation of the new Muslim individual in terms of “thinking and faith, 
ethics and feelings, mind and spirit;” 2) the creation of the new Muslim 
family, to “provide care and service to men, women, youth and children on 
equal footing;” 3) the creation of the new Muslim nation carried on the 
shoulders of the new Muslim family; 4) the establishment of the Islamic 
government leading “the people to the mosque, and educating them on the 
ways of Islam;” 5) the unification of the Islamic world politically and an end 
to the current artificial disunity; 6) the liberation of Muslim lands currently 
occupied and colonized by kuffar (“nonbelievers”); and 7) to take the 
universal Islamic message to every corner of the earth (2008:130). 
 
To achieve these aims, Islamic NGOs have concentrated on individuals’ education as 
well as their social and economic needs so as to create a new Muslim who thinks 
and behaves in line with Islam. In the same vein, the family is also forms a focus of 
these NGOs, since they understand that the Ummah or Muslim society is a 
congregation of families. More specifically, the family is seen by Islamic NGOs as 
being the smallest fundamental cell of society “where the most important basic 
rules of a community are exercised and practised” (Mohagheghi, 2006: 71). Hence, 
the religiosity of society is determined by that of families. In Ra’uf’s words the 
“family is a political unit of Islamic Umma” (cited in McLarney, 2010: 129), and is 
one of the most important structures of Islamic politics” (ibid: 136), which is defined 
as “microcosm of the Umma” (ibid). From the Muslim Brotherhood’s point of view, 
an Islamised society comprising Muslim families will elect, if the political 
opportunity arises, an Islamic political system. To achieve these aims three 
important types of provision are on the agenda of Islamic NGOs.  
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The provision of social welfare is one of the significant strategies that enables these 
organisations to reach out to their community. The intention of these NGOs to 
pursue social welfare stems from two motivations: a) there is the desire to respond 
to their communities’ needs as their compassion emanates from their religious 
commitment towards the community, as emphasised by the “collective adherence 
to a God-given moral code and collective responsibility for the public welfare” 
(Wickham, 2004: 238) ; and b), through social welfare provision, the Islamic NGOs 
can present themselves as an alternative to state welfare provision or even as an 
alternative to other peer organisations (Robinson, 2004: 127). Running hospitals, 
schools, universities are common projects for the Islamic movements. With respect 
to this, provisions and facilities organised by Hamas for the Palestinian population 
represent invaluable social support (ibid), whilst those established by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt have been described as “a state within a state” (Esposito, 
2000:4).   
 
Davis and Robinson (2012) explained that if Islamic groups are able to provide for 
their community’s needs instead of the government, this may increase their 
legitimacy and credibility in the public eye. By providing social welfare, the religious 
movement is a) implying the failure of the state in addressing socioeconomic 
problems (Wiktorowicz, 2004:11); b) enhancing their legitimacy in the community 
(Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004); and, c) giving a concrete visible example of what 
Islam can provide, through the Islamic NGOs, in contrast to the state’s secular 
modernisation failure. Therefore, as a result, there is a possibility of winning the 
support from those they have helped and thus, it is not unusual or unexpected that 
these organisations may recruit followers from amongst the beneficiaries of their 
social services. 
 
The Islamic NGOs endeavour to influence the values and ethos of their service 
users. This is part of a wider strategy of Islamisation of the state, bottom up, 
through the Islamisation of individuals. This strategy is used by the moderate 
tendency, while the radical organisations tend to call for a top down Islamisation by 
resorting to coercion aimed at the overthrow of the state, such as that perpetrated 
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by Jihadists organisations (Esposito, 1998). Moreover, the Islamic social movement 
organisations strive to spread their religious values by showing the community a 
strict mandate regarding what is right and wrong and to inform social changes in 
personal behaviour (Davis and Robinson, 2012).  
  
The intended theological and political influence of the Islamic NGOs has been 
described as an attempt to assert the Islamic identity of the wider community, as 
well as at the individual level (Maskielly, 1984: 15). A broad literature addresses the 
intention of Islamic NGOs regarding shifting society quietly and consistently towards 
Islamic values (Maskielly, 1984; Kaag, 2008; Milton-Edwards, 2006; Ghanim, 2011; 
Abbott and Pippas, 2010: 138; Petersen, 2012; Hoodfar, 1999). This purpose stems 
from the criticisms made by these NGOs pertaining to the moral, societal, and 
political structures of many present day Muslim societies (Berger, 2010: 27).  
 
Finally, Islamic NGOs endeavour to influence their community’s political choice and 
they do so through promoting the outcomes from the two strategies explained 
above. That is, through their charity work with the poor and their insistence on a 
strict adherence to Islamic codes of practice, they shape the future citizens who will 
give their allegiance to Islamic political organisations (Wiktorowicz and Farouki, 
2000: 686).  
 
Zubaida (1997) claimed that the Islamic NGOs aim is to influence and control the 
masses through social provision. From this author’s point of view the religiously 
inspired networks of volunteers working for the Islamic NGOs form crucial links for 
transmitting religious and political ideas and practices to individual Muslims. 
Therefore, Muslim organisations, according to Zubaida (1997) do not give voice to 
the masses, for they direct their attention to influencing individual behaviours by 
tasking themselves with ethical pedagogy. Thus, he has described the nature of the 
relation between these organisations, for example the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 
and the masses, as authoritarian (ibid).  
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The political objective of these NGOs is to secure the service users’ votes in 
elections. Jawad commented on this role, stating that “the most controversial issue 
related to the initiative of the social welfare in the countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) is its vulnerability to politicisation” (Jawad, 2009: 92). The 
empirical data she provided from Lebanon show that there was a “straightforward 
situation where an aspiring politician or political body offered social services in 
exchange for political support” (Jawad, 2009:93). In this environment the service 
users are influenced by the service providers, in particular, and according to Jawad, 
when it is election season, the latter are directed to win the former’s votes. 
 
The literature referred to thus far in this chapter has focused mainly on Islamic 
Sunni NGOs which comprise the vast majority of Islamic ones in the Middle East. On 
a much smaller scale, those run by Shi’a are also active in the region, in particular, in 
Lebanon and Iran and are considered next.  
 
2.6 Islamic Shi’a NGOs in the Middle East 
 
Regarding Islamic Shi’a NGOs, as will become apparent, the most prominent have 
closely linked their activities with their political agenda and two of these groups are 
to be found in the Lebanon and Iran. In fact, the literature in relation to this type of 
NGO primarily focuses on their activities in these two countries.  
 
2.6.1 Hezbollah linked NGOs 
 
The formation of Islamic NGOs from the Shi’a side, in particular those linked to 
Hezbollah took place as a result of specific political events and such, accords with 
Benedetti’s explanation for their development. They became active in social welfare 
owing to the political events that occurred in the Middle Eastern region, in general 
and Lebanon, in particular. More specifically, there was a revival of the Islamic 
social movement and political Islam in the region as a result of the failure of the 
Arab Nationalist movement (Esposito, 1997), with the Islamic movement putting 
itself forward as alternative to the state in a number of countries. In particular, the 
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revolution in Iran inspired the whole region and Islamic NGOs were formed in order 
to advance the Islamic political movement so as to over throw the state 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004).  
 
In addition, the destruction that was caused by the war of Israel against the 
Lebanon in 1982 left the country in a dire situation. That is, the war left vast 
quantities of unmet needs that the Lebanese authorities were unable to address, 
which led political groups to seize the initiative and provide for their community 
with the aim of winning their political support (Fawaz, 1995: 14). The literature also 
documents that the formation of these NGOs, as in the case of other Islamic ones, 
did not come from voluntarily initiatives by individuals at the grassroots level, but 
rather were established by  the political group Hezbollah with support from sister 
NGOs in Iran (Fawaz, 1995).  
 
These NGOs shouldered the responsibility of responding to the poor’s needs by 
providing much needed health care, education and income generation through 
training in skills including sewing, hairdressing, cooking and bread making 
(Fawaz,1995) They also set up effective regular rubbish collection (Samii, 2008: 42). 
Moreover, they gave jobs to the lucky few as well as offered opportunities to work 
voluntarily for their organisation. The NGOs linked to Hezbollah have provided, for 
example, 20 percent of its community’s need for water (Fawaz, 1995). Their 
extensive involvement in the Shi’a community in southern Beirut has led them 
becoming the most important provider of social services to that community.  
However, these NGOs are not only concerned about providing for the poor, for they 
also aim to advance religious values in line with Islam, by shaping individual and the 
community behaviour. To demonstrate their intentions, they run their operations in 
line with Islamic principles. 
 
The Shi’a NGOs linked to Hezbollah are no different to Islamic Sunni NGOs, for as 
can be seen above they too are linked to a political party and “use social service 
networks to build political capital” (Jones, 2011: 3). In fact, the link between 
Hezbollah and its NGOs is not a secret, for the former uses the latter quite openly to 
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attract supporters to its political cause, in particular, resistance to Israel. The 
language of resistance is quite explicit when Hezbollah is providing social services to 
its community along with its Islamic political ideology.  As such, the politicisation of 
social welfare is plain to see in the operations of Hezbollah and its NGOs (Jones, 
2009:1). In sum, through both its social welfare provision and discourse of 
resistance, Hezbollah has been building a social base for its political movement and 
also engendering a positive reputation amongst its community (Fawaz, 1995). 
Moreover, the social and political activities have been delivered through the 
promotion of an ideology of Islamisation of Southern Beirut.  
 
2.6.2 Bonyads: Social welfare organisations in Iran 
 
In Iran, a new set of organisations appeared after the revolution of 1979 
(Messkoub, 2006; Saeidi, 2004), which manifest themselves quite differently to 
other Islamic NGOs in the Middle East, whether from the Sunni or Shi’a sect. These 
organisations are seen as being parallel to those of the state or para-state 
organisations (Saeidi, 2009). In general, as with the rest of the Middle East, NGOs 
mushroomed in Iran after major political upheaval, in this case revolution. In 
particular, following the collapse of the Shah’s regime and during formation of the 
post revolution state, a new type of organisations, namely the Bonyads, were 
established top down by the leading elite who were in charge of the state 
institutions (Saeidi, 2009).  
 
Messkoub (2006) explained that some of these organisations concerned with social 
welfare are either linked to the state1 or are semi-autonomous NGOs, while others 
were established by al-Khomeini. At the outset, the Bonyads were acting mainly as 
authoritative financial resources of the Shiite clergy (Vahabi, and Nasser, 2011: 21) 
                                                 
1
 Some of these organisations are considered as being state organisations, such as Behzisti which 
comes “fully under the government’s social policy framework” (Messkoub, 2006:346). It was 
established in 1980 and is active in social service provision, having supported around 300,000 urban 
families in 2000. This organisation is contracted by the state to provide for the public (ibid). 
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and initially their formation was down to the new political elite who had yet to 
control the state apparatus.  However, over the years these organisations have 
become huge players in the Iranian state (Saeidi, 2004), being responsible for the 
welfare needs of over 6 million people in both urban and rural areas (Messkoub, 
2006).These organisations are autonomous and independent from the state and are 
not accountable to the latter but to the religious authority as the state has no 
control over their activities. They became financially powerful in the 1980s and now 
are huge economic enterprises. The Bonyads that were instigated by the religious 
authority aimed “to tackle poverty and help the poor families… operates as an NGO 
and comes under the Supreme Leader (Emam)’s office” (Messkoub, 2006: 245). One 
of these Bonyads or foundations established based on an order issued by Khomeini 
is the ‘Emam Khomeini Assistance Committee’ (EKAC). This NGO is engaged in a 
wide range of social service provision, in particular in rural areas. EKAC offers 
financial and other support to poor families, such as: providing them with the 
means for income generation; helping the elderly; provide emergency relief for 
those affected by natural disasters at the national level (Messkoub, 2006). To 
conduct its work, this organisation provides also job and volunteering opportunities 
for thousands of people. Messkoub (2006) explained that in 1998, this NGO 
employed 15,000 workers, and had recruited 47,000 volunteers. Another example 
regarding the role of Bonyads in supporting the poor is ‘the Foundation for the 
Oppressed and Warriors of the Islamic Revolution’, which was established in 1979. 
This NGO is a non-for profit institution, active in manufacturing, agriculture and 
tourism. Moreover, it provides social assistance for disabled people affected by war 
with Iraq and distributed regular financial assistance to 120,000 people in 2000 
(Messkoub, 2006: 249). Those war veterans who benefited from this organisation’s 
social assistance were able to do so owing to government funds channelled through 
the NGO for distribution (Messkoub, 2006: 249). Its budget, for example in 1998, 
“was equal to half the government budget for health, treatment and nutrition” 
(Messkoub, 2006: 248), some being provided by the state and the rest coming from 
its own business activities as well as public donations.  
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Other Bonyads that are linked to religious establishment include ‘the Foundation of 
Martyr of the Islamic Revolution’, which is also engaged in supporting the needs of 
those effected by the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The other group of NGOs allowed 
to operate in Iran is the ‘Red Crescent Society’, which was established in 1923 and 
acts as a charity organisation in health service provision. This NGO was active before 
and after the revolution in providing these services, running “forty percent of 
hospitals” (Messkoub, 2006: 247) and its operations are overseen by the Ministry of 
Health (ibid). Their activities are also directed to those affected by natural disasters, 
and “public education programmes on humanitarian issues” (ibid). From this, it 
appears that Shi’a NGOs in Iran have an very important role in social welfare in Iran 
and run parallel to the state or in Saeidi’s words they act as ‘para state’ 
organisations (Saeidi, 2004).  
 
In general, the Bonyads have not only been social service providers, for they have 
also been major protagonists in the post revolution state building in Iran and have 
in the words of Saeidi: “contributed to the ideological and cultural needs of an 
Islamic state” (Saeidi, 2004: 480). Thus, in addition to the Bonyads representing one 
of the largest economic sectors they have also been engaged in other religious and 
political activities. These have included organising programmes for indoctrination of 
the youth in order to increase their adherence to Islamic ideology through opening 
new schools and universities, new research centres and books distribution. They 
have also assisted the social mobilisation of the supporters of Islamic forces by 
helping them to occupy higher professional posts in the state apparatus. To 
summarise, having been established by the leading clergy, the Bonyads have played 
a huge economic role in the society by providing social welfareindependently of the 
state, which has led to them being called para state organisations. As such, they 
represent a unique type of organisation amongst NGOs in the global context.  
 
From the above literature review whether concerned with Islamic NGOs from the 
Sunni or the Shi’a side, all appear to have three interconnected roles that involve 
social welfare, religion and politics, but the nature of these roles varies according 
the specific political contexts where these NGOs work.  
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2.7 The thesis theoretical framework  
 
Following the discussion of the Islamic NGOs in the Middle East, whether Sunni or 
Shi’a, it is evident that there is a gap about the Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq. Similar to 
the rest of the region, Iraq is witnessing the emergence of these organisations from 
the Shi’a sect. Despite the existence of these NGOs, however, there is no mention 
of this group and hence, there is no knowledge regarding how these NGOs behave 
in the social, religious, or political arenas. Consequently it is not known whether 
they act like Islamic NGOs elsewhere, such as the Sunni NGOs across the Middle 
East, or those run by the Shi’a in Lebanon or Iran. It could be the case that they 
function in an entirely different way from all of these. The aim of this research is to 
address this gap in the literature and to guide the process following research 
questions are put forward:    
 1. Why have Shi’a NGOs risen to prominence in social and political life in Iraq after 
the regime change of in 2003?   
2. What are the main social services, religious, or political activities that they are 
engaged in? 
3. What is the significance of these services and activities for the reformation of the 
state and society in Iraq?  
 
Davis and Robinson (2012), writing in the context of religious organisations, 
identified three connected key objectives used in varying configurations, that is: 
serving the community’s social needs, providing religious guidance in terms of 
shaping ethical, moral, and social behaviour and politically influencing the laws of 
the state so as to bring them in line with their religion  During the field work these 
three aspects clearly came to the fore as well as their interconnections as being 
pertinent to the investigated Shi’a organisations. Having completed the data 
collection, I came across these authors’ perceptions regarding religious 
organisations and realised that these could form the basis for the thesis framework. 
Hence, the analytical framework adopted is consistent with Davis and Robinson’s 
(2012) observations, whereby Shi’a NGOs are studied as Islamic NGOs engaged in all 
three of the aforementioned activities. That is, their religion, social welfare 
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provision and political activities are analysed in turn so as to elicit their 
interconnections and hence, elucidate what these organisation actually are.  
 
The focal Shi’a were established to serve a religious agenda or at least have been 
inspired by it (Petersen 2012: 130) and their choice of programmes is permeated 
with faith (Sider and Unruh, 2004). This encompasses their choice of name for the 
programme, the content as well as how it is packaged and delivered to their 
community. The activities of Islamic NGOs are imbued with their religious values, 
which are expected to serve religious goals as there is perceived to be a 
“connection between religious content and the desired income” (Sider and Unruh, 
2004: 124). These NGOs target specific kinds of beneficiaries who are mainly from 
their own denomination and their funding is drawn from religious resources 
common to their community, such as Zakat and Sadaqqa (Harmsen, 2008).   
 
The Islamic NGOs have established their programmes in social welfare in line with 
their religious values aimed at serving religious objectives. Helping the poor is also 
essential in protecting religion and life (Kreoessin, 2008). If Muslim lives are secured 
and their basic needs are met, they can then practise their religious duties and 
conduct their religious tasks, such as worship, fasting and going to Hajj. If they 
cooperate and help each other, a good society will be established and ultimately 
happiness can be restored (Dusuki, 2009: 2). Supporting the poor is important for 
communal benefits, as it is believed that this will protect human life on earth 
(Dusuki, 2009: 4) and it is also believed to prevent corruption and social evil (Dusuki 
and Abdullah, 2007: 32). If the poor’s needs are addressed, society will be protected 
from any chaos or destruction that might be caused by poverty. In cases of social 
welfare distribution Muslim religious organisations the revenue collected must be 
distributed “in the community from which it was taken” (Murdock and Khan, 2011: 
6). Despite the beneficiaries of social welfare having been clearly defined in the 
Quran2, the literature review has shown that such provision can cover a wide range 
                                                 
2
 The Zakat is regulated to be distributed to eight groups: “al-fuqara or the poor; al-masakin or the 
needy; al-‘amalina ‘alayha or the people appointed to administer zakat; al-mu’allafati qulubuhum or 
those whose hearts incline to truth, usually interpreted as those recently or about to convert; the 
 51 
of recipients in many contexts, including:  education, orphanages, support for the 
poor youth in meeting their wedding ceremony expenses (Harmsen, 2008; 
Wiktorowicz, 2000), poor widows’ needs, food distribution at religious events, 
emergency interventions, development programmes such as training and capacity 
building, as well as opening health centres and religious libraries; all of which might 
be covered by religious monies. Prior literature studies have shown that the 
interventional role of Islamic organisations is an expression of their religious 
motivation regarding watching out and caring for community members’ needs 
(Davis and Robinson, 2012).  Under Shari’a law, essential needs, such as sufficient 
food and clothing, have to be met in order to protect life (Dusuki and Abdullah, 
2005) and to achieve this, Muslims are instructed to remove economic hardship 
from their co-religious brethren (Murdock and Khan, 2011:6). 
 
The main goals of Islamic NGOs are to make changes to individual thought, have an 
impact on their social behaviour, influence the family and instil wider society norms 
and practices, thus bringing the people closer to Islam (Esposito, 1998; Wiktorowicz, 
2004). That is, the literature has provided ample evidence that advancing Islamic 
values by Islamic NGOs, whether from the Sunni or the Shi’a sect, is a significant 
objective that these NGOs endeavour to bring to fruition. It has been demonstrated 
that the Islamisation strategy is important for those NGOs acting opposition to the 
state, as they aim to use it to influence the politics of state bottom up. To this end, 
they promote a religious way of life, such as encouraging wearing of Hijab, and 
financially supporting young people’s wedding ceremonies.   
 
The experiences of religious political movements in the three Abrahamic religions 
shows that the outcomes of social welfare by religious NGOs is not limited to 
helping the poor and enhancing religious values, for it is also political. The Islamic 
NGOs operate as political mobilisers for their own political visions and alternatives. 
As such, they link religion to the state and society, with their activism being inspired 
                                                                                                                                          
‘captives’, interpreted as war prisoners and once as the enslaved; the debtors; those in jihad or in 
the way of God; those who are defined as entitled to it, and ibn as-sabil or the ‘Sons of the road’, i.e. 
travellers in need (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003:10). 
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by Maqasid al-Shariah or the purposes of Shari’a, which reflects the holistic view of 
Islam as “a complete and integrated code of life and its goal encompasses the whole 
life, individual and society; in this world and the hereafter” (Dusuki and Abozaid, 
2007: 144).  
 
The Islamic movements in the Middle East have tasked themselves with bypassing 
state provision, as Davis and Robinson (2012) have pointed out, so as to give people 
a sense of what an Islamic state would look like if they were to seize power (ibid). In 
so doing, they expose “the inability of the state to effectively address socio-
economic problems…they also offer a concrete visible example of what Islam can 
provide, in contradistinction to the state’s secular modernisation failure” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004: 11). The provision for poor families by Islamic organisations, at 
the same time, enables the providers to enhance their legitimacy in the community 
(Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004); as a result, there is a possibility of winning the 
support from those they have had already helped. Thus, it is not unusual or 
unexpected to recruit followers from beneficiaries of their social services. To 
achieve their political aims, these organisations engage in long term social welfare, 
whereby they build “a massive, grassroots networks of autonomous, religion-based 
social service agencies, hospitals, and clinics, clubs, schools, charitable 
organisations, sidestepping the state, rather than directly confronting it” (Davis, and 
Robinson, 2012:1). In sum, in line with the perspectives of Davis and Robinson and 
other literature reviewed in this chapter, I will analyses Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq to 
shed light on the ways in which they function as well as their similarities with and 
differences to other NGOs in other contexts. In particular, the three focal NGOs in 
Iraq, one of which comes from a different religious trend to the others, are 
investigated to gain understanding of their social, religious and political activities 
and how these impact on the state and society.     
 
2.8 Religious NGOs and clientelism 
 
The literature reveals that clientelism often plays a role in shaping NGO activities 
and formulating relationships between them and their service users. Social welfare 
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provided by NGOs may be utilised to build political support in countries where the 
state is weak or fails to provide for its citizens (Cammett and Issar, 2010). That is, 
under such clientelistic relationships there is a trade off of votes or other kinds of 
partisan support in exchange for social benefits (Piattoni, 2001; 4). The two parties 
involved consist of the patron, who is of a higher socioeconomic status and the 
recipient who is often poorly placed in society (Clark, 2004: 946). This informal 
arrangement is mutual, but grounded upon an unequal exchange of favours (Weitz-
Shapiro, 2009) between the providers, who may be politicians or organisations and 
the clients who are the poor and underprivileged, seeking to secure basic economic 
needs (Weitz-Shapiro, 2009). The relationship becomes particularly important 
during election times when power brokers aim to garner maximum support from 
the electorate by distributing favours (Hopkin, 2006: 2, Piattoni, 2001: 4, Weitz-
Shapiro, 2009; Sacouman, 2012). The social incentives received from the patrons 
cover such things as providing cash, work, or even delivering food (Cammet and 
Issar, 2010: 389).  
 
Clientelistic relationships are forged by both religious and non-religious 
organisations (Cavarozzi and Palermo; 1995; Baccaro, 2001). In developing 
countries, such as Bangladesh, it has been found that they are not “exempt from 
the problems of clientelism” of NGOs (Baccaro, 2001: 15), but rather, this is a 
dominant feature that characterises the whole national culture. That is, NGOs in 
this country have been found to be actively promoting relationships with their 
service users or clients consistent with clientelism (Baccaro, 2001: 15). In Argentina, 
Cavarozzi and Palermo (1995) identified clientelistic behaviour being exercised by 
secular NGOs who were using their service provision to strengthen the power of 
certain political factions (Baccaro, 2001: 15). Trejo (2009) provided evidence that 
religious competition between Christian groups, such as the U.S Protestant Church 
and traditional Roman Catholics in Latin American countries, such as Mexico, has 
resulted in these groups maintaining a strong hold over the targeted indigenous 
communities. The Protestants have provided health services, education for the poor 
and underprivileged as well as translating the Bible into local languages, motivated 
by their goal to evangelise the most underprivileged and marginalised. 
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Consequently, both sides of the Christian church have competitively maximised 
their efforts to provide such services in order to protect their privileged status 
(Trejo, 2009: 324).   
 
Cammett and Issar (2010) have provided evidence that in countries where there is a 
powerful sectarian division, the religious organisations strive to cross their sectarian 
boundaries to secure votes during election times. The experience of Islamic Shi’a 
NGOs linked to political parties, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, shows that while 
they endeavour to support their own sect, they also strive to reach out to other 
sects’ constituencies (ibid). Moreover, the Islamic Sunni political groups such as the 
Future Movement in Lebanon and its linked NGOs follow the same strategy 
attempting to reach out to Shi’a voters. In sum, there is wide range of evidence 
from different parts of the developing world showing that social welfare is provided 
by religious and non-religious NGOs in a clientelist manner aimed at gaining political 




This chapter has reviewed the pertinent literature related to NGOs in terms of their 
resurgence at the global level since the 1980s. It has shown how this resurgence 
came about in the developed world to serve the economic and political agenda of 
neoliberal policies. Economically, the agenda is to expand the role of the NGOs in 
social welfare so as to be able to reduce state provision. In the developing world, 
while the economic shift towards neoliberal policies was begun in the same era, it 
had another objective – that of empowering the role of civil society as a 
counterweight to the political power of the state. 
 
Amongst these NGOs are those that are religiously motivated. In the West, FBOs 
providing for the poor instead of the state have been welcomed. However, 
according to the literature, they have used this provision to influence people’s social 
and political choice. In fact, this kind of influence is common within religious NGOs 
across the world, whether Catholic, Protestant, Muslim or Jewish (Davis and 
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Robinson, 2012). Issues relating to the family, abortion, and same sex marriage, 
attracted a lot of attention for  Christian organisations that stress the importance of 
family values throughout society. In addition, some of these organisations have 
played a role in supporting right wing administrations against communism (Clarke, 
2008).  
 
In the Middle East, with the resurgence of political Islam during the 1970s and 
1980s, new groups of Islamic NGOs appeared. Despite the political openness that 
evolved throughout much of the Middle East during this period, many states did not 
tolerate the political activism of Islamic groups. This led the latter to identify new 
channels to reach their constituency by forming NGOs. The literature reveals that 
clientelism was a crucial factor in determining the types of activities and social 
services provided by these NGOs, who were motivated by a multipronged agenda 
aimed at shaping the private and the public spheres in line with religion. The 
experience of the Islamic NGOs shows that their social, religious and political 
activities have been aimed at Islamising the state, bottom up, which they have 



























This chapter narrates the journey taken for conducting this research and explains 
the ontological, epistemological, and the methodology adopted. In so doing the 
approach utilized to address the research questions and decisions made regarding 
this are justified. This chapter is divided as follows. In section 3.2 the ontological 
approach of this thesis is explained and in section 3.3 the epistemological stance is 
considered. Subsequently, in section 3.4 the methodology is presented and in 3.5, 
access to the field is explained. After explaining the data collection techniques in 
section 3.6, in section 3.7 the data analysis procedure is presented. The 
trustworthiness of the study outcomes is addressed in section 3.8 and in section 
3.9, the ethical considerations are elucidated, and finally, the chapter conclusion is 
presented.  
 
3.2 Ontological approach  
 
To conduct research, the investigators are guided by their philosophical 
assumptions about how they understand the world ontologically and 
epistemologically. Ontology refers to the nature of being and the nature of reality 
(Tuli, 2010:99) and concerns the ways we think about the world with respect to 
whether there is one “‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge 
of it” ( Marsh et al. 2002), or whether it is multiple in form. Moreover, it focuses on 
the nature of reality determining “whether the reality is objective in itself or a 
product of an individual’s mind” (Muhos, 2011: 26). Based on the researcher’s 
assumptions as to whether reality is singular or multiple, and exists independently 
or is constructed, two distinctive ontological approaches can be identified: 
positivism and interpretivism. 
 
The advocates of positivism regard reality as a “single, objective, and independent 
of what an individual perceives” (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988: 509) and propose that 
the social sciences are investigated in a similar way as natural sciences. This 
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emphasises the underpinning notion that “there are universal laws that govern 
social events, and uncovering these laws enables researchers to describe, predict, 
and control social phenomena” (Tuli, 2010: 103). In contrast, the interpretivist or  
constructivist approach is grounded in the view that the real world is multiple, 
socially constructed, complex and ever changing (Rowlands, 2005; Tuli, 2010). 
Under this approach it is contended that individuals “both the researcher and the 
participant construct their own reality and knowledge” (Tuli, 2010: 105). Further, 
different individuals and groups of individuals hold different perspectives and 
“reality is constructed by its participants” (Tuli, 2010: 99). 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the roles of the Shi’a NGOs in the post war 
era.  The ontological stance for this study is interpretivist for the understanding of 
these roles is constructed by both the participants and the researcher regarding 
their experience of this phenomenon.  
 
3.3 Epistemological approach   
 
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge (Tuli, 2010:99) and focuses 
on the question of “how researchers understand the world and communicate this 
as knowledge to fellow human beings” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:1). Moreover, it 
addresses the questions of “what is the relationship between the knower and what 
is known? How do we know what we know?” (Tuli, 2010:99). In line with the 
ontological perspectives which can be considered as either falling into positivism or 
constructivism regarding the nature of reality, epistemological approaches are 
similarly divided.  
 
Given that their ontological approach is that the world is independent from 
individuals, and is out there waiting to be captured, under the positivist 
epistemological lens it is contended that reality can be understood through an 
“organized method for combining deductive logic with precise empirical 
observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm a set of 
probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human 
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activity” (Tuli, 2010:99). Accordingly, there is no attention paid to individual 
perceptions or interpretations, as fact they are seen as independent entities (ibid).  
With respect to the epistemological perspective adopted by the supporters of the 
interpretivism approach, it is contended that “meaning is constructed by individuals 
in their interaction with their world and is not a fixed, single, agreed upon or 
measurable phenomena” (Merriam, 2002:3). Therefore, meaning from interpretivist 
epistemological point of view “is embedded in the participants’ experiences and 
that this meaning is mediated through the researcher’s own perceptions” (Tuli: 
2010:102). Thus, from this point of view, the world is seen as constructed and 
interpreted by individuals through their interconnection with each other and with 
their outside world (ibid).  
 
Given the ontological approach of my research is constructionist, I accept  that the 
real world is multiple, socially constructed, complex and ever changing (Rowlands, 
2005; Tuli, 2010), the epistemological approach adopted for this study is 
interpretivist as it is contended that knowledge will be generated from both the 
participants and the researcher. This stance informs the methodology used to 
approach the study subject, as both the ontological and the epistemological 
approach determine the methodology that is used to obtain relevant study data 
(Tuli, 2010: 99).  In sum, the research philosophy is interpretive for it is contended 
that knowledge lies in people’s experiences and understandings. Moreover, it is 
constructed by them in the field and is shaped by culture and history. Regarding this 
research endeavour, the researcher has two tasks, first to make the voice of the 
researched heard, and second to interpret this voice. This is achieved through 
carrying out a rigorous process of scientific inquiry and for this, so as to bring the 
knowledge to the surface, interviewing people in their natural setting is deemed to 
be the most appropriate methodological procedure.  
 
3.4 The research methodology 
 
Methodology refers to a set of procedures and practices that guides the process of 
the research and covers the entire process of conducting research (Marczyk et al., 
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2005: 24). The methodology incorporates the ontological and epistemological 
approaches of the researcher into a comprehensive strategy for conducting enquiry 
(Tuli, 2010: 102). As the ontological stance is constructivist and the epistemological 
approach is interpretive, the methodology of this study is inductive and 
interpretive. Based on this, to gain knowledge, the researcher’s task is to bring data 
from the field by personal contact with the study participants in the field over a 
period of time. This contact and dialogue with participants can provide “deeper 
insight into the context under study, adding richness and depth to the data” (Tuli, 
2010: 100), which, in turn, enable the researcher to “move towards discovering 
binding principles” (Gray, 2014: 17). This qualitative approach, while introducing 
new knowledge (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) does not claim to design or generate new 
theory.  
 
This research endeavour, although inductive in nature, does not ignore extant 
knowledge regarding the experience of this group of organisations stated earlier in 
chapter 2, the Shi’a NGOs.  Therefore, to some limited extent, this researcher draws 
on a deductive approach. In fact, the initial choice of this particular group of 
organisations was influenced by the existence of some prior analysis of this type of 
NGO which served to provide “judgements” (Gray, 2014: 18) about their important 
roles. Moreover,  I set up the theoretical framework of the study at the outset, that 
is, has had already made the “researcher’s first cut at making some explicit 
theoretical statements” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 91) before undertaking any 
further work. Generally, it is assumed that a deductive method is used to test “an 
hypothesis after which the principle is confirmed, refuted or modified” (Gray, 2014: 
17). However, although in this thesis there is no hypothesis, some of the generated 
knowledge may confirm or falsify concepts when reviewed against the reported 
experiences of other organisations. 
 
The method of data collection for this research is to conduct informant interviews in 
the participants’ natural setting (Gray, 2014: 17) in order to have first-hand 
information regarding how they perceive the phenomena under discussion. For this, 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews are deployed as the main method for 
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collecting data. This is an appropriate technique as it ‘reinforces the purpose of 
gaining a detailed insight into the research issue from the perspective of the study 
participants themselves,’ (Hennink et al., 2011:109). This method was used because 
the information lies in people’s experiences as well as in the experiences from those 
in different positions within the community group (Rosenberg, 2008), which made 
this method, i.e. the interviews, appropriate for gaining insiders’ perspectives of the 
subject in question (Hennink et al., 2011; Litchman, 2014) and face-to face 
interviews were deemed the appropriate for capturing each informant’s perspective 
(Kumar, 2011). In general, interviews permit understanding, experience and 
interaction (Mason, 2002: 63).  
 
3.5 Access and the researcher’s position: insider and outsider  
 
The sampling of the population of this research was purposive and theoretical. The 
main criteria for sampling the Shi’a NGOs were that they were non-governmental 
organisations and Shi’a. In addition, they needed to be known for their activism 
and/or social work. The interviews with the Shi’a NGOs’ representatives were 
supplemented with others from their counterpart secular organisations; Sunni 
organisations; and governmental institutions including the directorate of the NGOs 
as well as international organisations. My motivation for interviewing state and 
non-state organisations was not to check whether or not the information I was 
given by the Shi’a NGOs was correct but rather to understand the non-Shi’a groups’ 
views about the Shi’a NGOs’ activities, and how their activities are contextualised 
against the backdrop of wider socio-political change in Iraq.  
 
The focal NGOs were chosen from the two religious trends of Shi’a Quietist and 
Activist, in order to ensure better coverage of the different views of the Shi’a NGOs 
roles. This research is not aimed at being a comparative study between the two 
trends but intends to bring the experiences of two sets of Shi’a NGOs to the surface 




The Martyr of al-Mehrab Foundation for Islamic Preaching  
 
The Martyr of al-Mehrab Foundation for Islamic Preaching hereafter (al-Mehrab) is 
a formal organisation that was established by the Shi’a Activist Marja Mohammad 
Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of (SCIRI)3 in Iran in 2002, with the aim to provide social 
welfare for Iraqi refugees in Iran, mobilising the students of al-Hawza (the school for 
Shi’a studies) to work for the organisation. After 2003, the organisation moved to 
Iraq and is registered in the General Directorate of NGOs. Following the 
assassination of the founder in September 2003 in a terrorist attack, the leadership 
was transferred to his brother Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, and after his death, it was 
reallocated to his son Ammar al-Hakim4, who remains a director of al-Mehrab up 
until the current date (September 2014).   
 
Al-Mehrab’s main office is based in Najaf. Najaf is the most significant city for the 
Shi’a across the world as the Shi’a visit the shrine of Imam Ali based in this city. al-
Mehrab has 17 central offices in total, distributed all over Iraq, three of them in 
Baghdad with the other 14 spread mostly around the middle and southern parts of 
the country. The offices are linked to 30 branches that are located in counties and 
80 Etemadia (trustees) in remote villages. Etemadia refers to an informal setting of 
a group of people, who run the organisation’s work from their own houses. al-
Mehrab has eight departments, some of them are specialist and others are 
supportive. The specialist departments cover Student affairs; Quranic affairs; 
Charity affairs; and Women and Children’s affairs. The supportive departments are 
public relations; media and communication, financial; and management and 
administration. The Student Affairs Department is linked to a network of 
Mobalgheen (preachers) and teachers. Each of these departments has a 
counterpart section for women. This organisation relies financially on different 
resources from the state; pious Shi’a donations, such as Khums, coming from within 
Iraq and also from supportive Shi’a in the Gulf countries.  
 
                                                 
3 The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI ) has changed its name in 2007 to Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq(ISCI).  
4
 The leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). 
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The Civil Dialogue Forum (CDF) 
The Civil Dialogue Forum (CDF) is an umbrella organisation which comprised 26 
organisations at the time of its establishment in July 2005 in Baghdad city. The 
establishment of this organisation could be seen as a process that built up through 
three subsequent stages. The first and elementary stage might be described as 
having taken place before 2003 when an informal social network that emulated al-
Sistani was already engaged in social welfare and religious provision. This formed a 
nucleus of the establishment of a number of Shi’a NGO post-2003. The second stage 
was the reformation of these social networks as civil society organisations on the 
eve of the elections 2004-2005, and the third stage occurred when 26 of the Shi’a 
NGOs congregated from nine cities in Iraq (excluding Kurdistan) in a conference that 
was held in Baghdad in the summer of 2005 and agreed to establish an umbrella 
organisation termed the Civil Dialogue Forum (CDF)5.  
 
The founders of the CDF were mainly the emulators or Moqaldin of al-Sistani. The 
CDF office is based in al-Kadhimia city. The site of the city is famous for its Islamic 
religious centre, including the shrine of two Imams; Imam Moussa Al-Kadhim (the 
seventh Imam) and Imam Mohamed Al-Jawad, the ninth Imam (Alwan, 2006). The 
CDF’s work focuses on enhancing the capacity of NGOs as a fifth establishment; this 
means, according to the interviewees, to contribute to building a state that is 
governed by the rule of law and the surveillance of the performance of state 
institutions. In this sense, the CDF understand their role as to train the statesmen 
and women to better perform their duties as governors on issues such as fighting 
corruption. The CDF also trains NGO workers to carry out this role; providing 
training on issues related to law or any other pressing issues by inviting members of 
Parliament and other professionals and officials to talk to the CDF audiences. The 
CDF is linked to al-Sistani and supervised by his office through his Wakil, who is in 
continuous contact with this NGO, as explained by their interviewees. This 
relationship according to its members is known for the public. The organisation has 
                                                 
5 In my interviews with the CDF in March and April 2013, the interviewees confirmed that the 
current number of their forum is 12 organisations from at least six cities from the southern part of 
Iraq. 
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been able to generate financial resources from al-Marja’iyya, government funding, 
international organisations, and pious Shi’a donations. The CDF is not involved in 
activities related to social provision like al-Mehrab, however, their members are 
carrying out this role, such as al-Thabat Women’s Organisation and other NGOs that 
are active in six cities in the southern and central parts of Iraq, as the interviewees 
explained.   
 
al-Thabat Women’s Organisation 
I was introduced to one of the CDF members, who acted as a gatekeeper for the 
organisation, al-Thabat Women’s Organisation (hereafter al-Thabat). al-Thabat is 
one of the founding members of the CDF. It is a grassroots women’s organisation 
that was established in 2003 by pious, middle class, educated Muslim Shi’a women 
with a missionary aim to spread the word of Islam through religious education, and 
through running Shi’a rituals sessions. The original name of the organisation was 
Monathamat Montatherat Al-Mahdi (Awaiting for al-Mahdi women’s 
organisation)6. The name of this NGO raised suspicions amongst the US troops who 
were patrolling the streets of Baghdad in 2005, and subsequently, the organisation 
was subjected to an investigation. Following this, it changed its name to al-Thabat 
Women’s Organisation. al-Thabat refers, as explained by the interviewees, to their 
enduring commitment to the twelfth Imam, al-Mahdi, who went into hiding in 961 
AD. The organisation’s office is based in a middle class area, on the top floor of a 
Mosque, in a big hall called Hussainaia7. al-Thabat, similar to  the CDF, emulate al-
Sistani as a Marja, and are not linked to any political groups, for, in line with their 
Quietist orientation, they are willing to keep away from politics. The organisation, 
according to the interviewees, was aware that the disconnection from political 
parties deprive it from financial resources that their counterpart Shi’a Activist 
organisations, such as al-Mehrab, enjoy. For this reason, the organisation relies 
heavily on pious donations such as Khums, and Sadaqqa. al-Thabat do not have any 
                                                 
6
 The Shi’a believe that the hidden Imam will return and save not only Shi’a but the whole world 
from the atrocities and injustice (Halm, 2007). 
7
 Hussainaia is a hall where Shi’a religious activities are held.  
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paid workers as it operates depending on volunteers’ work, some of whom are 
teachers, retired educators, and university students. 
 
Turning to discuss the issue of access to the field, this was secured through social 
connections and friend-of-friend relations. Given that I am originally from Iraq, this 
positioned me in a place where I am not entirely an insider or an outsider. On the 
one hand, as an insider, I share “the language, and experiential base with the study 
participants,” (Dywer and Buckle, 2009: 58) which equipped me with a good 
understanding of the culture traditions, customs, and the meaning embedded in 
being a Shi’a.  Although I may have been perceived as an insider, the participants 
were not necessarily “more open” as claimed by Dywer and Buckle (2009: 58) for 
some suspicions remain unresolved for participants in terms of understanding the 
aim of this research (discussed below).  On the other hand, as I had lived abroad 
and this thesis is conducted in a British academic context, I was able to keep some 
distance as an outsider from the focal organisations (Kerstetter, 2012: 100). The 
position of an outsider is “valued for their objectivity and emotional distance from a 
situation” (Kerstetter, 2012:101). My position was however, differently perceived 
by participants, and according to each situation. Therefore as a researcher, I could 
not be described as a complete insider or outsider, and perhaps could best be 
described as in-outsider, moving beyond “the strict insider/outsider dichotomy …to 
the space between” (Kerstetter, 2012: 101).  
 
However despite my nationality and ethnic origin, I had, sometimes, to undergo an 
‘official examination’ (Flick, 2009:108). This stems from some concerns of a political 
and security nature that were raised by the Shi’a NGOs. As a researcher, 
information in regard to my professional and political background was touched 
upon as well as queries regarding my social relations and whom I knew in the UK. 
This type of personal questions may have helped to establish trust with the 
researcher. In relation to the research itself, three connected concerns were raised; 
first; why these organisations were being categorised as religious NGOs and not as 
NGOs or civil society organisations; secondly; why I was singling out Shi’a 
organisations as opposed to other groups; and thirdly, what was the risk that the 
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research would end up making unfair accusations against the organisations8. In 
response to these concerns, my position of insider and outsider changed 
accordingly, and on some occasions, it shifted from the first query to another, even 
within one particular interview. Once the dialogue started and a sense of 
understanding had begun, there was often an accommodation of the role of the 
researcher as being an insider. The main concern related to security, as one of the 
interviewees stated, was that this kind of research was only conducted in the past 
by the UK for the sake of intelligence services in Western countries and in order to 
spy on their country, Iraq, and its organisations. Given that the Shi’a were 
oppressed and politically marginalised over many centuries, any attention directed 
to this group may provoke sentiments and raise such concerns or even be 
interpreted as a possible threat.  
 
To respond to the above concerns the following strategies were adopted. My first 
task in gaining access was to share with the interviewees some information about 
my professional background as a worker in women’s charity organisations in the UK 
for ten years, which made me familiar with the world of NGOs. To this end, I shared 
with them the name and the website details of my organisation for which I am a 
member of the management committee. Their other main concern was regarding 
my choice to research only Shi’a organisations, and my decision to categorize these 
organisations as FBOs. In response, I presented some background information 
about religiously motivated organisations or FBOs in the area of social welfare, 
explaining the economic motivation behind these was to fill the gap left by the 
state, and that this type of FBOs had been encouraged in the West since the 1980s. 
This point was not easily accepted by the interviewees as they have the perception 
that the West is non-religious and cannot be so tolerant towards religious 
organisations. I brought the discussion to focus on Iraq by explaining the shift, post-
                                                 
8
 In an interview with one of these organisations, I was questioned for 40 minutes out of the one 
hour that I was allocated with an interviewee. Following the discussion about the role of FBOs in 
social welfare, the result was I had one of the longest interviews which, in fact, lasted for four hours. 
The interviewee asked for my feedback stating that ‘he learned from our talk’ and asked ‘to put him 
in contact with my supervisor for future cooperation’, from which I concluded ‘that my field work 
has not been seen as ‘disturbance’ but rather as source for knowledge’ (Flick, 2009: 231). 
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2003, towards the adoption of the neoliberal policies whereby the NGOs had been 
expected to play a role in social welfare. I supplemented my account by showing 
interviewees a book that was published at the end of 2012 by my supervisor (Dr. 
Rana Jawad) about the role of religion in social policy. This was very helpful for 
focusing the interviewees’ attention on the interview topic and the name of my 
supervisor might have suggested that the book author was ‘one of them’.  
 
After my explanation of the phenomena of religious NGOs or FBOs, the responses 
from the interviewees varied. Some expressed their understanding of what I was 
talking about, and thanked me for sharing this information, stating at the end of the 
interviews, that they had learned from our talk, while others remained uncertain 
and maybe remained doubtful of my motivation. However, the positive response 
from the majority of the interviewees, for which I am grateful, made this research 
endeavour possible. 
 
Most, if not all, of the interviewees confirmed that their organisations were not 
religious NGOs and they have nothing to do with religious or political issues clearly 
stating that they did not mention religion or politics in their publications. 
Nevertheless, they did make various references to religion and Islam. For example, 
some interviewees explained that they were keen to clear the name of Islam from 
the terrorist accusations that amounted following 11th September. Others 
confirmed that, although they do not accept unveiled women in their offices, and 
they expect their male members to grow beards, these examples do not make them 
religious. This confirmation of the non-religious nature of these Shi’a NGOs is not 
new, as other researchers in the Middle East have recognised the same issue with 
Islamic NGOs (Yeginoğlu, 2010). This may reflect caution regarding being labelled 
sectarian in the heated sectarian environment prevailing in Iraq. The interviewees 
also stated that their NGOs did not do politics, however, they frequently mentioned 
their work in elections.  
 
I faced a number of practical difficulties while conducting the fieldwork. The culture 
of organising a schedule for interviews in advance proved to be difficult as most of 
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the interviewees preferred to arrange the interviews on the same day, so I had to 
make calls every morning to see whether they were prepared for an interview. 
Some of the interviews were with the senior managers of the MoWSA, and the 
MoP. These proved to be difficult as these officials often experienced last minutes 
changes to their agendas. The difficulty in organising meetings in advance in 
Baghdad can be attributed to the security situation, in particular, that existing from 
December 2012 onwards. Moreover, as a woman it was better not to stay out after 
4:00pm in winter because of the security problems and this applied during my 
second visit from January to April 2013. One reason why I preferred not to use 
participant observation was the complexity of the overall situation in the country 
and thus had to rely on the interviews with people from different levels in the 
various organisations. As a researcher I had to make sure not to raise participants’ 
expectations. I was seen by some as an insider and was asked by one of these NGOs 
to be interviewed on TV, talking about their activities, and on another occasion, I 
was asked to organize a joint meeting with my university. This could be seen by 
other participants as recruiting the researcher to a specific NGO cause and had to 
be handled sensitively, given the highly heated political context in Iraq, even within 
the Shi’a context.  
 
3.6 Data collection  
 
The data collection was guided by the thesis research questions and was in line with 
the list of questions I outlined on the topic sheets. The research themes were, to 
some extent, informed by the literature review (Lewin and Somekh 2011). The 
interviews were mainly conducted in Arabic with the coding and translation of the 
coding in English. More than once, the interviewees asked whether they could see 
the list of questions in advance prior to our interviews, which I provided in order to 
build a comfortable atmosphere and to ease any concerns, although I explained 
that other questions could arise throughout the interview (Kumar, 2011). The data 
was collected in natural settings (Creswell, 2009) e.g. their organisations’ offices. On 
some occasions at the participants’ request other public places were used and for 
others, I visited the places where they had their activities running. The interviews 
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were carried out into two stages; the first stage in October, November and 
December 2011. The focus of the first stage was a wide range of organisations, 
religious and non-religious, in the central state of Iraq and the Kurdistan region. The 
second round of interviews was adjusted to concentrate on the Shi’a NGOs, the 
central state institutions as well as the international organisations based in the 
capital city, Baghdad. This second stage took place in February, March and April 
2013. 
 
The total number of interviews was 30 and appendix (2) shows the list of the 
interviews. I sent the transcribed interviews, as the interviewees requested, for final 
approval to two of them for a final check and one of them sent it back with nearly 
no corrections. Most of the interviews were audiotape recorded. Once the answers 
being gained during the interviews produced no new issues or only repeated issues 
which had already been mentioned, i.e. saturation (Manson, 2010), I wound up the 
interviewing phase. 
 
The second source of data was extracted from documents. This source has its 
strengths and limitations, its main strength being that it enabled me to access 
information at a convenient time. Nevertheless, the limitations are that information 
may be protected and unavailable for public access, or materials may be 
incomplete, and documents may not be authentic or accurate (Creswell, 2009:180). 
Understandably, there is a very limited literature that addresses these organisations 
in Iraq with the key documents used for this research being national strategic plans, 
the constitution, publications from NGOs, and some governmental and 
international organisations’ reports. Some data were also gathered from 
organisations’ websites and correspondence with the academics interested in 
different aspects of state politics and economy.   
 
Although there was a limited number of documents related to the work of the 
organisations available in print, some could be accessed through their websites. 
However, al-Mehrab had recently changed the format and the organisation of their 
website and materials I accessed through the old website, appear unavailable on 
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the new one. However, al-Mehrab’s English website9 is much clearer than the 
Arabic one and carries a different name. This NGO is registered under the English 
name: Al-Hakim Foundation, whilst its publications in Arabic still carry the name of 
al-Mehrab. The publications of these various organisations take the form of 
pamphlets, newsletters and small publications which have provided me with 
supplementary resources to explain the objectives of these organisations. In fact, 
the documents were helpful in providing some information regarding their activities 
and the motivations underpinning their work.  
 
3.7 Data analysis  
 
The data analysis is a decisive stage when conducting research and for this study 
the analysis was carried out in relation to the research questions (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). To this end, an inductive thematic network was constructed for the purpose 
of analysing the data. Attride-Stirling defines thematic networks as a “tool in 
analysis…to take the researcher deeper into the meaning of the texts” (2001: 93) 
and this form of analysis provides “a flexible and useful research tool, which can 
potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data,” (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006: 78). 
 
The process of thematic analysis started with an informal first stage of data analysis 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006:11) while undertaking the fieldwork. This was followed by a 
second informal stage when I transcribed the interviews during which I became 
more aware of the important themes that were touched upon by the participants. 
The formal stages of thematic analysis started when the coding for themes was 
applied to the written transcripts. The coding is important “to open up meaning” 
(Richards, 2009:103) and to identify features that are important when trying to 
understand the experience of the participants in a meaningful way (Boyatzis, 1998). 
                                                 
9
 Al-Mehrab foundation uses another name for the English website, and it is registered in the UN as 
al-Hakim Foundations. The website is:  http://www.alhakimfd.org., the Arabic name on the website 
reads: the Martyr of al-Mehrab Foundation. There is no specific website in Arabic for al-Mehrab, it 
has a section of the larger website which is: http://www.belagh.com. This website covers all the civil 
and activities of both ISCI and al-Mehrab. 
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The coding was data driven and started with this first step of immersion in the data 
to find repeated patterns of meaning (Braun and Clarke, 2006) followed by the 
second step of coding.  
 
The third step involved sorting about 197 codes across 30 interviews, each of which 
tagged between 2- 40 extracts, all of which were points explained by the 
interviewees. These have formed the basic themes and are divided into five 
categories, each concerned with a question of: what; why; how; who; where; and 
when. The first three of these categories form the main focus of the analysis with 
the last two offering supplementary information. The question of what activities 
these NGOs carry out and what are the motivations of their social activities, in other 
words, the why question, have a list of codes. Each list of codes represents a 
number of extracts forming basic themes.  This formed the fourth step of coding 
which entails bringing together and coalescing different views and ideas of the 
participants within a refined thematic structure. At this point in the process, the 
interpretation of data has begun.  
 
I started to classify my basic themes by comparing and combining their ideas, and in 
this way, the organising themes emerged and this formed the fifth stage. These 
organising themes work as middle-order themes that organize the basic ones into 
clusters of similar issues, for they are “clusters of signification that summarizes the 
principal assumptions of a group of basic themes” (Attride- Stirling, 2001: 389).  
Going further in the analysis requires that the researcher looks at the links, 
contradictions, similarities, and investigates the meaning of organizing themes, by 
drawing on the extant knowledge gained from previous studies (ibid) and in this 
case, experience of religious–political NGOs. As a result of this process, my global 
themes started to emerge as the main issues that concern these NGOs. The global 
themes show the outcomes of the thematic analysis of the data starting from the 
coding and ending with the units of analysis. Table (1) below demonstrates the last 
three stages starting with the basic themes moving towards organising themes, and 
finally, reaching the global themes.   
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Table (1) The last three stages of coding 
 
Code and basic 
themes 




1) Social service 
 
- Helping the poor 
widows and orphans 
- Poverty  
- Moral 
- Good society 
- Family and social ties 
- Mercy 
- Social system 
- Traditions 
- In cash, in kind 




- Filling the state gap 
- Thawab and Ajr 
(Divine rewards: God 
satisfaction i.e. heaven 
afterlife) 
- State responsibility 
- Missionary role 
- Help from the Gulf 
countries 
- Khums distribution for 
Shi’a 
- The reputation of al-
Marja’iyya family 
- Saddaqa 
- The economic impact 
of provision 
- The psychological 
impact on the widows 
- The procedures  





2) Education and 
awareness raising   
- Teach what you 
learned 




- Safeguarding the family 
- Poverty as a cause for a 
society destruction 
- Link between family 
and society 
- Islam and family 
- Islam and social order 
 - Helping the poor is 
religious duty imposed 
on all 
- The benefits of religious 
donations for all 
- The temporary 
intervention of the Shi’a 
organisations in welfare 
- Welfare role and 
missionary role 
- The state responsibility 
in welfare provision 
- Staff religious 
motivation 
-Transfer religious 
money for welfare 
provision 
- The criteria for Khums 
provision 
-The procedures  and the 
criteria for the provision 
-The psychological 
impact of the social 
welfare 
-Collective wedding 
ceremony is a Religious 
permeated programme 
- The important of 





 The importance of 








- Protect family to 
protect the society 
- Welfare  
 
-intervention is a 







- Provision mostly 
for the one’s 
community 
  





















- To organise 
human relations 
















































prevent the wrong 
- Teaching the way of 
life 
- Teaching from an 
early age 
- Family safeguarding 
- Human building 
- Self building 
- Bring people closer to 
God 
- The importance of 
empathy 
- To show how Islam is 
different  
- The love of others  
- Assuming 
responsibility on others 
- Cultural building 
- Brining humans closer 
to God 
-  Disseminating the 
teaching of Ahl-al-Bayt 
- Shi’a rituals 
- Protecting the 
individuals from the 
wrong doings 




3) Political activism 
and mobilising people 
for elections   
 
- The elections 
- The constitution 
- The Fatwa  
- Loyalty 
- Voting  
- al-Marja’iyya 
- Taqlid, emulation 
- Good society 
- Right choice 
- Religious duty 
- To protect the Shia 
- To avoid the return of 
the previous regime 




- The role of Zainab and 
- The importance of 
moral education 
- Enhancing the human- 
God- relationship 
- Education for religious 
purpose 
- To take religion in every 
aspect in life 
- The importance of 
teaching children their 
religion 
- Equipping children with 
skills and knowledge, and 
responding to their 
needs 
- Warning them from the 
influences of the  
Western culture  
- Definition of child 
- Teaching children, their 
families, and informing 










- Mobilisation people for 
the elections, and vote 
for the new  constitution 
- Follow the religious 
Fatwa of the Marja 
- Enhancing the Shi’a to 
relations to Ahl-al-Bayt 
- Knowing the righteous 
way of life 
- The link between social 
welfare and loyalty 
- The Shi’a NGOs and 
political party relation 
- The role of the 
preachers in political 
mobilisation 
- The legitimacy of 
mobilising service users 
for the elections  
- Informing Muslim’s 
political behaviour 
- Education for 
building religious 
character of the 
child 




- Education is to 
create a new 
generation of 
Muslim Shi’a to 





features of the 
society and the 
state 
- The Shi’a rituals 
are to consolidate 
the Shi’a 
community 
- Informing the 
individual 
behaviour to 
inform the society 




- Turning Shi’a 
organisations to  
Social bases for 
mobilisation 
- The link between 
providing social 
welfare services 
and asking for 
political loyalty 
exists if not for 
political reason, 
for religious goals  
- Shi’a NGOs to 
consolidate the 
























































- To protect the Shi’a 
from their enemy  
- Islam role and the state 
- Manufacturing a  new 
generation for the state 
and society 
- State- NGOs 
partnership 
- The importance of 
preparing the future 
generation to lead the 




state and citizen 
- Creating new 
generation to lead 




In the above discussion, I have presented the ontology, the epistemology, the 
methodology of the thesis, and the research method in collecting and analysing 
data. Table 2 shows a summary of the research design.  
  
Table 2 - The research design 
The research ontology Constructivist 
The research epistemology Interpretivist 
The research methodology Inductive interpretive 
The research method Informants’ interviews 
The research data analyses Thematic analysis 
 
3.8 The trustworthiness of the research 
 
It is important to highlight the procedures taken in order to confirm the 
trustworthiness of the research, in terms of ensuring that a clear “picture of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny is being presented” (Shenton, 2004; 64). For 
interpretive research the trustworthiness and credibility are significant whilst under 
a positive approach measurements of “validity, reliability, objectivity, precision, and 
generalizability” (Tuli, 2010: 101), are important.  Taking steps to addressing the 
question of how to be “certain that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying 
attention to, worth taking account of” (ibid) and establish trust in a research study, 
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for, trustworthiness is “based on a sound rationale that justifies the use of chosen 
methodology and the processes involved in data collection and analysis” (ibid). 
 
The trustworthiness of this research is ensured on the following grounds. First, the 
method used for this research for collecting data is commonly used as a qualitative 
method (Shenton, 2004; 64), that is, informant interviews were carried out in the 
appropriate social setting, with all necessary procedures observed to conduct 
scientific qualitative research. Second, a researcher’s familiarity with the 
participants, according to Shenton (2004), is important when conducting scientific 
research. As a researcher, I was familiar with both the Shi’a traditions and with the 
NGO world, which enabled me to understand and reflect on the issues raised by 
these NGOs’ representatives. Moreover, the literature about Islamic NGOs has 
provided me with a clear context regarding what might be going on in this type of 
NGO.  
 
Next, triangulation was achieved through individually interviewing different people 
in one organisation, and in different settings and by holding group interviews. It is 
culturally acceptable that some of the interviewees allowed others colleagues or 
even friends to attend their interviews. This research has captured a number of 
interviews with a wide range of bodies: governmental and non governmental, local 
and international, religious and secular, Islamic Sunni, and Islamic Shi’a. This has 
provided what Dervin calls a “circling reality” which means “the necessity of 
obtaining a variety of perspectives in order to get a better, more stable view of 
‘reality’ based on a wide spectrum of observations from a wide base of points in 
time-space” (Dervin, 1983 cited in Shenton, 2004:66). This was made possible 
through the iterative questioning about some points raised by the interviewees. 
This involved iterating the topic and bringing forward statements to make sure that 
I gained the right meaning from the interviewee by repeating or rephrasing what I 
had understood from the answers. Moreover, the study was carried out in its 
specific socio-political context which is fundamental in understanding the 
experience of the NGOs under study. 
 
 75 
Fourth, and lastly, peer reviews have been sought to inform the analysis and 
methodology of conducting this research. I have submitted a brief of this thesis to 
three public gatherings: a seminar and a conference for PhD students in Bath, in 
May 2012, June 2012 respectively; and in a workshop in Morocco in February 2014. 
My work will be presented in the forthcoming conference held at the University of 
Bath in November 2014. Moreover, throughout this chapter, an audit trail is 
presented which means that the reader can “trace the course of the research step-
by-step via the decisions made and procedures described” (Shenton, 2004: 72). This 
account delineates the boundaries of the groups under discussion, in terms of their 
formations, links, geographical areas, their class positioning, numbers of 
organisations, as well as the number of interviews, and the time periods of the 
interview fieldwork stages wherein the data was collected.  
 
3.9 Ethical considerations for conducting the research 
 
Before the empirical work, ethical approval was obtained from the university. Once 
the scene was set for interviews, I explained my ethical commitments to the 
participants, verbally and in writing. For this, a written statement in Arabic was 
provided to the interviewees confirming that all information provided would not be 
misused or mishandled, and that anonymity of participants was guaranteed. During 
the course of the fieldwork some explained that they would not mind if their names 
were revealed, however, I chose not to reveal these. I confirmed that the 
confidential collected data would be stored in secured computerized systems and 
would not be shared with any agencies (Biber and Leavy, 2006:109). I explained the 
interviewee’s right to withdraw at any time (Shenton, 2004), and they had the 
option to refuse audio recordings of all or any part of the interview. In fact, I was 
asked more than once to switch off the recorder and then asked to start it again 
later. I provided a one page information sheet in English and Arabic which clarified 
the research subject (see Appendices 3 and 4). 
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I distributed a consent form in Arabic for the interviewees to read and sign when 
they agreed to take part the interview. Some signed it and others preferred to give 
their agreement verbally.  
 
In a number of my interviews with some Shi’a NGOs I found it was better to wear 
Hijab and to take off my shoes before I entered their offices, as others did. I made 
sure that I did not extend my hand to male interviewees to shake their hand, unless 
they initiated this, so as not cause any embarrassment. On some occasions the male 
interviewees made sure that the door was left open to their offices throughout the 
interviews. The interviewees with female members were freer and even relaxed by 
comparison.  One thing I could not manage well was the issue of eye contact. Some 
of the interviewees at the beginning of our conversations avoided making eye 
contact, as a sign of respect, however, naturally I made contact when listening and 
writing down their comments. After a while, the conversation went on smoothly 




In this chapter I have described my research journey from its outset in terms of its 
ontological approach, epistemological assumptions, the research methodology, as 
well as the collecting and analysing of the data, explaining access and 
demonstrating my role as insider and outsider and I have introduced briefly the 
Shi’a NGOs. In addition, in this chapter I have outlined the ethical matters which I 
had to take into consideration whilst conducting this research. In subsequent 
chapters the empirical research is presented with the focus being on the NGOs’ 
social provision and its intended influence. However, before considering the 
collected evidence, the following chapter gives an overview of the setting for the 














To analyse the multipronged intended influences of the Shi’a NGOs in Iraq, it is 
important to situate the emergence of these organisations in the post war socio-
political environment, when a new era of the revival of the Shi’a began. Introducing 
this background is important for understanding their roles in terms of the 
motivations, operations, and the influence they hope to make on the society. This 
chapter includes a presentation of the demographic structure of Iraqi society, the 
new political settlement in Iraq after the war and the political economy of the 
country. Regarding the lattermost, the political and economic changes in line with 
neoliberal policies are discussed, thereby shedding light on the relevant social 
policies and context in relation to the emergence of the focal NGOs in Iraq.  Data 
generated from the fieldwork involving interviews with representatives from the 
Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (MoWSA) and the Ministry of Planning (MoP), 
NGOs, both religious and non-religious and from international organisations, are 
drawn upon to explain the recent developments of interest. In addition, the 
literature pertaining to the socio-political situation in the country is engaged with to 
the same end. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the 
demographic structure of Iraqi society, whilst section 4.3 explains the post war 
political settlement and section 4.4 discusses the evolution of the political economy 
of the country. Section 4.5 covers post war state social policies, then the chapter 
concludes. 
 
4.2 The demographic structure of the country 
 
Frank Gunter, the author of the Political Economy of Iraq, stated that “there is no 
shortage of data on Iraq...the problem is that the available data is often 
inconsistent” (2013: 6). The population of Iraq is unknown as there has been no 
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census since 1997. According to Gunter, the estimated population is approximately 
31 million covering an area of 433,970 km (Metz, 2004). Interviewees from the 
Ministry of Planning (MoP) attributed the reluctance to conduct a national census 
to political reasons in that knowing the geographic distribution of the population 
would have political and economic implications10.The nation has 18 governorates, 
15 being administrated by the central state, and three by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). That is, Iraq is a federal state, but Kurdistan is the only part of 
the federation separate from the central state, having had its own parliament and 
government in the northern part of Iraq since 199111. The population of Iraqi 
Kurdistan is estimated to be 5.3 million (Kurdistan Review, 2013). Erbil is the capital 
city of Kurdistan region, whilst the status of Kirkuk, the biggest oil rich city in 
northern Iraq, populated by Kurdish, Arabic and Turkoman speaking populations, 
remains strongly contested, in particular, by the Kurds12. The Arabic speaking 
people, mainly in the middle and southern parts of Iraq, represent 75% - 80% of the 
population, Kurdish speakers totalling 15%-20% are largely based in the north. 
Turkoman and others (approximately 5% in total) are mainly based in Kirkuk city 
and the southern Kurdistan region. The new constitution considers both Arabic and 
Kurdish as the official languages of the state. Other languages, such as Turkoman 
(Turkish dialect), Assyrian and Armenian are permitted to be taught in their 
respective communities. The main religion is Islam, comprising 97% of the 
population (Shia represent between 60% and 65% and Sunni between 32% and 
37%), with Christian and others, thus only constituting 3% of the total. The Arab 
Shi’a are mainly concentrated in the south and middle of the country, whilst the 
Sunnis are predominantly located in the centre and the west. However, this division 
                                                 
10 The census issue became politicised by the ruling political parties after 2003 (Orsam Report, 
2012:19). The census and demographic distribution could effect the political balance of power, in 
particular, in Kirkuk as there has been ongoing political struggle between Arab and Kurdish political 
parties over its administration. Gunter has pointed out that if the census took place and shows that 
Kirkuk has majority Kurdish speaking population, then “ this would strengthen the movement to 
have Kirkuk join the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)” (Gunter, 2013: 9). 
11
 Iraq was obliged to accept resolution number 688 issued on April 3, 1991, which “demanded that 
Iraq cease repression of its population….against Kurds in the north and Shi’ite Muslims in the south” 
(Prados. 2002:3). 
12
 Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution states that a referendum will be held in this city to allow its 
inhabitants to determine their own status (Bet- Shlimon, 2012:914 ), regarding whether to be a part 
of the Iraqi central government, or a Kurdistan Region, or to have a federal state. This was supposed 
to take place in December 2007 and still has yet to do so (September  2014).  
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based on religion and ethnicity “conceals more than it reveals” (Gunter, 2013: 68) 
as each group is not homogenous, being divided according to: economic class, 
political views, level of education, religion or secularity, tribal affiliation13 or 
patriotic preferences.  
 
4.3 The post war new political settlement  
 
The post war era has witnessed a new political setting that was unseen since the 
establishment of Iraq as a state in 1921. This new political system is based on the 
notion of sharing powers between sectarian and ethnic groups, including the Shi’a, 
Sunni, Kurds as well as others. This policy began with de-Bath’ifcation of the state, 
which led to the laying off of 30,000 Ba’thists, on top of 500,000 army soldiers, who 
were dismissed as a result the dissolving of the Iraqi army (Yousif, 2006: 497). This 
process was announced in the first order issued by Paul Bremer in 2003, which was 
aimed at stripping the remnants of the previous regime of political power, i.e. 
disbanding “what was left of the Saddam – era” (Nasr, 2006:198). This intensified 
the conflict between the Shi’a newly emerged political groups, and those from the 
Sunni sect, as this was also perceived by the latter as a policy of “de-Sunnification” 
(ibid). The project was underpinned by the notion that each sect would have a share 
in the state, in terms of membership of parliament and the ministries. Called al-
Mohassassa, it was decreed that the size of ‘shares’ of these posts would be based 
on the proportion of each sectarian and ethnic population across the nation (Ismael 
and Fuller, 2008). Underlying this unequal division of power was the goal that it 
“gives each community a share of power and prestige to promote cooperation and 
unity” (Katzman, 2014:1). Nevertheless, the policy in reality has “strengthened the 
sectarian loyalties by making sectarian affiliation synonymous with representation” 
(Gunter, 2013: 13), and it seems also to have paved the way for the sectarian 
conflict that eventually resulted in military confrontation.  
 
                                                 
13
 Within tribes there are sectarian divisions because “of the five major tribes of Iraq, three have 
both Shi’a and Sunni branches” (Gunter, 2013: 68). 
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In practical terms, Al-Mohassassa, initiated by the USA administration in Iraq led to 
the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)14 that ruled the 
country from May 11, 2003 (Halchin, 2004:3). The CPA subsequently formed the 
Interim Governing Council (IGC) July 13th 2004, consisting of 25 members divided on 
sectarian and ethnic grounds: “13 from the Shi’a, 5 from the Sunni, and the rest 
from the Kurds and Assyrians” (Haddad, 2010). The CPA proposed moving from the 
interim government to an elected national government through a caucus system 
that would consist of "notables", important personnel from each province of Iraq, 
who would appoint an assembly that would select a government and write the 
constitution. However this proposal was rejected by the higher Marja’iyya, al-
Sistani, who called for a general election so as to allow every man and woman the 
opportunity to vote in the elections, and also to vote for a new constitution to be 
written by Iraqi hands. The confrontation between the CPA and the al-Marja’iyya 
did not last long and al-Sistani’s vision of holding a general election soon became 
the overriding wish of the Iraqi people, especially the Shi’a. This was remarkable 
given that al-Sistani belongs to a Shi’a religious trend that believes that clergymen 
should not intervene the in politics of the state and should restrict its involvement 
to advising what is the best for the Ummah. Despite this, a Fatwa, or religious order, 
was issued by al-Sistani on 20th April 2003 (Visser, 2006: 10). Regarding which, he 
explained to his followers or emulators his view that the CPA’s intention to carry 
out elections through caucuses lacked legitimacy. According to Visser, al-Sistani’s 
response was:  
 
“All of a sudden…acute and crisp. ‘Those authorities’ he remarked, ‘have no 
mandate to appoint the members of the assembly charged with writing the 
constitution’. He then went on to sketch out the ideal procedure as he saw 
it: a general election in which every Iraqi would vote for representatives to a 
constituent assembly, followed by a general referendum over the proposed 
constitution. Sistani added that ‘all believers’ ought to insist on this 
                                                 
14
 The Coalition Provisional Authorities (CPA) was established by the USA on May 2003 to restore 
security, stability and to facilitate economic recovery. It was “closely aligned with the department of 
Defence [USA] and the USA Agency for International Development (USAID)”. The CPA ended its 
mission in June 2004 (Halchin, 2004; Pina, 2006).  
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procedure – thereby making it clear that not only was he now entering the 
political scene, but was actually drawing up political imperatives for his 
followers (Visser, 2006: 11)  
 
Given al-Sistani’s importance as the higher Marja’iyya for the Shi’a the CPA has to 
submit to his will after 100,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Baghdad city 
supporting his plan (Dodge, 2005:716).  That is, his influence was so great that the 
USA backed down from its initial position and Iraqi politicians as well as the Shi’a 
NGOs fell in behind him. An interviewee   close to al-Sistani this as follows:  
 
SM ND2: The USA attempted to organise the situation in Iraq by signing an 
agreement between Paul Bremer and al-Talabani15 calling for caucuses, 
which was an alternative to a general election. al-Marja’iyya strongly 
rejected this agreement and al-Sistani issued a fatwa, known as the Fatwa of 
July16. This took everyone by surprise, since the timetable was so tight, and 
the security situation was not good. al-Sistani did not budge, he called on his 
Wokala (trustees, agents) asking them to advocate and educate the public 
for this fatwa in their areas. al-Syad [the Master, or the Marja, al-Sistani] 
insisted on his position and all submitted to his will.  
 
al-Sistani’s proposal was immediately translated into a plan of action and the first 
election was held on 30th January to establish the Transitional National Association 
(TNA), which was charged with the writing of the constitution before the national 
general elections. The TNA was dominated by Shi’a in the absence of the Sunni and 
began drafting the constitution in May 2005. In this draft, Islam was affirmed to 
have a superior position in the state, with it being the main source of all laws 
(Schmidt, 2008) and no law was to contradict the law of Islam. Accordingly, SCIRI as 
well as the other Shi’a parties made a commitment to legalise and institutionalise 
                                                 
15
 Paul Bremer was in charge of the CPA and al-Talabani, a member of the Iraqi governing council, 
became the first president of Iraq in 2005. 
16 The Fatwa was issued on 26 June 2003 (Feldman, 2005).  
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Shari’a Law (Cole, 2007:10). The constitution was put to a nationwide referendum 
on October 15, 2005 and approved by the majority of those who voted17.  
 
The second step in al-Sistani’s proposed process was the elections to the legislative 
council, which were planned for mid December 2005 and this was supported by the 
Sunni political parties. Nevertheless, the Shi’a political parties, once again, won the 
elections with a majority of 128 of the 275 seats, representing 47% of the total, 
while the Kurdish alliance won 53 seats, representing 19%, and the Sunni parties 
including secular groups won 44 seats, representing 16%, with the Kurdish Islamist;  
Iraqi National List gaining 25 seats representing 9%;  Independent Sadrist; Turkmen; 
and Christian won 14 seats representing 5%, and the Sunni Arab list, ostensibly non-
sectarian, al-Hiwar won 11 seats  representing 4%.  Table (2) provides the results of 
these elections. The subsequent distribution of the ministerial posts was organised 
in line with number of seats in parliament.  
 
The main feature that characterised the first and second election campaigns is that 
there was no clear economic, social, or even political programme of any sort. 
Instead of introducing such programmes, the focus of the Shi’a political parties, as a 
powerful election propaganda tool, was on their previous religious oppression. As 
Diamond et al explain: 
 
“we do not have issue-based elections, we have identity based elections… 
there are no platforms, there are no white papers, there are no programmes 
for winning office, nor agendas, that give voters a sense of what to expect 
from candidates or from groups if voted into office” (Diamond et al, 
2009:55).  
 
                                                 
17  The vote for the constitution was: 78.6% in favour and 21.4% against. This was despite the “Sunni 
provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin producing a 97% and 82% “no” votes, respectively and the mostly 
Sunni Nineveh province voting 55% “no”, whereas Diyala, believed to be mostly Sunni, had a 51% 
“yes” vote. However, in Kurdistan and the other cities populated by Shi’a, the constitution was 
approved.( Katzman, 2006:4) 
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Despite the democratic elections and the Mohassassa, both arrangements did not 
solve the sectarian conflict. Before 2003, the Shi’a political parties espoused that 
“the ruling Sunni elite exploited the nation’s oil wealth, dominated the armed 
forces … discriminated against Shi’ites at the political level and within government 
service, and favoured development of Sunni areas in terms of housing, education, 
social services, the building of mosques, and many other areas” (Khazai and 
Cordesman, 2013:7). The Sunni, having lost power, began to claim that that the Shia 
were puppets to their “Iranian masters…want absolute power in Iraq, and that all 
Sunnis are to be rendered powerless” (One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second 
Session, April 30, 2012). The Shi’a on their part, having suffered decades of political 
oppression, believed that “the Sunnis want to take back control and return a 
dictator to power who will once again marginalize the Shia” (ibid: 2). Data from 
both the fieldwork and the literature provide evidence to support Khazai and 
Cordesman’s (2013) contention that: “the emergence of a Shi’ite dominated central 
government since 2010 has tended to alienate many Arab Sunnis” (P9).  
 
Although the tension between the Shi’a Arabs and Kurds did not  lead to violence, 
throughout the post-war period there has been ongoing tension in regard to oil 
distribution and the administration of Kirkuk.  The Sunni, on the other hand, have 
no access to oil fields that are available to both the Shi’a and the Kurds. In fact, the 
Shi’a whose oil reserves are concentrated in the south, have “about 60 percent of 
the reserves and the north of the country with 17 percent of reserves” 
(International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 13/218, July 2013) is under the 
control of the Kurds. This situation has seriously economically disadvantaged the 
Sunnis and their representatives in parliament and has further strengthened the 
sectarian divide. As a result of the new political reality, it has become nigh on 
impossible to come to a consensus on a wide range of economic, political and social 
issues. 
 
The period between the first national elections in 2005 and the second in 2010 
witnessed an escalation in violence that brought the country to the edge of civil 
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war18, in particular after the bombing of the two Shi’a shrines in 2006 where the 
tenth and the eleventh Imams of the Shi’a were buried in the ninth century19 in 
Samara, North Baghdad. In March 2010, the second election took place to fill 310 
seats and was won by a secular block, which consisted of a coalition of a mixture of 
political parties and individuals from secular, Sunni, Shia and Kurdish backgrounds. 
However, the election result was not recognised by the previous Shi’a government, 
claiming that there were irregularities20 and consequently power remained in the 
hands of the Shia parties up until the April 2014 elections21.  
By the time of the 2014 elections, the government had so far managed to survive 
political and social unrest that was exacerbated following months of 
demonstrations by the Sunnis starting in December 2012. These demonstrations 
raised socio-political demands inspired by the revolutions of the Arab spring. The 
Sunni political parties, having witnessed the victories of Islamic Sunni parties such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Arab speaking countries, entered a 
new stage of political negotiation with the Iraqi government that ended in military 
confrontation. Thus, when the country approached the elections of 2014, the 
struggle was reaching its peak. The Institute for the Study of War issued a report 
about the elections in Iraq noting:  
 
Iraq’s 2014 national elections are taking place at a difficult time. The country 
is at a crossroads, presented with the possibility of widely different futures. 
Deteriorating security conditions frame political thought in ways that harken 
back to Iraq’s first national elections in 2005. The Iraqi state does not hold 
control of territory in some of Iraq’s key political provinces, such as Anbar, 
                                                 
18
 The sectarian violence that followed the formation of first government resulted in “3,159 deaths, 
in July 2006 only” (Haddad, 2013:115). The casualties of the 2006-2007 reached 29,296 and 25,813 
respectively including the US forces (Iraqi Body Account) https://www.iraqbodycount.org. 
19 The Tenth Imam is Imam Al-Hadi who was died in 827- 828 at the age of 42 in Samara where his 
shrine is to this day, and also his son Imam Hasan al-askar was buried in 874 in the same place (Imam 
Muhammad Shirazi- Fountain books, 2008:90-92) 
20
 The accusations of corruption in the election process was repeatedly mentioned in all the elections 
(Derby and Cordesman, 2010:3) 
21
 In 2009, Al-Malki, the prime minister and the leader of al-Dawa party announced in his meeting 
with group of tribal leaders that “we will not give it away [the power]” in Arabic ‘Ma-Nintiha’; this 
provoked wide reactions and some websites and face book pages under the name Ma-Nintiha were 
opened condemning this statement.  
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Ninewa [Mousil], and Diyala. The disenfranchisement of Iraq’s Arab Sunnis; 
the rising threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS); and the 
activation of Ba‘athist groups collectively discourage electoral participation… 
Iraqi Security Forces are not able to contain the increasing violence. 
Baghdad, the capital, is under a growing threat of ISIS and Iraqi insurgent 
groups that seek to undermine the political process. Security and local 
identity are dominant themes in the 2014 elections. This is a stark contrast 
to Iraq’s 2010 elections, which primarily involved strategies of ethno-
sectarian unity. Pre-election coalitions in 2014 have re-crystalized around 
primary stakeholders within the main Iraqi Sunni, Shi‘a, and Kurdish blocs, 
generating competition rather than unity” (Ali, 2014: 4). 
A decade after the Iraq war, no political agreement has been arrived at regarding 
either the democratic process or power sharing. The country is still going through 
“different layers of tensions between the Shi’a-Sunni which was fuelled by de-
Ba’thfication policy that polarized Iraqi politics and contributed to severe instability 
in the Iraqi military and government not just in the first flush of regime change, but 
extending as far as the parliamentary elections” (Sissons and Al-Saiedi, 2013: 1). 
These ongoing conflicts involve Arabs versus Kurds,  Shi’a versus Sunni and that 
relating to the role of Islam in the state. What now seems to be the key tension is 
that between the Shi’a political parties and Sunni groups, whereby the latter have 
turned to violence in the belief that they have been marginalised by the actions of 
the former. The two sects Shi’a and Sunni’s political and military actions have 
“fuelled a nationwide surge in ethnic violence that has contributed to a major spike 
in sectarian violence across Iraq, bringing about political instability, and significant 
security challenges” (ibid), which has limited “the ability to reach key compromises 
and decisions on the patterns of governance and development (Sissons and Al-
Saiedi, 2013:5). This conflict gained extra fuel following the uprising in Syria. That is, 
the Sunni Militia that began fighting in Syria extended their operations to Iraq in 
2011, where they have been supported by the Islamic Sunni tribes and the 
remnants of the Ba’th party members, who as mentioned above are also Sunnis. In 
2013, these groups killed nearly 9,000 people and wrested control in at least three 
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cities as well as taking over some land pockets near Baghdad (Katzman, 2014).  
However, the situation has now escalated much further, for since June 2014, ISIS 
has stripped three cities, including Mosul, from the control of Iraqi government, 
leaving thousands of Shi’a, Sunnis, Christian and, Yazadis either killed or having fled 
(Sekulow et al, 2014: 11).   
 
4.4 The post war political economy  
 
Iraq as a state was established in 1921 following the British occupation in 1917-
1919, which took control from the Ottoman Empire (Katzman, 2009:1). The newly 
formed state covered its costs aided by the British government in the 1920s and 
1930s (Dodge, 2005: 705- 721) and Iraq became fully independent in 1932. 
Following the discovery of oil in the 1920s (Kane, 2010: 7), this became the main 
source of it’s Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and with high dependence on this 
resource the nation became a rentier state. Rentier states are defined as countries 
that “receive on a regular basis substantial amount of external rent….paid by 
foreign individuals.. or governments of a given country” (Mahdavy, 1970: 428) . In 
Iraq, the oil represents external rent for the country, i.e. it is the main source of the 
state’s revenue. The Ba’th party seized power in 1968, driven by its Arab nationalist 
socialist ideology. It set to work exploiting the natural and human resources for the 
nation’s economic development (Ozlu, 2006), with the aim of enhancing the 
regime’s political legitimacy. In particular, the regime played a key role in universal 
social welfare provision funded by oil revenues.  
 
Economically, the regime’s policy was characterised by its focus on establishing a 
centralised command economy founded on industry and infrastructural 
development (Al-Khafaji, 2000). In 1980, nearly 100% of school-aged children were 
enrolled in primary school (Al-Samaraai,, 2012) and female attendance in primary 
schools rose from 34% to 95% between 1970 and 1980 (Sanford, 2003). The oil 
revenue had enabled the regime leaders to allocate “considerable resources both 
for state building and for consolidating their own positions” (Joseph, 1991:178). 
Politically, the Ba’th party’s economic development and welfare policy led to a high 
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degree of political tension between it and its political competitors:, the Iraqi 
Communist Party (ICP)22, which had been prominent since the 1958 revolution 
(Yamao, 2008), the Islamists who were living their golden age between 1963 and 
1968 23 (Marr, 2004 cited in Yamao, 2008: 243) and the Kurdish parties. In 1977, 
the Ba’thists started a nationwide campaign of Ba’thification, in particular for of all 
students in secondary to higher education24. 
 
In February 1979, the revolution in Iran echoed strongly across Iraq at both state 
and societal levels. That is, the Shia political groups attempted to follow Iran’s 
example by organising a Shia uprising in Baghdad on the 12th June 1979 (Al-
Khursan, 1999). This was exposed and thus, had to be aborted before it took place. 
The fear that Islamic revolution would be replicated in Iraq led Western 
governments to support the hard line of the Ba’th party as represented by Saddam 
Hussein in taking control of the government and ousting the then president Al-Bakir 
(Al Khursan, 1999:302). On 16th July 1979, Saddam Hussein came to power and 
started his presidency by executing the leading members of his own party who 
opposed his extreme policies against the Shi’a. In August, only a few weeks after 
seizing power, he turned against the Shi’a, assassinating Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, 
the prominent Marja’iyya25 of the Shi’a world wide for his public support of the 
Iranian revolution. The Ba’th regime continued in power for 35 years of 
dictatorship; launched an internal war against the Kurdish population in the 
northern part of Iraq in 1973, declared war against Iran that lasted from 1980 to 
1988 and invaded Kuwait in 1990. This last action led to war being waged against 
                                                 
22
 The Ba’th party invited the Iraqi Communist party (ICP) to occupy two nominal ministerial 
positions in 1972, but in 1977 the ICP was severely attacked (Al-Khursan, 2001:145). 
23 In this period, the Islami Da’wa party, following the attacks of the Ba’th Party against the 
communists in 1963, was the only Islamic Shi’a party that “made an effort to participate in Iraqi 
politics through elections if possible, established labour unions in order support the party in 
elections” (Yamao, 2008:247).  
24 There is a substantial literature that discusses the de-Ba’thification policy in Iraq adopted by CPA 
(Al-Saiedi,2013; Ghanim, 2011; Porch, 2003;; Katzman, 2014). However, there is scant literature on 
the process of Ba’thfication . My personal experience of its meaning was the enforcing of Iraqi 
citizens, regardless of their religious sect, nationality, political affiliation, to join the Ba’th party and 
implement party orders. Those who signed up for membership were  not allowed to defect to 
another party or other political groups and in fact, doing so was punishable by death. Thousands of 
students in both secondary schools and universities were expelled from their education as a result of 
their refusal to join the party.    
25
 Al-Marjaia is the highest religious establishment in the Shia sect. 
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Iraq by the US and its allies in 1991, which resulted in humiliating defeat for its 
army. Subsequently, an uprising took place in the southern part of Iraq, which the 
media saw as a Shi’a uprising, but this was severely crushed by the regime. 
Following which, Saddam continued his repression of the Shi’a until the US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 (Khazai and Cordesman, 2013:7). After the war, a new era began, 
one in which new arrangements regarding state-society relations were installed 
(Zubaida, 2005; Jabar, 2003; Tripp, 2007).  
 
The post war political change involved a rapid transition of the Iraqi economy from 
being centralised to a free market type. Regarding which, the CPA declared at the 
first meeting in Jordan that the main objective of its mission was to liberalise Iraq’s 
economy (Yousif, 2006:23) and set out a programme of reforms of privatisation and 
marketisation that were to be swiftly implemented (Abboud, 2008:426). This 
attempt at liberalisation was thwarted by two phenomena: the civil war that took 
place in 2006-2007, and serious resistance to privatisation from the Iraqi 
government (Gunter, 2013). Thus, the public sector continues to have a key role in 
economic and social welfare matters. Iraq, as a rentier state, continues to rely 
heavily on “petroleum exports that provide some 95% of its government revenue” 
(Khazai and Cordesman, 2013). This has led the Iraqi economy to suffer from a 
serious lack of economic diversity, which has left it vulnerable to oil price shocks 
and the ongoing focus on oil has meant other sectors, such as manufacturing 
industry, agriculture and services have largely been neglected. 70% of the state 
budget is allocated to its operations, and only 30% is earmarked for investment.  
 
Following this discussion on the history of the political economy, the focus is 
directed now towards understanding how the Shi’a NGOs appeared in the 
socioeconomic context and where they fit on the political map of the country. 
However, a few words about the state social policies might be useful for understand 
the upcoming discussion about the role of these organisation in Iraq in terms of 




4.5 Post war state social policies  
 
The oil revenue has enabled the state, according to De Freitas and Johnson (2012: 
11) to have a “rather unique public welfare system; while other countries in the 
MENA region spend an average of 3.6% of GDP on public social safety nets, Iraq 
spent 8.8% of their GDP on social safety nets in 2008”. In addition, since 1973 the 
state has implemented free education and health systems (Pina, 2006: 3; Al-Khafaji, 
2000: 4). A Social Care Law, number 126, was issued in 1980 directed at those who 
were unable to work, such as the disabled, widows, elderly, orphans and divorced 
women (Ebrahim and Hussain, 2009:112).  
 
According to the interviewees from international organisations in Iraq as well as the 
ministries, USAID, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNDP, ESCWA, 
and other UN linked organisations have worked closely with the Iraqi government 
to reform the previous economic and social policies towards free market and 
neoliberal policies; pushing back the role of the state in social welfare provision. The 
aim has been to increase the role of the private sector to generate economic 
growth and increase employment opportunities through privatisation and reducing 
state subsidies as well as promoting the role of NGOs as social welfare providers. 
Since 2005, continuous efforts have been made to reform the old welfare 
programmes, the state remains still largely in control of the economy. 
Consequently, the old policies have, in the main, continued with the economic 
policy still being driven by the state. The concentration of the financial and political 
power both in the hands of the sectarian or ethnic political parties who control 
access to massive oil revenues, in Gunter’s words, could lead to Iraq becoming an 
oligarchic capitalistic state, like other countries in the Arab Middle East whereby the 
power and wealth is held by a small group of families (Gunter, 2013). There 
continues to be adherence to the view that state power should be the main 
provider of welfare as an incentive for people to keep supporting the status quo 
with their votes. As a result, much of the proposed reform legalisation is still waiting 
for parliament to act, as I was told by interviewees from the MoP and MoWSA 
ministries. In relation to this Gunter has pointed out the following:  
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“within Iraq’s current coalition government, the 34 ministries are divided up among 
the various political parties … some of the ministries are important because they 
control SOE [state owned enterprises]. These SOEs provide the ministries with large 
budgets and elevated status as well the capability to distribute government jobs to 
loyal supporters. If a ministry loses its SOE to privatisation then there will be fewer 
prizes –desirable ministries –to divide among coalition members and important 
members of the opposition” (Gunter, 2013: 169) 
 
From the above, it seems that the role of the state is still central to the economy 
and the private sector is not seriously developed. Given that the role of the NGOs 
was considered important for development, as well as for democracy, in the 




In this chapter, I have painted a picture of the socio-political scene of Iraq pre- and 
post 2003, so as to provide a background prior to exploring the role of the Shi’a 
NGOs in detail. It has been shown that politically the country has not yet been 
stabilised after the sectarian violence following the overthrow of Saddam’s regime 
and the subsequent de-Ba’thfication, which swept the Shi’a into political power and 
marginalised the Sunni. Economically, despite serious attempts to reform Iraq in 
line with neoliberalism, there has been great resistance to this strategy. This is 
attributed to the fact that Iraq is a country that is rich with resources, which has 
provided the state with considerable funds that have enabled it to enhance its 
political power as with the previous regime. That is, continuing control over the 
state enterprises has provided political parties with the wherewithal to be able to 
distribute incentives to their followers so as to guarantee their vote and hence, 
remain in power. Consequently, they have a vested interest in maintaining the 
primary role of the state. Moreover, the powerful public sector has worked to 
ensure that there is a hostile environment towards both the private sector and civil 
society organisations. To identify what the roles of Shi’a organisations play in terms 
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their social activities as well as their motivations, who they influence and who they 














































Chapter 5: The emergence of Shi’a NGOs in Iraq 
  
5.1 Introduction  
 
In the literature review chapter, chapter 2, it was shown that the emergence of 
political Islam during the 1970s combined with the new political openness involving 
the adoption of democracy and neoliberal policy, form the context in which Islamic 
NGOs were able to function. In the chapter, it was explained that these NGOs were 
often utilised due to political restrictions on the work of political groups, being 
formed as apolitical organisations that worked to provide for those in need and also 
to spread the word of Islam to Muslims. It is clear from the evidence that political 
Islam took advantage of this new form of organisation in order to reach a wider 
constituency through its social welfare provision that, as explained in Chapter 2, 
took the form of clientelism, whereby it was distributed under the expectation that 
political loyalty would be granted by the receivers to the donors. 
 
Subsequent political change, post 2003, proved to be fertile ground for Shi’a NGOs 
as they mushroomed in line with the political vacuum that followed the invasion 
and the collapse of the previous regime. The Shi’a NGOs, thus, can be seen as a 
phenomenon rooted in the era of the revival of the Shi’a (Nasr, 2006). To get a 
sense of what the Shi’a NGOs do and why are they conducting their chosen 
activities, it is necessary to look at to two important factors: first, the historical 
division between the Shi’a and Sunni, which sheds light on how Shi’a NGOs differ 
from those of the Sunni. The second factor relates to the new opportunities that led 
to this new type of organisation being able to operate in a political way at different 
levels within the Iraqi landscape. Consequently, section 5.2 provides the historical 
background to the Shi’a sect; section 5.3 discusses the emergence of Shi’a NGOs as 
a distinct entity post 2003, while section 5.4 covers the Shi’a NGOs’ sources of 





5.2 Who are the Shi’a?  
 
‘Shi’a’ refers to “a particular school of Islamic thought, which is based on the 
teachings of the Prophet and his family, and sometimes it is referred to as the 
“school of Ahlul Bayt” (Al-Qazwini, 2013:1). Its adherents are supporters of Ali, 
Mohammad’s cousin and son in law, who believe that after the death of 
Mohammad, he was the only legitimate Imam for ruling the Ummah. The claim is 
based on a statement made by Mohammad in 632 at Ghadir Khumm, in which the 
prophet appointed Ali as his successor26 (Kelidar, 1983; Campbell, 2008). However, 
this pronouncement was ignored by other close associates of Mohammad who 
continued in their powerful positions (Sanders, 1992). They were in favour of 
holding a Shura, or a council, to elect his successor, which consisted of the most 
prominent Muslims who were close to the Prophet and this group chose to have a 
caliphate involving both religious and political leadership. This was seen by the 
supporters of Ali, or Shi’a of Ali, as being in opposition to Mohammad’s will and 
stripping his descendents of their divine right of ruling the Ummah. This was the 
point at which Muslims were divided into two sects: the supporters of Ali, or the 
Shi’a; and the supporters of the caliphate, with the tasking themselves with 
following the rule of Mohammad. Under the arrangement of the latter, Ali was able 
to rule the Ummah as the fourth caliph until he was killed in 661 (Pinault, 1999; 
Kelidar, 1983). The Shi’a endorsed the Imamate whereby Mohammad’s direct 
descendents were considered the right people for his legacy. That is, in their point 
of view, Imam Ali, the cousin of Mohammed, should become the first Imam, 
followed by his family, or from other members of Ahl-al-Bayt.  
 
                                                 
26
 Ghadir Khumm’s pronouncement is significant to Shi’a believers. This statement appeared in a 
collection of Hadith by Ibn Hanbal stating the following:  “We were with the Apostle of God in his 
journey and stopped at Ghadir Khumm. We performed the obligatory prayer together and a place 
was swept for the Apostle under two trees and he performed the mid-day prayer. And then he took 
Ali by the hand and said to the people: ‘Do you not acknowledge that I have a greater claim on each 
of the believers than they have on themselves?’ And they replied: ‘Yes!’ And he took Ali's hand and 
said, ‘Of whomsoever I am Lord, then Ali is also his Lord. O God! Be though the supporter of whoever 
supports Ali and the enemy of whoever opposes him.’ And Umar met him [Ali] after this and said to 
him: ‘Congratulations, O son of Abu Talib! Now morning and evening [i.e. forever] you are the 
master of every believing man and woman’” (cited in Campbell 2008: 435). 
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The notion of the Shi’a as a religious sect was further consolidated after the killing 
of Ali’s son, Hussain and seventy two of his companions in Muharram in Karbala in 
Iraq in 680 (Elbadri, 2009). This was followed by the taking of the women and 
children of his family as prisoners to the Muslim Caliphate in Damascus, when the 
latter received news that he was planning to revolt against his rule in Iraq. This 
became known as the most tragic event to the Shi’a all over the world, known as 
Muharram, which refers to the first month of the Islamic calendar and Ashura is the 
first tens days of this month. After the murdering of Hussain, the Shi’a remained 
aloof from politics and the subsequent Imams from Ali’s family were persecuted 
and/or killed (Elbadri, 2009). The last Imam, or the twelfth Imam, according to Shi’a 
doctrine, disappeared into a dungeon Samarra in Iraq in 874 after the death of his 
father (Yaluh, 2011: 1). This was known as the small occultation which in 961 was 
transformed into the absolute occultation, under which it was believed that the 
hidden Imam, or Imam al-Mahdi, would come back one day to establish justice not 
only in Muslim countries, but also throughout the entire world (ibid). Consequently, 
the Imamate forms one of the most important concepts for the Shi’a in that the 
Imam is both the political and religious leader of the Ummah (Arjomand, 1979), 
who has a divine place close to Mohammad. The Shi’a considers the Twelve Imams 
who are descendents of Mohammad as the only legitimate and infallible Imams and 
leaders of the Ummah. Hence, until the return of the hidden Imam they believe 
they should stay aloof from politics as it is not their responsibility to be involved in 
leading the people. 
 
The question subsequently arose as to who would lead the Ummah until al-Mahdi’s 
return. The answer was said to rest with the learned jurists, including the Ulama 
(religious scholars) the Marja’iyya (source of reference), or Mojatahid, Faqih, which 
all refer to religious authorities. Following Imam al-Mahdi’s absolute occultation in 
961 (Elbadri, 2009), the Shi’a religious establishment or al-Hawza, adopted the 
principle of Taqqiyah, which means ‘dissimulation of faith’, so as to avoid political 
and religious harassment by the state and thus to be able to live harmoniously with 
the government or oppressors (Arjomand, 1979; Marcinkowski, 2006). al-
Marja’iyya, the highest religious authority for the Shi’a, was established in Najaf in 
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the eleventh century by the Shi’a jurist al-Tusi (Kadhem, 2012: 25; Arjomand, 1997), 
who established al-Hawza, a Shi’a school tasked with spreading the teachings of this 
doctrine. al-Marja’iyya also ran Shi’a community affairs, including marriages, 
funerals, inheritance matters and the organising of the collection of Zakat and 
Khums for redistribution to the poor. From this it can be seen how the religious 
authority represented by al-Marja’iyya guides widely informs Shi’a social affairs. 
Each Shi’a man or woman is expected to follow or emulate a Marja, seeking advice 
from him on issues relating to social, religious, and even political matters. To this 
day, the Shi’a pay their religious taxes to their emulated Marja, who has to provide 
the Shi’a with leadership through the introduction of Fatwa or religious edicts 
whenever deemed necessary, which they are obliged to follow. The Marja, 
according to Litvak (1998), has continued to be seen as the charismatic authority 
who has combined superior knowledge in religious law along with a very modest life 
style (Litvak, 1998: 15). In general, the Marja’iyya for the Shi'i denomination holds 
the most powerful position as the “theoretically authorized” (Sakai, 2001) leader of 
society, tasked with the role of guiding the community in its social, religious and 
political affairs and thus, can appear as being more powerful than political parties, 
particularly if he decides to engage in political debate (Sakai, 2001). 
 
This created division between the supporters of Ali, who became known as Shi’a 
and the majority of Muslims called the Sunni. In fact, those of the Shi’a 
denomination form a minority of Muslims of about 10 percent when compared to 
the Sunnis. However, in Iraq the Shi’a comprises 60 to 65 percent of the population 
(Shanahan, 2004). This division between sects of Muslims also has financial 
implications, whereby Khums, a religious tax that was paid to Mohammad was 
agreed by all Muslims, which as Rahimi has explained “is a special annual tax that 
Shi’ia pay one-fifth of the value of their land, silver, gold, jewellery, and profits 
made from goods found in the sea, which is spent mostly on the needy, orphans, 
travellers, and on the prophet and his family. However, one-tenth of Khums is 
required to be paid to a high-ranking cleric or marja‘ al-taqlid ’The Source of 
Imitation’” (Rahimi, 2007: 6).  This was continued by the Shi’a, for they saw this as a 
right for Mohammad’s family after his death. However, the Sunnis refused to 
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acknowledge this right since they believed that it was only appropriate for 
Muhammad when he was alive. The importance of this source of funding for the 
Shi’a as the main resource for their organisations will become apparent later on in 
this thesis.   
 
Historically, the state was led by the caliph from the Sunni sect while the Shi’a 
remained a marginalised minority.  Following the end of the last Islamic Ottoman 
state and the British occupation of Iraq, al-Marji’ayya was divided as to whether to 
rally against the occupiers are to remain aloof from politics. That is, two stances 
appeared, with one faction calling for Jihad, and the other deciding not to intervene 
in politics. Moreover, following the formation of the Iraqi state and the emergence 
of political parties, new Shi’a political groups emerged in the 1950s (Al-Khursan, 
1999) that called for changes to the social and political life, some of which wanted 
the establishment of an Islamic state or at least a commitment to Shari’a law (Sakai, 
2001). This new development was opposed by one group of al- Marja’iyya claiming 
that establishing political parties was a Western phenomenon and did not fit with 
Islam (Yamao, 2008).  
 
Other active Marja’iyya saw no conflict between the forming of political 
organisations and Islam. The Marjai’yya, such as Mohsin al-Hakim and Mohammad 
Baqir al-Sadr, were amongst those who endorsed their establishment (Sakai, 2001). 
Those who followed the political line that endorsed the religious establishment 
represent the Activist trend, while the other trend is known in literature as Quietist. 
The former was led by the founder of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SCIRI), the political groups belonging to which being renamed as the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in 2009. The founder of SCIRI, Mohammad Baqir al-
Hakim, was also the founder of one of the Shi’a NGOs that are studied in this thesis, 
namely: al-Mehrab Foundation for Islamic Preaching.  The Quietist trend pertains to 
the Shi’a Marja: al-Sistani. Following the war on Iraq and the collapse of the 
previous regime, these two trends became central to the new reality of what is 
known as the Shi’a revival, whereby they took advantage of the political 
opportunities that emerged. Next, it is important to explain the concept of the Shi’a 
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revival as it appears in the literature, and also clarify the terms: Quietism and 
Activism. 
 
5.2.1 The revival of the Shi’a 
 
The revival of Shi’a in the post-war era in Iraq can be understood as their 
empowerment following the toppling of the Ba’th regime, which is seen by some 
authors as a marker representing the end of a period of Sunni ascendancy (Jankunis, 
2007).  The political vacuum that followed the invasion of Iraq enabled the Shi’a 
political groups to seize power and practise their religious rituals on a massive scale. 
This achievement was seen as a gain that both the government and movement had 
to promote and protect (Nasr, 2006: 179). Given that they were able to seize power 
with support from the US, they are, unlike their counterpart Sunni Islamic NGOs, 
not motivated by an anti-Western agenda (Nasr, 2006). To the contrary, the Shi’a 
political groups and religious establishment have benefited from the democratic 
discourse that was brought by the US war on Iraq, seeing the elections as the way to 
win political power. The revival of the Shi’a has not gone unchallenged, for it has 
been subjected to a backlash (Jankunis, 2007) from the previous regime supporters, 
who were banned from taking power in the post war era through the de-
Ba’thfication policy that was announced in 2003. This policy (Nasr, 2006:198) has 
intensified conflict between the Shi’a newly emerged political groups, and the 
remnants of the previous regime, who redefined themselves as Sunnis, thus 
equating “de-Sunnification” policy with de-Ba’thfication (ibid). The post war conflict 
between the Shi’a and Sunni, according to Nasr (2006), opened up the old division 
between the two sects in relation to conflict over political power and resource 
distribution, The Shi’a revival has also been seen as a factor that empowered and 
emboldened the Shi’a outside of Iraq, such as those in Bahrain, the Shi’a minority in 
Saudi Arabia, and also Hezbollah in the Lebanon in its struggle against Israel 
(Hesova, 2007: 97). Despite the Shi’a political parties holding power in Iraq since the 
elections held in 2005, at the time of the writing of this thesis, the Sunni Islamic 
militias were controlling large amounts of Iraqi territory (Smith et al, 2014: 1), thus 
being a great threat to the state. However, the Shi’a groups in Iraq do not form a 
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homogeneous group and have been historically divided according to religious-
political tradition as Quietists and Activists, each linked NGOs.  
 
In sum, while the formation of political parties was a new development for the Shi’a 
in the 1950s, after 2003 another new entity arrived on the scene, namely, Shi’a non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  These NGOs were welcomed by the different 
sections of Shi’a, both Quietist and Activist, but before I consider the Shi’a NGOs in 
Iraq, it is pertinent to discuss the origins and characteristics of these two trends.  
 
5.2.2 Quietism and Activism 
 
In the post war era of 2003, the two concepts of Quietism and Activism attracted a 
lot of attention. This debate surfaced following the emergence of a powerful role 
for the Quietist Marja’iyya in Iraq in shaping the political map of the state post 
invasion (Braam, 2010). The literature shows that, historically, Quietism is 
longstanding in Shi’a politics (Rahimi, 2004; 2008, al-Kifaee, 2010; Braam, 2010; 
Rizivi, 2010; Smyth, 2012), with the key tenet of this trend being that Shi’a clerics 
must refrain from intervening and taking a political role over the Ummah, or Muslim 
community. This doctrine has resulted from the conviction that the Shi’a recognises 
no legitimacy for any fallible Imam to lead the Ummah. Under this lens, it is 
contended that religious clerics have to wait for the return of the hidden Twelfth 
Imam or the Hidden Imam27, Imam al-Mahdi, who represents a divine authority, 
being descended from the Prophet and that he will come back one day to end the 
corrupt political system; replacing it with a just society in line with Islam (Kadhem, 
2013; Marcinkowski, 2006; Kalanatari, 2012: Arjomand, 1979; Cook, 2011; Litvak, 
1998). Up until the return of the Imam, the Quietists believe that the clerics have a 
duty to advise according to the best interests of the Ummah, only if the political 
circumstances allow for this. If the political situation leads to violence or 
oppression, the Shi’a, whether lay or jurists, may utilise al-Taqqiyah. This refers to 
                                                 
27
 The last or the twelfth Imam of the Shi’a is a descendent of Mohammed and went into hiding in 
961 because of the political oppression of the Shi’a. He is believed to be coming back some time in 
the future.  
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the ‘dissimulation of faith’ by believers in order to protect themselves and live 
harmoniously with the government or oppressors (Arjomand, 1979; Marcinkowski, 
2006). The Shi’a religious establishment represented by al-Sistani is a key symbol of 
this trend.  
 
The Activist trend, although sharing the faith in the eventual return of the Hidden 
Imam, believe that religious clerics should not be passive as they have a duty to lead 
the Ummah until his return. The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution28 in Iraq 
(SCIRI) 29 was the first and most powerful representative of this trend, and it 
demanded the formation of a theocratic state in Iraq following the system of Iran, 
known as Welayat al-Faqih (jurist guardianship) (Jabar, 2003:424). The SCIRI 
advocates that the highest cleric or Marja has a right to rule the Ummah in social, 
religious and political affairs, whereby he is entitled to the role of the general 
deputy (niyaba 'amma) for the Hidden Imam30 until his return (Litvak, 1998). This 
claim was rejected by the Shi’a Quietists in Iraq represented by Marja’iyya Ali- Al-
Sistani, as they do not accept that fallible men can take up the role of leading the 
Ummah. In general, both trends formed linked NGOs after the war (Rahimi, 2004, 
Slavin, 2008). At this time, a serious debate emerged as to how the Activist/ Quietist 
dichotomy would play out in the new political era, given that the higher Marja’iyya 
of the Shi’a in Iraq, namely al-Sistani, who represents Quietism, became more 
politically proactive prior to the 2005 elections.  Whilst he maintained his traditional 
stance not to intervene directly in state politics, he did issue a Fatwa calling on all 
Shi’a to vote in the elections, which people acknowledged and took to mean they 
should elect Shi’a candidates. By contrast, the Activists, such as SCIRI, who had 
called before 2003 for Islamic revolution and the establishing of a form of state 
similar to Iran, i.e. Welayat al-Faqih, also joined the new political settlement by 
agreeing to compete for power through democratic elections. 
                                                 
28
 SCIRI is the Shi’a religious coalition established in 1982 in Iran and it adopted Welayat al-Faqih 
(jurist guardianship). This party changed its name in 2007 to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and 
is the founding father of the Martyr of al-Mehrab Foundation. Both the party and the FBO are led by 
Ammar al-Hakim, the grandson of the Mohsin al-Hakim, the activist Shi’a Marja, who died in 1970. 
29
 This party changed its name in 2007 to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq,  
30
 The Hidden Imam is al-Mahdi, who the Shi’a believe went into hiding in 961 and who will return 
one day to bring justice to the world. 
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Some authors reject viewing Quietism vs Activism as black vs. white, or politicised 
vs. unpoliticised (Smyth, 2012), as the new developments in Iraq led all Shi’a actors 
to revisit their stances in line with the new political opportunities. Smyth suggested 
that there has been a shift in Shi’a politics from the Quietist line towards a form of 
what he called ‘semi quietism’, as the Marja’iyya has stepped out from its 
traditional role; influencing the political process from Najaf where it is based. Smyth 
based his argument on the claim that  despite the Quietists rejecting the formation 
of an Islamic state, they have not been absent from intervention in politics. The 
above reviewed literature on Quietism and Activism, has touched upon the issue of 
the role of the clergymen in the state, however it has not considered the fact that 
both trends have formed linked NGOs. In fact, very few works have discussed the 
NGOs in Iraq and their links to political parties or the religious establishment and 
none of them have identified the existence of Shi’a NGOs. In the following section, 
the extant literature on NGOs in Iraq is first reviewed and this followed by 
discussion of the empirical findings from the field work regarding the formation of 
these organisations and their various characteristics.  
 
5.3 The new political opportunity and the formation of NGOs  
 
The NGOs concept was unheard of during Ba’th rule when the dominant form was 
the mass organisation linked to political parties, such as the Iraqi Communist Party, 
who established women’s organisations in Iraq for the first time (Fischer-Tahir, 
2010: 1383) and trade unions, the Ba’th Party, and the Islamic Da’wa Party (Yamao, 
2008: 247). These acted as arms of the political parties representing specific groups, 
such as: women; students; youth; peasants; and the trade unions. They were 
supported, funded, and supervised by the political parties and became “to some 
extent part of the party structure” (Nørlund, 2007: 74). The formation and the 
relationship between the members of these organisations were governed by their 
affiliation and belief in the ideology of their respective parties, which involved a 
high level of trust based on “comradeship” (Nørlund, 2007:84). Thus the political 
parties, whether they were communist, Islamist or Ba’thist, established linked 
organisations, for example, all formed women’s organisations (Fischer-Tahir, 2010: 
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1383). It was the communist party who pioneered this move of creating mass linked 
organisations and this structure was later adopted by the Ba’thist and Islamic 
parties in their struggles to obtain state power. However, those organisations linked 
to the communist and Islamists vanished once their political parties were attacked 
under the rule of the previous regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the 
only remaining ones eventually being those associated with the Ba’th party. Despite 
the fact there were no NGOs before 2003, charitable social welfare provision did 
exist, being run by religious networks that collected and distributed religious taxes. 
 
Here, it is pertinent to review the literature that has covered NGOs in Iraq, which 
highlights three main areas of interest: Their social role in providing for the poor 
and carrying out a range of activities to serve their communities; the negative 
impact of the link between the NGOs and political parties on the nascent democracy 
in Iraq; and the impact of the sectarian division of the distribution of humanitarian 
aid and social welfare provided by these NGOs. Slavin (2008) explained that NGOs, 
some of which are linked to political organisations, shouldered different 
responsibilities from the outset after the war, ranging from policing the roads and 
maintaining security after the collapse of the previous regime (Slavin, 2008), to 
collecting rubbish from the streets or carrying out missionary roles, such as 
promoting the values and teachings of Islam. Saral’s (2009) research affirms that the 
new religious networks provided important services, such as “medical care, 
education, marriage mediation and help for job search” (p18). The link between 
NGOs and political groups or the religious establishment has also attracted the 
attention of some authors, who have pointed out that these organisations were 
established by political groups and the religious Marja’iyya, such as the Martyr of al-
Mehrab Foundation, al-Sadr groups (Slavin, 2008) and al-Sistani’s organisational 
network (Rahimi, 2004). 
 
Rahimi (2004) highlighted the positive role played by al-Sistani’s social network in 
promoting democracy in Iraq and advancing a state-independent network of 
organisations. Whilst Kerr (2009) claimed that the link between the NGOs and 
religious parties would have a negative impact on the development of democracy as 
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any political role for these organisations would undermine their ability “to promote 
the independence and neutrality of civil society vis a vis the state” (Kerr, 2009:16), 
which would consequently entrench religious and political cleavage. That is, political 
ties would have a corrosive effect on the NGOs’ ability to perform effective 
surveillance of the state as well as their playing a useful role in engineering political 
change through lobbying, monitoring, education and mobilisation. Al-Shammam 
(2008) in his PhD thesis takes the debate further by explaining that Islamic NGOs in 
Iraq are, in fact, a product of these political parties, since they are funded and led by 
senior leaders who are high ranking politicians. As the religious parties are polarised 
on sectarian bases, therefore, their linked NGOs operate according to the sectarian 
divisions, which are not confined to the NGOs, for they also pertain to mosques.  
 
Given the sectarian nature of the political conflict following the collapse of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, mosques have played an important role as a place, not only for 
worship, but also for “providing information, ideology, and organization in the name 
of the religious group” (Hoffman, 2014 ). Furthermore, the mosques have turned 
into sites for political mobilisation. In general, in the Islamic world, Muslims gather 
for Friday prayer, whereby mosques have become places where they gather not 
only to be informed about religious affairs but also political ones. In addition to the 
Mosques, the Hussainaia have provided space for political mobilisation, in 
particular, during election times not only for the Shi’a, but also for the Sunnis 
(Hoffman, 2014). As a consequence, the mosques that accommodate collective 
prayer and Hussainaia that host the Shi’a rituals act in Jabar’s words “more like a 
political agent, information, and ideological center,". (Jabar, 2011: 22).  
 
The literature shows that mosques have been used by the religious establishment 
as well as Shi’a religious groups as places for mobilising community organisations. 
Mosques loyal to al-Sistani through their networks of Imams and preachers have 
demonstrated this activity on a widespread basis. In a similar way, those linked to 
the Sadrist networks have used the mosques in some areas to disseminate their 
political messages (Zuhur, 2006: 22). SCIRI, following the collapse of the regime, 
used mosques as avenues to denounce Saddam and put up posters of Mohammad 
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Baqir al-Hakim as well as al-Khomeini, seeking to gain control over Iraq’s main 
(Shiite) mosques (Middle East Report, 2007; 18).This gave the organisation a 
platform in many mosques to run the Friday sermon and also to make its political 
statements on a weekly basis.   
 
It is also apparent that in addition to the political role of mosques, they been 
involved in charity provision for those in need. For example, al-Sistani’s linked 
foundation, according to Rahimi, gave $25,000 to the imam of the mosque of 
Kadhemiya in Baghdad to be spent on charity in 2004. (Rahimi, 2007: 7). Clearly, 
Mosques have not been isolated from the socio-political affairs of the daily lives of 
Muslims in Iraq, but rather, have become important places for the Shi’a community 
organisations to thrive. This could explain the reason why Shi’a mosques were 
targeted frequently by Sunni insurgents, which reached a climax on 22nd February 
2006 when the Shi’a Imam mosques were bombed in Samara and resulted in 
sectarian violence sweeping the country and bringing it to the verge of civil war 
(Middle East Report, 2007; 13). 
 
Another stream of literature addresses the role of the NGOs in spreading the Islamic 
faith. Saeed (2010) highlighted how in the southern part of Iraq, an area populated 
by Shi’a, many NGOs have emerged as organisations affiliated to the sect that aim 
through their work with their communities to Islamisise society (2010: 76). Saral 
(2009) has pointed out that movements aiming to spread the word of Islam have 
almost always been present in Iraq, and that this vocation was taken up by newly 
established religious networks post 2003. Saral also claimed that division based on 
sectarian, religious, ethnic and tribal lines has been ever present in civil society and 
hence, a trans-ethnic network across this society is absent in Iraq. Consequently, 
this division is seen by many as being able to provide “an alternative for the 
aggregation of interests” (Saral, 2009:19). That is, this fragmentation amongst these 
NGOs has led them to “seek to influence their own societies by promoting 
segregation and conflicts and by fuelling the ethno-religious conflicts among them” 
(Saral, 2009:19).  
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Murphy (2004) contended that the principle of impartiality in social services aid 
provision by the NGOs is absent in Iraq, because these organisations divert the 
delivered aid to local groups of their affiliation. For instance, the author explains 
that funds from the Gulf countries to Sunni organisations in Iraq are distributed in 
line with these donors’ political agenda. Similarly, Hansen (2008) pointed out that 
external donors to the country provide support for people based on their sect. He 
attributed this as being the logical extension of the increasing sectarian divisions, 
whereby it “infers less impartiality and greater politicisation in resources allocation” 
(p26).  
 
From the above reviewed literature, it can be seen that there is marked absence of 
Shi’a NGOs being mentioned and consequently, there is no knowledge about their 
roles and outputs in the post war era or their objectives and functions.  Moving on 
to the field work, it emerged that the roles of the NGOs amongst those I 
interviewed from both state and non-state NGOs are unclear, which is perhaps not 
surprising as they have only emerged in the last decade in Iraq. However, the social 
and charitable roles of the religious establishment or al-Marja’iyya were confirmed 
to have existed even under the rule of the previous regime and have never been 
interrupted.  
 
An interviewee close to the Shi’a NGOs explains:  
 
RA C3: The regime would not allow the Marja’iyya to provide their support 
in a framework of NGOs, therefore, they could not go in the past to the 
houses and provide their support for those in need. The Moqaldin [the 
emulators, followers] and Wokala [al-Mara’iyya agent] carried out this 
responsibility on behalf of al-Marja’iyya, secretly. The charity work of al-
Marja’iyya existed before and now. The Marja’iyya never stopped its support 
and help for people. 
 
While religious charity provision was possible through the distribution of Zakat and 
Khums by and for Muslims, and justified as a religious duty under the rule of the 
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previous regime, secular provision of welfare was close to impossible and those 
who tried to engage in it could face severe punishment. An interviewee from a 
secular NGO explains this as follows:  
 
SM CA: The previous government had prevented any one from doing 
voluntary work and supporting others, This was seen as a political action. It 
happened that once they sentenced a doctor and pharmacist to prison who 
voluntarily initiated and offered free services to patients during the 
economic sanctions period as they did not get permission from the state and 
their action was considered as taking over the state’s role.   
 
The formation of NGOs was absolutely new and unknown to Iraqis. For this reason, 
there was the perspective that this phenomenon had been imported by people who 
came from abroad. Regarding which, according to the interviewees, these NGOs 
were mainly formed by exiled Iraqis who had experience of this type of organisation 
either in Western countries or in Kurdistan. Subsequent to the latter gaining 
autonomy after the first gulf war in 1991, NGOs31 became a feature of the 
landscape and after 2003 some of these Kurdish organisations extended their 
operations to the whole of Iraq (Fischer-Tahir, 2010). The founders of the new 
NGOs had access to international funders as well as knowledge about setting up 
projects and carrying out fundraising. However, these new experts in this field were 
not necessarily seen as a positive development and in one interview with a senior 
manager of the Ministry of Planning (MoP) he commented as follows: 
 
SM P1: these organisations were formed by people who were abroad and 
had no real knowledge about Iraqi society issues, and what are the society’s 
needs. All they talk about is gender… and they want to carry out surveillance 
on the state’s work….. Who are they to watch the state’s performance? We 
have been told that these NGOs have to attend our planning meetings. They 
                                                 
31
 I carried out interviews with Islamic Sunni NGOs in Kurdistan as well as secular NGOs, in which it 
was confirmed that these NGOs had existed for some time in the region.   In fact, the Islamic League, 
comprising Sunni NGOs, was established in 1988 in Germany by Kurdish exiles and then moved to 
inside Kurdistan in 1991. 
 106 
only talk and talk and do nothing…These people came back from exile and 
have no knowledge about how things are done here.  
 
The emergence of NGOs was also not celebrated by other state organisations. In my 
interview with a manager from one department of the Ministry of Work and Social 
Affairs (MoWSA) he stated the following:  
 
SM WS1: these NGOs work to get the poor’s votes in the elections. Wait and 
see.. when the elections come …you see they are here [in the ministry] all 
the time here, distributing for widows, for the disabled. They come to us and 
tell us that they want to distribute to the poor. They remember the poor 
only in the elections time, and then they disappear.  
 
An interviewee from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
reported: 
 
SM UN1: The UNDP tried with the Iraqi government to accept civil society as 
a development partner. We tried to make sure that the NGOs were 
represented in development project planning. But there is a huge confusion; 
there were many new things that were taking place at one time and so it 
was difficult to take all these changes together. The civil society here is like a 
bird that was for so long in a cage, suddenly you open the door, and you 
asked the bird to fly. The government do what they know, NGOs are 
immature, unprofessional. Like any thing else in the country is going through 
a transition era, it is going through changes in every thing, politically, in 
security, socially, and economically.  
 
Owing to the newness of the NGOs, the role of this sector remains unclear to many 
including those running the state institutions and the level of suspicion towards 
them is high. An interviewee from a women’s secular NGO explains:   
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SM WC1:   the statesmen have no idea what NGOs means. It happened that I 
spoke with a senior manager in one of the ministries, when I told her we are 
NGOs, or we are CSOs; she said what does that mean….they do not like us. 
They think we are competing with them, or we want to occupy some 
positions in the state.   
 
Suspicion of the intentions of the NGOs was also expressed by interviewees from 
Shi’a NGOs, regarding which one from al-Mehrab shares:  
 
SM M5: we are not like any other organisations who distribute for the poor 
in the elections time. We provide for the poor all year long.   
 
Despite the wish of the international organisations to integrate the NGOs into the 
development plan, in terms of making a contribution to its different stages of 
planning, implementation, and monitoring, alongside the state, the responses from 
the ministries were not encouraging. An interviewee from a secular NGO reports: 
 
SM CA1: The current state is similar to the state we had before the war.  It 
still has a key role, and this role was articulated in the constitution; it is 
clarified that the state is responsible to provide for the needs of different 
layers of Iraqi society: children, youth, women. It explained that the state 
shoulders the larger responsibility. The acknowledgement of the role of civil 
society, was extracted forcefully from politicians, and it was indicated in a 
very weak way in the constitution. 
 
Given their only having been around for a few years, the NGOs’ role in development 
in the era after the war of 2003 has yet to be investigated in any detail and in fact, 
they are rarely mentioned in this context in the literature. In my correspondence 
with Frank Gunter, the author of a work about the political economy of Iraq, on the 
24th April 2014, regarding their role he stated the following: 
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“When I left Iraq in 2009, NGOs were in their infancy and - due to their questionable 
legitimacy - were making a very limited contribution to Iraqi society. There are 
several reasons for the perceived lack of legitimacy. Many Iraqis seemed to distrust 
these organizations as being foreign innovations since they only appeared after the 
U.S. led invasion in 2003. Also, I think that the GoI [Government of Iraq] saw the 
NGOs not only as vocal critics of GoI actions, but also as competitors in that they 
sought to provide some of the same services that the GoI tried and failed to 
provide. Finally, there is the question of finance. NGOs that are funded by the GoI, 
political parties, religious groups, etc. are not seen as independent voices”. 
 
Thus, from the field work interviews, it seems that after a decade of work by the 
NGOs in Iraq there is still suspicion about these organisations’ motivations and 
intentions. This is not only the perspective of state organisations, as became 
apparent through my interviews with respondents from two ministries of the GoI, 
for this has also been reported as being problematic by the NGOs themselves, both 
religious and secular.  
 
Despite there being little information about their role, the field work shows that 
NGOs in Iraq are carrying out work across the country, are legal and have funds 
allocated to them either by their linked political group, through religious donation, 
the state, or internationally. Their formation and regulation began in 2003, when 
the CPA issued Order 45 concerned with these matters, which was followed by the 
establishment of a specialised ministry for civil society organisations. However, this 
was dissolved later on due to the notion that civil society had to be independent 
from government. Order 45 was seen, on the one hand, as a positive development 
when it was passed, as it aimed to control the rapidly mushrooming number of 
NGOs. However, on the other hand it was criticised owing to its restrictive nature, 
whereby it failed to meet the minimum standards for NGOs. Subsequently, law 12 
was issued in 2010, which was perceived as a positive development, because it “is 
considered as one of the best and most liberal NGO laws in the region” (NCCI, 2011: 
23) In addition to this law, a General Directorate of NGOs was established linked to 
the prime minister’s office charged with supervising NGOs' affairs (NCCI, 2011: 22) 
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and their role was also acknowledged in the constitution in 2005 in article 45, which 
declares that the state shall seek “to strengthen the role of civil society institutions 
and to support, develop, and preserve their independence” (Iraq constitution, 
2005). 
 
The number of registered NGOs, according to Saeed (2010), in 2005 was 2,535, in 
2006 was 5,071, in 2007 was 5,669 and in 2008 was 7,000. However, following the 
issuing of law 12, the number registered declined to 1,681 in 2013 and 1,831 were 
unregistered as they lacked the basic requirements (NGO Directorate, 2012). There 
is no formal distinction between religious and secular NGOs, but many of the 
former use Islamic symbols in their names and/or religious leaders’ names. For 
example, 87 organisations carry a reference to Islamic Shi’a phenomena or names, 
such as; ahl-al-Bayt, Fatima, Zainab, Mawakib, al-Hussain, al-Hawra, Imam, al-Zahra, 
al-Karrar, al-Mehrab, or simply Islam. Other Shi’a organisations investigated for this 
research show no indication of their orientation in their names, but are still 
motivated to act in line with Islamic values. From my interviews with state and non-
state NGOs, both religious and secular as well as international, I identified five types 
according to their objectives, which I describe below.   
 
First: Voluntary social initiatives, which started straight away after the war 
performing social work that served the public good in a particular suburb or sector. 
For example, in the education sector a number of such initiatives were organised at 
the grassroots level to address the shortfall in schooling. This could involve 
transferring teachers in war affected areas or forming groups of men to protect 
female students from violence on their way to and from school. In my interview 
with a female academic who took part in these initiatives to support local 
communities, she explained that their aim was to protect their community and to 
ensure that daily life carried on normally, in particular, for students in their schools. 
She explained the purpose of their work as follows:   
 
L PS1: when the state institutions collapsed, civil society organised itself by 
itself; we organised groups to clean streets; we dealt with the lack of 
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security situation, we adopted a system where teachers could resume their 
work in schools close to their homes instead of having to travel to schools 
away from where they worked. Voluntarily committees were formed by 
fathers and brothers to escort girls to and from their schools, and also to 
guard them while they were there. We decided to move the final exams in 
universities to July instead of May; this has happened for the first time. We 
were connected with each other, nobody was giving us orders, we organised 
it ourselves. But, once the money poured in for the civil society 
organisations, people’s spirits were badly affected”.  
 
The availability of funds impacted negatively on civil voluntary initiatives as the 
competition over them directed the focus away from the community to self-serving 
practices and as a result, these groups vanished or were turned into registered 
NGOs. In my interview with al-Thabat the respondents affirmed that when they 
started as pious Shi’a women to conduct Muhrram (the first month of Islamic 
calendar)  rituals and the mourning sessions of al-Hussain, they had not heard about 
NGOs, however, later on they came to understand that they could turn their 
voluntary initiative into a formal NGO.  
 
Second: A group of NGOs was established by those who became aware that this 
kind of organisation could run projects by being funded by international donors. The 
funds were made available so as to promote such matters as democracy, gender 
equality and human rights awareness. In particular, money was donated on the eve 
of the elections so that these NGOs would educate their service users about the 
meaning of democracy and the purpose of voting. In my interview with a secular 
NGO, the respondent explained that in the first two years following the war the 
focus was on humanitarian support, but just before the elections this shifted to a 
project to promote democracy, as this was the desire of the international donors.  
 
Third: There is a group of organisations that are either religiously or politically 
linked NGOs. That is, this group was formed or at least inspired by the religious 
authority or al-Marja’iyya, or directly linked to political parties and they are funded 
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by these entities. They are Islamic NGOs32, some of which are Shi’a established as 
organising bodies for ritual activities, whilst others were formed on the eve of the 
first elections and were indirectly involved in the writing of the constitution. An 
interviewee close the al-Marja’iyya linked to the NGO Directorate33 explains:  
 
SM ND1: In regard to the Shi’a NGOs, there are two types of organisations, 
those that were established by al-Marja’iyya directly, and they are 
significant, others are only supervised by his office. The organisations that 
are supervised by al-Sistani may not be known widely, but they are massive. 
The Imam Redha institution has built first class schools. Mohammad Hussein 
Fadlallah’s34 organisation is a very powerful one. Mr Haji’s35 organisation 
follows al-Sistani. The Martyr of al-Mehrab36, his two sons, each has his 
own organisations. Regarding the Saeed al-Hakim37 foundation, two of his 
sons have their own organisations. These are massive Shi’a organisations. 
Fadlallah has a hospital for cancer disease. 
 
The representative from the Directorate of the NGOs explained to me the scope of 
the projects of the Shi’a NGOs, which includes: hospitals, schools, orphanages, 
libraries and internet coffee shops. Moreover, he confirmed that there are more 
new projects on the agenda of al-Marja’iyya that are mainly directed at the 
education of youths. The directorate interviewee reported that the funding of some 
of the Shi’a NGOs is substantial and that much of the money is collected through 
Khums (religious tax)  This has, in fact, provided them with a source of income that 
is unavailable to their counterpart Sunni NGOs (Halm, 2007).  
 
                                                 
32
 Other organisations, such as al-Mehrab, were established in Iran before the war on Iraq, and 
moved after 2003 to Iraq.  
33
 General Directorate of NGOs is a governmental institution that is linked to the Council of Ministries 
and it supervises the work of the NGOs.  
34
 A Shi’a Lebanese Marja who has followers in Iraq and whose organisation has its own linked NGOs 
that run health projects and a hospital in Baghdad.  
35
 This is a nickname of one of interviewees that I met in the NGOs directorate who also leads an 
NGO.  
36
 The first political leader of ISCI, Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, who was killed in September 2003.  
37
 One of four key Shi’a Marja based in Najaf. 
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Fourth: Family based NGOs are linked to prominent Shi’a families who enjoy a high 
reputation and have earned the public’s trust for their religious role and their social 
provision for the poor. This type of NGO is well known in Arab countries, especially 
in the Lebanon (Jawad, 2009).  
 
Fifth:  Iraq has also witnessed the formation of what is known in the literature as 
briefcase NGOs (Lee, 2014). The term brings forth “imagery of an impeccably 
dressed individual holding a well-written proposal in a briefcase. The individual 
leading the briefcase NGO receives funding for their proposals, but ultimately 
pockets the money for themselves rather than use it for any programs”( Lee, 2014). 
This form of organisation emerges “in response to a particular situation”, especially 
in corrupt states (Ferris, 2005: 318). They have been operating in both the central 
state and the Kurdistan region, being established by unscrupulous individuals who 
disappear with the money after just one project or not implementing any. 
According to some respondents, they have given NGOs, in general, a bad 
reputation.  
 
From the above descriptions, it can be seen that Iraqi NGOs, have a range of 
activities, including social welfare, development, support for democratisation and 
advocacy. Consequently, although they have been acknowledged and regulated it 
remains unclear as to what their role should be. Moreover, the state, as has 
become apparent from the fieldwork and the literature, continues to play a key role 
in all aspects of Iraqi life despite the efforts to reduce its involvement. For example, 
the state provision of the public distribution system or monthly ration that has been 
available in Iraq since 1991 remains a social safety net that provides for more than 
one million citizens, including the most vulnerable, such as orphans, widows and 
the disabled, from an allocated budget of more than $500 million per year (US 
Embassy press release, 2013). Following this brief introduction to the five types of 
NGOs in Iraq, my interest is now focused on Shi’a ones, many of which appear to 




5.4 Shi’a NGOs’ sources of funding for their activities 
 
The NGOs do not “float freely in social space” (Salamon,2010:190), but rather, they 
are guided by their own vision whether religiously or politically driven, running 
different  activities aimed at helping those in need and providing services, such as 
health and education. They have set up hospitals and schools to advance their 
missionary goals and reach out to wider communities. This form of organisation 
spreads in a situation where there is religious pluralism (James, 1987). They have 
the incentive to reach out and communicate their political or religious objectives 
and they are firmly “embedded” in the prevailing social, political and economic 
structures (Salamon, 2010: 190). They operate in an array of relations between 
citizens, other organisations, and the wider society. In the literature, the NGO is 
considered as one of the components of the contemporary political setting that 
contributes along side other governmental agencies to provide social welfare, 
development, and/or advocacy, in particular, as participants in social policy 
formation.  
 
The Shi’a NGOs were formed by different groups, such as: political parties; the 
religious establishment; Shi’a families; and Shi’a grassroots activists. I carried out 
interviews with five Shi’a NGOs, however, I decided to focus on those representing 
two trends within the sect: Activists and Quietists. al-Mehrab adheres to the former 
stance and is linked a political party, ISCI, whilst the others are the CDF, an umbrella 
organisation and one of its members, al-Thabat, both of the Quietist persuasion. 
Here, I shed some light on the financial resources of these NGOs, which is important 
as their financial capacities determine their ability to reach out and serve their 
community. al-Mehrab is funded by ISCI, the state, international donors, and from 
religious resources, such as Khums. The CDF is also funded by the state and 
internationally, while al-Thabat, having no links to political parties, relies heavily on 
their community’s religious taxes. Regarding which, al-Thabat was advised by its 
advisor, the Wakil of al-Sistani, as follows:  
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SM T1, the Sayad (Mister) told us that the organisation has to learn how to 
raise money from the people, learn how to communicate with others in a 
good way, in a way that makes people feel confident to donate their money, 
and that their money will not be wasted. The money goes for the sake of 
God. The funds we receive from people is not little, it is from the society, as 
we are not linked to a political party, and we do not have other links that tie 
us to others. 
 
Their local community work with their women service users attracted the attention 
of political groups inside and outside of Iraq, who approached the organisation, 
offering, according to the interviewees, huge amounts of money to support the 
expansion of their welfare provision programme. However, the members of al-
Thabat feared that if they accepted the money, this would mean that they would be 
forced to act politically in line with the donor’s agenda, which they were not 
prepared to do. One of the interviewees clarified this as follows:  
 
SM T2: Accepting big amounts of money means accepting big demands as 
well. We have been approached by the political parties here, and also, 
because we are Shi’a organisation, it is Iran and not Saudi who will approach 
us. Iran supports many organisations, and we see no wrong with that, since 
the organisations are providing for the poor, helping the needy and running 
wide educational programmes. There is nothing wrong with all these, but… 
we are afraid... that... we might be seen as an Iranian agent… by other 
international donors... so we do not want to lose the potential opportunity 
to be funded by other international ones, we want to keep our autonomy.  
 
al-Thabat, as a Quietest organisation, attribute their inability to access to state 
funding as their not being linked to any political parties. Therefore, they are much 
less fortunate than their counterpart Shi’a NGOs, like al-Mehrab, who have access 
to the government’s social benefits fund. In my interview with a secular women’s 
organisation, I was informed that the state began this programme in 2009, through 
which money was transferred from the state budget to the members of parliament, 
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who were tasked with redistributing these monies to their constituency. These 
funds were stopped after a while, as acts of corruptions were found in the 
distribution and subsequently, when they were resumed they were distributed in a 
much tighter way that was closely audited.  Regarding the earlier arrangements, she 
explained: 
 
SM WC2: In 2009, the state granted 50 NGOs social benefits. Most of the 
organisations that received the fund are those linked to people in the 
government or parliament mainly with religious affiliations. For example, the 
al-Jafari organisation for women, Jalal al-Deen al-Sagher received 98 million 
Dinar (approximately US $ 90,000).  
 
To summarise, NGOs that are not linked to political parties, like al-Thabat, are not 
eligible for state funding. In any case, al-Thabat prefers to maintain its loyalty with 
al-Sistani’s approach, keeping its distance from any political parties and thus, they 
rely mainly on religious money donated by pious Muslims. al-Mehrab, as an 
organisation that is linked to a political group, ISCI, has secured access to both 
governmental and international funds, regarding which a senior manager 
commented:  
 
SM I1 we have funds from the state sometimes, we submit our programmes 
and they provide us with grants to cover the costs38.  
 
With regards to gaining international funding, al-Thabat has failed so far, with a 
member of the management committee explaining that although they attended 
many training courses organised by some of these funders, their proposals had 
never been successful. As a member of that NGO explains:  
 
                                                 
38
 The experience of the Islamic Sunni CSOs shows that the support of the state for these 
organisations includes sometimes paying the wages of some employees of the organisations, 
however, it is not known if such provision from the state to NGOs is also practised with the Shi’a 
NGOs in the central state.  
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SM T2 We receive no funding from international donors. Every time we were 
told to ‘submit a proposal and you will get something’, we tried, al-Noor 
association39 tried too, but every time we were told that our applications 
were not successful. We have heard that there is corruption in the 
international organisations. Their representatives here are Iraqis and they of 
course facilitate the funds for those they know and are close to them. We 
know nobody there, and that is why we cannot get funds.  
 
By contrast, al-Mehrab does receive international support, as an interviewee from 
ISCI explains:  
 
SM I1: At the beginning we thought that international donors prefer secular 
NGOs, but that was not true, they granted all organisations equally in 
professional way. Although the name of our organisation indicates our 
identity, however, we have gained their trust. This has a positive influence 
on people here; they see us as trusted organisation that is able to attract 
funding for its projects from abroad, from international organisations.  
 
To summarise, NGOs linked with political parties or those close to the government 
are more fortunate as they can obtain financial resources from the state and 
international donors. However, Shi’a working at grassroots level, as in the case of al-
Thabat, have to rely on pious Muslims’ donations and their community. The reliance 
on religious taxes given by the Muslim community has remained a fundamental 
steadfast source for providing for welfare, regardless of whether those 
organisations providing it are linked to political parties in power or not.  In sum, 
financial sources are essential for NGOs to carry out their activities and those linked 
to political parties are able to obtain more money than those with links to the 
religious establishment and those with no association with either of these.  
 
 
                                                 
39
 al- Noor is a Shi’a women’s organisation that works closely with al-Thabat, some leading members 




This chapter has shown that the formation of the Shi’a sect was from the outset 
political in nature, being attributed in the literature to political conflict for power 
since the seventh century. The consolidation of the Shi’a as a religious sect was the 
result of the political oppression against this denomination by other Islamic 
Caliphate states that ruled the territory of Iraq since the birth of Islam (Kadhem, 
2012). In response to the historical oppression, the Shi’a religious establishment 
adopted the position of staying away from politics. However, the formation of Iraq 
as a state after the British left and the formation of political parties, brought the 
Shi’a back to the political scene, which included the involvement of the Activist 
trend who claimed that religion should be at the heart of the state. Nevertheless, 
this was not entirely accepted by all Marja’iyya and the trend known as the 
Quietists contended that the Shi’a religious authorities should remain apolitical. The 
new developments in Iraq post the invasion of 2003 brought the Shi’a the 
opportunity for the first time to rule. This was conceptualised by Nasr (2006) as the 
era of the revival of Shi’a. Another new development for this the sect took place 
during this period; the formation of NGOs or sometimes called civil society 
organisations. The chapter has briefly explained how some of the NGOs were 
perceived with some trepidation, for they were considered to represent outside 
influence in the country’s affairs. Amongst these organisations were Islamic Shi’a 
NGOs, which, as in other Middle Eastern countries, have worked successfully to 
support their communities by providing services for the poor. Also, as with these 
nations, the Islamic Shi’a NGOs set out to influence the state and society by 
exploiting their religious or political affiliations. Evidence has been provided that 
these affiliations and the intentions of these NGOs have determined their sources of 







Chapter 6: Social services activities of the Shi’a NGOs  
  
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on analysing the social provision activities run by Shi’a NGOs. 
In doing so, the research questions addressed are: what are the main social 
services, religious, or political activities that they are engaged in? And what is the 
significance of these services and activities for the state and society in Iraq? More 
specific questions addressed are: what are the social services that Shi’a NGOs are 
engaged with? For who and why are these NGOs engaged in these particular 
programmes? What do they provide? How do they provide it? What are the 
expected outcomes of their provision? Two Shi’a NGOs, al-Mehrab and al-Thabat, 
are the contexts where these enquiries will take place. It is contended that 
providing for the poor serves three connected aims: it helps the poor, in particular 
widows and orphans as well as well young people who lack financial resources for 
weddings; enforces theological social behaviour; and also it expects to bring about 
political outcome from the service user loyalty to their providers.  The underline 
objectives of the social provision of the Shi’a NGOs appear to be directed to protect 
family.  
 
This chapter will study the most important welfare provisions: the in-cash transfer 
for widows and orphans or Kafala, and collective wedding ceremonies. It is divided 
into three sections: section 6.2; understand the motivation and the values behind 
welfare provision for widows and orphans; section 6.3 analysing sponsorship of 
widows and orphans; section 6.4 will analyse the collective wedding ceremonies for 
young poor men. Section 6.5 is devoted to understand the Shi’a NGOs’ social welfare 
influence on the poor and wider society. Each section will explain the values that 
underpinned the motivation and the justification of each provision. It is also will 





6.2 Sponsoring widows and orphans - or Kafalat al-Yateem  
 
This section will explain one of the most significant and common provisions for Shi’a 
NGOs, i.e. cash transfers for widows and orphans, through their provision of Kafalat 
al-Yateem (sponsorship of orphans). All Shi’a NGOs cater for these groups, including 
the two NGOs, al-Mehrab and al-Thabat.  The socioeconomic situation of widows 
and orphans situation in Iraq has already been explained in chapter 4, affirming that 
the war and further violence created a large number of female-headed households, 
who can be especially vulnerable to intergenerational poverty (Buvinic et al., 2013). 
In the following I will explain the meaning of Kafalat al-Yateem, exploring the key 
values that inform this provision. 
 
6.2.1 Kafalat al-Yateem (sponsorship of orphans): Religious justification  
 
Kafala is an Arabic word which means sponsorship. In this chapter it refers to cash 
donated to widows and orphans. It is a form of social charity aimed at assisting poor 
widowed families with small amounts of money because of the loss of the main 
breadwinner of the family, or male member(s). The Kafala is financial assistance 
provided by a pious Muslim to another Muslim who is an orphan or widow. This 
provides the poor with small sums of money so as “to guarantee, to help, to take 
care of one another’s needs” (Mughal, 2008: 21). It entails two parties: the Kafil (the 
donor), who is usually a pious person making his or her donation to a poor orphan 
or widowed family; and Makfol (the poor) or the sponsored orphan or widow. An 
interviewee from al-Mehrab defined an orphan as a child, male or female, who has 
lost his or her father. The definition of the family adopted by the Shi’a NGOs is in 
line with Pahl’s conception, which states that the family is “composed of two 
married parents and their children, with a father as the main breadwinner and the 
mother as the homemaker” (Pahl, 2012: 127). Consequently, families who have lost 
their breadwinner are an important category for Kafala, provided by the state, non-
state organisations or even individuals. The religious donations, whether voluntarily 
or obligatory, is a duty ‘imposed on all’, including NGOs. A rich person was defined 
by an interviewee from al-Mehrab as the one who “owns a hoard enough for him 
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and his family for more than a year and has economic security” He is obliged to 
watch over others’ needs, in particular for those who are less resourced and more 
vulnerable, such as widowed families. In the following, I explain the motivations 
that guide the provision for widows and orphans. 
 
6.2.2 The religious motivation for social provision 
 
Generally, the focus on supporting orphans is common to most Islamic NGOs as 
there are many references in the Quran as well as in the Hadith (speeches of 
Mohammad) emphasising the importance of taking care of orphans. Mohammad 
said that those who provide for orphans will be with him in paradise and “The best 
house among the believers is the one in which an orphan is treated well and the 
worst house among the believers is the one in which an orphan is mistreated” (Duh, 
2010: 2). It is also referred to in one of Mohammad’s Hadith which states that for 
Muslims to be able to realise their goals, they must have pity on orphans and 
provide them with the food (Krafess, 2005: 333). Given that wars, economic 
sanctions, civil war and political oppression cost the lives of hundreds of the 
thousands of men, which led to an increasing number of orphans and widows, this 
provoked the Shi’a NGOs to step in to provide for their needs.  
 
In this chapter, it is argued that providing for the poor is motivated by religious, 
social and political concerns. The first driver of this provision stems from the notion 
that providing for the poor is a religious duty that is instructed by God; and Muslims 
are obliged to respond to this. The fulfilment of this responsibility or Takleef, brings 
God’s satisfaction as well as divine rewards in life and in the after life. Muslims who 
provide for the poor will gain Ajr and Thawab (recompense/compensation/reward), 
which are among the most powerful motivations for pious donors as well for the 
administrators. Thwab and Ajr include blessing in life by more fortune, success, 
increased wealth, and reduction in envy the poor. The workers of these 
organisations perceive their work as a blessed work, fulfilling a divine duty since this 
includes helping the poor by administrating and facilitating the transfer of religious 
money from the Kafil to the Makfol. An interviewee from al-Mehrab explains:  
 121 
 
SM M3: God, May He be Glorified and Exalted, imposes a religious duty 
upon us to donate to others from our money; Zakat and Khums, even the 
Sadaqqa we give away  in the streets are all parts of social care. When God 
imposes this, he did not enforce it on one political party for all are required 
to pay it. The Muslim has to pay Khums; other donations are recommended 
to be made for those in need since people like to do good deeds for Thawab 
and Ajr. Shari’a calls on us to do so. These donations act like a safety valve 
for a Muslim’s morals, for it helps him to stay away from bad deeds such a 
corruption. This money is paid for God; it shows Muslim loyalty, their 
commitment to the lord of the universe. 
 
al-Mehrab employees, although they are paid workers, understand their role is 
motivated by the religious order, and hope to gain God’s pleasure. As an 
interviewee from al-Mehrab put it:  
 
E M8: When I work, I do not want a result from the organisation, the result 
of our work is saved with Allah, the lord of the universe. Even if my 
organisation does not grant me my rights, what is most important is God’s 
satisfaction of our work, when we provide Sadaqqa, we give it for the sake 
of God.  
 
6.3 The Kafala provision to protect the family and the wider society  
 
In the Islamic, hierarchal and patriarchal context the father assumes the role of the 
head of the household (Binghalib, 2011: 4). Shi’a NGOs appear to uphold the 
patriarchal view that men are the breadwinners and are central to the family. Men 
have two roles: “to protect” and “to dominate” (Haddad, 2006:59). He is not only 
responsible for securing the livelihood of his family, but also for monitoring their 
social norms, i.e. watching out for the behaviour of both his siblings and his wife. 
The father, therefore, has a social role, for he “acts as the representative of the 
family to society at large, presenting the families beliefs, values and morals (Mourad 
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and Carolan, 2010). Consequently, the absence of the male breadwinner creates a 
gap not only in terms of livelihood, but also regarding the protection of family. From 
this perspective, the intervention of other Muslims is seen by Shi’a NGOs and by all 
Muslims as necessary to maintain both the livelihood the family and to inform their 
social behaviour. An interviewee from al-Mehrab explains:  
 
 SM M1: Our aim is to protect the family through helping widows, orphans 
and families who lack living means. Our work is to protect and safeguard the 
family entity. To have a good society, Mojtam’a Salih, we have a Takleef 
(religious responsibility and intervention) that is imposed upon all Muslims. 
 
Providing widowed families with cash support or other kinds of social assistance, for 
the Shi’a NGOs, serves to protect the family from seeking any unacceptable means 
to make their living and to inform their social behaviour. They contend that any 
harm to the family resulting from the absence of a male breadwinner, has a 
negative on the wider society of Muslims or Ummah because society is formed of a 
congregation of families. This is a shared objective that motivates and informs the 
two focal Shi’a NGOs’ welfare provision. An interviewee from al-Mehrab explained 
the consequences of not helping: 
 
SM M1: If the NGOs do not reach some families who are in need either for 
medical assistance or food, this will lead to psychological breakdown, 
aberration, moral drift, and deviant behaviour from the family side. These 
threaten the family and society. 
 
Another interviewee from al-Mehrab explains the Islamic vision in maintaining the 
family as a model to protect the wider society: 
 
SM M3: The experience of Islam in family building is very successful. The 
family can resist and hold for a long time and will not collapse quickly. This is 
because this institution [the family] is based on a number of principles and 
disciplines that inform its behaviour, and guide it towards security and 
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sustainability. I believe if humans uphold the idea that society is formed 
from a congregation of families, these families live with each other and they 
will watch out for each others’ needs.  
 
One of the important justifications for supporting the poor in Maqasid al-Shari’a or 
the Shari’a objectives, is that it allows the poor to carry out religious duties. The 
family is defined as a “microcosm of the Umma” (Ra’uf citied in McLarney, 2010: 
129) and as the smallest but fundamental cell of society, “where the most 
important basic rules of a community are exercised and practised” (Mohagheghi, 
2006: 71). It is seen as the place where children receive their religious education, 
learn the right social behaviour, and are taught that they should show mercy 
towards one another. Moreover, it should shape the youth and women’s behaviour, 
such that family members remain chaste and unpolluted. In sum, the Shi’a NGOs 
take the view that society will act in harmony and be protected from social and 
economic harm when families are sufficiently religiously and financially endowed so 
as to be able to contribute to the stability of the Ummah. 
 
An interviewee from ISCI put it as:  
 
SM I1: we believe that the family is the basic ‘infrastructure’ of society. The 
society is not based on individuals; there are no individuals outside the 
family. Individuals are members of a family. The building of the family is the 
way to build a society. We see the family as the first social unit.  
 
An interviewee from the CDF states their vision in regard to the importance of 
family:  
 
SM C2: what Islam wants is a system in place; we have our traditions that we 
are obliged to submit to, regardless of whether we agree with them or not. 
These traditions confirm the importance of the mercy for each other. We 
believe that successful families do create a successful society. 
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This enforces the notion that a good society that follows the path of Islam could be 
established if families act in line with religion; this way, families “share the same 
‘thick’ values” (Shani, 2008: 729). In Ra’uf’s words, the family forms a “political unit 
of Islamic Umma” (cited in McLarney: 2010: 129) or as another scholar puts it, the 
family represents the Umma as writ small, and the Umma represents the family as 
writ large (McLarney, 2010: 129).Thus, any challenge to the family, such as the 
absence of the father is thought not only to affect the family but also society as a 
whole. For this reason, the Shi’a NGOs shoulder their religious responsibility in 
meeting widowed families’ needs and the young men who are in need for help in 
forming their own families. Following the exploration of the key motivations for the 
Shi’a NGOs social welfare involvement, I now turn to consider their types of  
provision, to whom it is given, how it is collected and distributed as well as the 
theological implications regarding their participation.  
 
6.3.1 The Shi’a NGOs Kafala provision and other support 
 
Before discussing the Kafala provision, it is useful to address the support for widows 
and orphans provided by the state. In 1980, Social Care Law 126 was passed, which 
provided state provision for Iraqis unable to work as well as widows and orphans. 
The government of the day justified this law through the notion of achieving “social 
justice, and to widen distribution of resources to reach those who are most in need” 
(Ebrahim and Hussain, 2009: 112). The provision was funded and administrated by 
the state ministries. In 2004, a reform of the social care under the Social Safety Net 
was introduced targeting the poor and vulnerable population, including orphans 
and widows (De Freitas and Johnson, 2012: 13). This programme provides widows 
with 50,000 to 120,000 Iraqi Dinars (43 to 103 USD) in cash per month, adjusted by 
the number of household dependents (IOM-IRAQ Special Report, 2011: 8).  
However, according to Alkhoja and Dawan, the cash transfers have only reached 6 
percent of the 22 percent of the population living below the poverty line (Alkhoja 
and Dawani, 2013: 1) In particular, corruption by Social Safety Net programme 
administrators has  made  the current cash transfer system not been very effective 
(Alkhoja and Dawani, 2013), According to interviewees from the Ministry of Work 
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and Social Affairs (MoWSA), some governmental effort has been put into fighting 
corruption40, but it is still widely present.   
 
Governmental social assistance has not stopped or prevented the Shi’a NGOs from 
providing for widowed families as they are motivated by both their religious 
responsibility and their understanding of the impact if their needs are left unmet. al-
Mehrab is known for its Kafala provision, with the total number of the orphans being 
supported through the Kafalat Al-Yateem project which has reached, in some years 
186,000 orphans; but by March 2013, the number was 85,000 orphans as was stated 
by a senior manager of al-Mehrab. This has been mainly distributed geographically 
across all cities in the middle and southern parts of Iraq with orphans in Kurdistan 
also being entitled to the NGO’s support. However Najaf city, Basrah and Baghdad 
are the top three cities for the distribution of Kafala. This provision is run by the 
charity department; one of the most important sections of al-Mehrab, which began 
its work for widows and orphans in May 2003 through cash transfer, in kind 
provision, capacity building for widows, and organising collective wedding 
ceremonies for youth who want to wed but lack the financial capacity to do so, as 
discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
 
al-Mehrab distribute to every widow Kafala of approximately 24,000 Dinars 
(US$ 20-22) for widowed families the in-cash transfer which is usually paid 
bimonthly. However, sometimes the donor decides the amount of the cash 
for every orphan. For example a donor from Bahrain informed al-Mehrab, 
according to the interviewees that he is willing to make 24.000 for every 
orphan. al-Mehrab in some occasions bring the amount of cash distributing to 
around 10.000 Dinars  and sometimes it replaces the whole amount with 
different kind of goods distribution, such as rugs, or sometimes provides 
swing machines instead of cash.  
 
                                                 
40
 This was explained to me by the interviewees who brought many examples of state officials’ 
corruption.  
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al-Mehrab distributes its Kafala by phoning widowed women and asking them 
to come to collect their money. The workers make lists to call and every time 
a group of 50 women attend their office, which is located in better off 
residential areas and has some security measures. The widowed women are 
usually invited to come to the office on a specific date and at a set time. The 
worker, in her room, calls the name of the woman one by one to hand the 
cash for them. To give a sense of what this amounts to in terms of purchasing 
power in the Iraq market, I list here the prices of a number of items per 
kilogramme in dollars:  lamb meat US$ 9, fish US$ 3-4, and a dozen eggs US$ 
3-4, tomato US$ 1 and the minimum rent in southern cities of Shi’a populated 
areas was US$ 250 per month in March 2013. In addition to the provision of 
Kafala, the organisation sometimes provides widows with rugs, cookers, 
and/or refrigerators. al-Mehrab also provides capacity building programmes 
for widows and to this end, a number of workshops and training schemes are 
organised. An interviewee from al-Mehrab made the following statement: 
 
SM M6: We do not pay in cash only, but also we organise sewing 
courses to enable women socially. We do this so that widows do not 
need to rely on anyone any more. We have distributed so far 23,000 
sewing machines to widows. This means we have made available job 
opportunities where women can work and at the same time maintain 
their dignity and honour. And we organise courses to eliminate 
illiteracy. 
 
Hence it can be seen that al- Mehrab’s provision goes beyond cash transfers, for it is 
also aimed at capacity building for women to enable them to sustain their living by 
themselves. Whether all the supported women would be able to make their living 
through sewing, is unknown, however, this training does give them the possibility of 
alleviating their circumstances. In addition, al-Mehrab is aware that when working 
towards obtaining jobs for widowed women it has to protect their dignity through 
finding work that is mainly gender based and avoids mixing with men. By so doing, 
this Shi’a NGO is providing Kafala whilst at the same time protecting societal values.  
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al-Thabat, as explained in chapter 3, was formed as an organisation with its first and 
foremost mission being religious awareness raising. However, it moved into Kafalat 
al-Yateem provision an increase in the number of widows and orphans following 
sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shi’a in 2006-2007. The experience of al-
Thabat differs from other Sunni Muslim organisations in that they have usually been 
set up to provide social welfare and subsequently moved towards missionary 
objectives. However despite aiming to reinstate Shi’a rituals, al-Thabat and other 
Shi’a NGOs recognised the hard realities of poverty for women and orphans and so 
became involved in supporting them. An interview from the organisation explains: 
 
 SM T1: We started our work with widows in 2006-2007, it was a 
catastrophic situation. Every woman had a terrible story. We sympathised 
with these women. We realised that women had different priorities from us. 
We provide education but they wanted food.  So we had to find ways to 
make Kafala for them. Something we had never contemplated. The widows 
who attended our Hussainaia did not have an interest in listening to 
lectures. How can any one think about education if he is hungry?  
 
al-Thabat members reported that their Kafala budget is between US $2,000 and 
$2,500 annually, with the number of orphans receiving it being 79, although this is 
not a fixed number, and the number of the donors (by March 2013) is 29. They 
explained that the number of sponsored orphans changes from time to time, as this 
organisation has an allocated Kafil to each Makfol, or sometimes the Kafil supports 
two Makfol at the same time. The amount of Kafala, generally, is 25,000 Iraqi Dinars 
(US$ 20) a month, but this varies from one Kafil to another with some paying as 
much as 100,000 Dinars (US$ 90) a month to their chosen Makfol. The donated 
money, which is paid in cash to the organisation, is saved separately from the rest 
of its budget, so no mix up with other monies can happen. This to indicate that the 
Kafala money is religiously intended to help the orphans, so it would be a sinful act 
if the administrators did not deliver as the donor required. The person in charge 
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keeps the donated money in a plastic bag in a safe place, with a record of the 
names of the orphans and a list of their Kafala. One interviewee commented that: 
 
 SM T1: It is an orphan’s money and it is Haram to make any mistake in the 
distribution. So we have to separate this money from the rest of our 
spending. 
 
Underpinning Kafala provision for both the donors as well as the administrators of 
the focal NGOs is the concept of faith (Sider and Unruh, 2004). In sum, both these 
Shi’a NGOs rely on the religious alms to distribute to widowed families, and have a 
set of criteria and procedures to follow in order to provide their support. In the 
following, I explain how and to whom these NGOs distribute Kafala.  
 
6.3.2 Khums, the main financial source of Kafala provision  
 
It is important to consider the financial source of Kafala as it sheds light on the 
wider socio-political context in which this provision is delivered. The money is 
religiously motivated in that it is only provided to Muslims and only within the Shi’a 
community and hence, it is sectarian in nature. This can be attributed to the 
financial source of these funds, which is al-Khums. Khums, meaning a fifth, is a 
religious taxation system practised within the Shi’a denomination and involves 20 
percent of their extra annual income (Kadhim, 2013: 69) from profits or savings as 
well as assets such as property, land that have not been used during the previous 
year. As Halm (2007) explained “in principle, every Shi’ite, is required to pay one-
fifth of all profits-regardless of the trade or business they are from” (Halm, 2007: 
93). This is to be paid annually to the al-Marja they emulate through his 
representative or directly to those who are perceived to be poor descendents of 
Mohammad’s family.  However, Khums religious alms only pertain to the Shi’a sect 
and not the Sunnis. It was started in the seventh century as religious tax donated by 
all Muslims to Mohammad and his family. After his death in 632 AD one Muslim 
faction who were descendants from his family, claimed that the proceeds from the 
tax were rightfully theirs and so should be continued. Others dismissed this claim, 
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refusing to acknowledge it as ‘a right’ or a religious duty and arguing that it was only 
valid for Mohammad when he was alive. Those who supported Mohammad’s 
family’s (ahl-al-Bayt) claim became known as the Shi’a and hence they were the 
only people who engaged in Khums.  
 
Khums is usually given over to al-Marja’iyya’s network of agents, Wakils or their 
representatives, either in their offices or in their own mosques. Hawza students 
who are also linked to al-Marja’iyya have the right to collect the alms and send 
them to al-Marja’iyya too (Patel, 2005:14). These networks, according to Patel, are 
run by the Marja’iyyas’ sons who are connected to collaborators either based in the 
mosques or office. They receive the alms from the Shi’a (Patel, 2005:14) and 
transfer them to al-Marja or distribute them to those in need if they have 
authorisation to do so. The al-Marja’iyya’s office representative or his Wakils while 
providing for widows and orphans, also transfer Khums to the Shi’a NGOs to 
distribute it as they see it fit. From the other direction, if the Shi’a NGOs are unsure 
about what to do with Khums money that they receive from lay Shi’a, they may 
transfer it to the Wakils, or at least they may advise on how to distribute to those in 
need effectively.  
 
As Khums is rooted in Shi’a tradition it has to be spent only on the Shi’a, i.e. the 
money has to serve the community that it came from (Khan and Murdock, 2011). 
There are no financial reports about the amounts collected or distributed and it 
remains the primary source for Shi’a NGOs to fund their Kafala provision. In fact, it 
provides the Shi’a with “a sum of money- much greater than their Sunni colleagues 
have access to” (Halm, 2007: 93). The distribution within Shi’a community was 
explained by a representative from al-Thabat as follows:  
 
 SM T2: we are little bit worried to use the Khums money, as it has some 
conditions if we want to distribute it, for example, I cannot give it to a family 
that does not pray because it is possible that they do not spent it on the 
child. When we receive Khums we hand it to the Sayad, (the person 
transcendent from Mohammad family and linked to al-Marja). These monies 
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are Hoqoq (religious money belongs to people) and we have to be very 
precise in using it in order to purify the donor’s intention before God. 
However, for Sadaqqa (voluntary religious alms), we do not feel afraid of it. 
We may give it to anyone, even to a family that is not very poor, or to those 
who are not really religious. It is Sadaqqa, I could even give it to a Christian 
family.  
 
It can be seen that Kafala distribution involves theological commitment in which the 
care, charity and compassion are directed towards deserving community members, 
but only the Shi’a. In Davis and Robinson’s words, this notion of community “has 
elements of both inclusivity and exclusivity” (Davis and Robinson, 2012: 12). For, 
not only are non-Shi’a excluded from this provision but so too are some within the 
sect, because the NGOs have the power to set their own criteria to decide who is 
entitled to receive it and who is not. In what follows, I describe the criteria that the 
focal NGOs apply to their Kafala provision.  
 
6.3.3 The criteria for Kafala provision  
 
To determine those entitled to Kafala, both organisations: al-Mehrab and al-Thabat, 
as a first step, endeavour to establish whether there is a widowhood case and then 
if any orphans are within a certain age group, i.e. under 18 for boys and 20 for girls. 
In addition, the family should have no other resources for their livelihoods or any 
type of property, such as owning a house or land. Working male orphans under the 
age threshold are not entitled to any support and married female orphans do not 
receive any assistance because covering living expenses of a married woman is 
considered to be the husband’s responsibility. However, sometimes Kafala can be 
given regardless of these conditions if the organisations decide to do so. An 
interviewee from al-Mehrab explained that:  
 
E M8: some managers are very strict in the provision; others, God bless 
them, say these women receive only little money from others, so we should 
not cut their Kafala. Our current manager said we will not cut their [widows] 
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Ratib (salary) even if they receive money from others. The poor widows try 
to make their living; they try to collect from here and there. He says, give 
them their Ratib and do that with respect to their dignity.  
 
From the above, it can be seen that the managers can use their discretion regarding 
who receives Kafala. Some given their inclination to support the poor as a whole 
(Davis and Robinson, 2012) as a religious duty, extend their donations to people 
who do not come within their organisation’s criteria. There seemed to be some 
confusion amongst the Shi’a NGO representatives as to whether the criterion of 
loyalty of the service users to the Shi’a NGO principles had to be adhered to. The 
interviewees in senior positions held that that the cash transfers are unconditional, 
being only for humanitarian purposes with no strings attached, whilst those at the a 
middle level, saw that requesting loyalty from service users was reasonable since 
the NGO has had already helped them when they needed it. Those at the grassroots 
level were of the view that helping the poor was for the sake of God, nothing else 
and hence, there should be no link between service provision and political or 
religious loyalty.  
 
Despite these different views within this  NGO, i.e. al Mehrab, the evidence from 
the fieldwork demonstrates that there is a clientelistic culture exercised and 
enhanced by the Shi’a NGOs through their Kafala provision.  Given the link between 
this NGO and its politically associated party,  $20 bimonthly Kafala serves as an 
economic incentive for thousands of widowed women to give their votes to ISCI 
during election times. One interviewee claimed that if their NGO provided for the 
poor, it would obtain their unconditional love and devotion without their having to 
ask for it. As explained in the literature review, this identified relationship takes the 
form of clientelism found in developing country contexts as described by various 
authors (Trejo, 2009, Hopkin, 2006; Piattoni, 2001). That is, this Shi’a NGO utilises 
its provision to gain votes during the elections in particular from service users who 
are members of their own sect, such that it has become “an integral component of 
ethnic and sectarian politics” (Cammett and Issar, 2010: 381). 
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However, the evidence from al-Mehrab shows that this NGO extends its clientelism 
beyond election times by encouraging service users to enhance their knowledge by 
following its other activities including those of its associated political party, ISCI. 
This involves, asking them to watch the ISCI TV satellite channel Satellite (al-Furat); 
watching the weekly talk of Ammar al-Hakim as well as attending the meetings 
organised by al-Mehrab or ISC, amongst other activities. During the election the 
widowed women are expected to attend the office from where they are transferred 
collectively by buses to the places where the meetings are held. Loyalty to al-Hakim, 
as a family behind al-Mehrab, NGOs was discussed by one of the interviewees:  
 
E M8: We have loyal women. They love al-Hakim family. Widows are keen to 
know about our work and attend our programmes; they are loyal to our 
organisation. Thus, the question over whether they are loyal to us or not, 
should not raise any concern; and why should we link this with that anyway. 
Do the poor have to be loyal to you to give them your Sadaqqa? You give 
your Sadaqqa for the love of God. It is something between you and the lord 
of the universe. If I give a widow Ratib (salary) this is to help her and her 
orphans, why does she have to be a loyal to me? The true organisation is the 
one who helps the poor, and if an organisation does that, it will find people 
loyal to it even if it does not ask them to do so. 
 
However, despite the differences between the interviewee’s points of views on the 
relation between social provision and political loyalty, utilisation of the service 
users’ support in terms of acquiring their votes has been practised by the Shi’a 
NGOs. In chapter 8, detailed discussion about the political mobilisation by the Shi’a 
NGOs will help explain this link. These NGOs differ slightly in their procedures for 
identify those who are entitled to their Kafala provision, as is explained in the 






6.3.4 The procedures to identity entitled widowed families 
 
Both Shi’a NGOs carry out their Kafala procedures to establish the eligibility of the 
applicants in an informal manner. The women with a religious background who are 
appointed to carry out this role are not formally trained. Moreover men are not 
recruited as they are not allowed to visit widowed families or have interviews with 
them as usually these take place in their houses. To establish the eligibility for 
receiving the cash transfer, al-Thabat, as a small organisation, relies on a 
straightforward process that consists of the following steps: once a widow 
approaches the organisation, she will be asked to bring some documents in support 
of her claim. If the required documents are presented, the organisation asks its 
volunteers to go and visit the applicant in her house to examine the living standards 
of the family. The volunteers will ask the applicant verbally a number of questions 
about the family income, the number of orphans as well as whether the widow 
owns a house, land, or receives any financial support from relatives, other 
organisations, or from the state. The volunteers submit a report to the 
management committee who then make a decision. Once the case of providing 
Kafala is established, the NGO endeavours to find a sponsor. Sometimes it takes 
photos of the orphans and then approaches rich or at least better off women or 
men asking them to sponsor them. If they agree to do so, the donor is asked to 
decide upon the amount of money they are willing to give and will even sometimes 
provide a reason for donating his or her Kafala. An interviewee from al-Mehrab 
explained that once the donor has agreed to support, she would tell him or her that 
from now on the child is theirs, and they are responsible for his or her wellbeing.  
 
al-Mehrab follows a more complicated process to establish the entitlement of the 
widowed family. First the widow makes an application and then the NGO collects 
information about the potential beneficiary from its social network. If the applicant 
is unknown to al-Mehrab, then it uses undercover visits to the applicant’s house in 
order to find the necessary information before a final decision is made. This kind of 
visit is so as to avoid any embarrassment that might be caused if the family became 
aware that the aim is to collect information about its economic situation. Not 
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posing a direct set of questions was also justified by one interviewee as a proper 
way to show respect for the family’s feelings. The aim of the undercover visitors 
was explained as follows:  
 
SM M6: We do not want to embarrass the family, some questions if asked 
directly may hurt people’s feelings; if you can obtain the needed information 
indirectly, why should you use a direct way of posing questions? 
 
If the NGO is unable to obtain the required information through its undercover 
visits, then it proposes an open interview with the potential claimant. During the 
interview, usually nothing is written down by the social workers and a verbal report 
is given to the managers along with a recommendation as to whether or not to 
include the applicant in their Kafala programme. Both the focal Shi’a NGOs the 
entitlement of the widows and orphans periodically by investigating if there have 
been any changes in their personal circumstances. al-Thabat remove the name of 
the widows from their Kafala provision if the family receives support from a relative, 
or any other source, whereas al-Mahrab continues its support even the widowed 
family receives help from other Shi’a NGOs. This stance was justified by an 
interviewee from al-Mehrab because the amounts of income from any donor are 
not large and hence, many widowed women need small amounts of income from 
several sources to be able to reach a minimal acceptable living standard. Moreover, 
al-Mehrab’s substantial resources come from different sources, including Shi’as 
inside Iraq and outside Iraq, in particular from the Gulf countries. This enables it to 
continue supporting poor families even when some positive change has happened. 
Since al-Thabat uses the system of Kafil supporting Makfol, the donation may be 
transferred to another person who is in need if the circumstances of the original 
beneficiary family have improved.  
 
Following the discussion of the Kafala provision for widows and orphans, I now turn 
to another form of assistance of one of the focal Shi’a NGOs, i.e. organising 
collective wedding ceremonies for young men, including orphans.  
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6.4 Collective wedding ceremonies  
 
Organising collective wedding ceremonies is another important activity supported 
by some Shi’a NGOs. This is in line with Shari’a objectives since marriage is seen as 
serving to protect the intellectual, lineage, and religion of humans. Organising 
collective wedding ceremonies or in Arabic (a‘ras jama‘iyya) is common in Arab 
countries as one of the welfare services provided by certain Islamic NGOs in Muslim 
communities (Wiktorowicz, 2001, Harmsen, 2008). This type of support serves two 
main purposes; to help recipients financially, and to bring them as Muslims closer to 
the religious order. Economically, weddings in Arab countries are the highest single 
cost item during the course of a life (Engelen, and Puschmann, 2011). By 2005, 
according to a 2006 Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey, this cost had reached 
US$7,000 in Egypt (Singerman 2008) and in Yemen, for example, the dowry costs 
have risen from US$ 200 to upwards of US$ 20,000 within the last generation 
(Mulderig, 2011: 3). In Iraq, according to the Iraqi Women’s League, it ranges 
between US$6,000 and US$9,000, or even more (source). Some youth are 
prevented from marrying owing to “the high prices of dowries, the high expenses of 
wedding ceremonies and the exorbitant prices of housing” (Bengio, 1993: 380).  
 
Religiously, marriage is considered a sacred engagement that organises and 
legitimises relations between the two sexes, helps people to observe individual 
chastity by “satisfying natural sexual needs as well as for fulfilling the important task 
of bringing up children (Mohagheghi, 2006: 72). Chastity is considered important in 
Islam and it is highly praised in the Qur’an. It is said “to prevent natural desires from 
leading to unlawful behaviour” (Al-Hibri and El-Habti, 2006: 206). Moreover, 
marriage is considered a religious duty and “one of the greatest divine blessing” 
(Amini, 1988: 9) and “there has not been created any institution in Islam which is 
more favoured and dearer to Allah than marriage” (Amini, 1988: 10). In Iraq, 
organising these collective ceremonies (a‘ras jama‘iyya) before 2003 by the state 
was common under the rule of the previous regime, and were sometimes held on 
Saddam Hussein’s birthday, where hundreds of couples were united (Podeh, 2010: 
198; Bengio,1993: 371). These ceremonies were administered by the General Union 
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of Iraqi Youth (GUIY), which also initiated various other programs such as 
“extending loans to young couples, helping them to acquire bedroom furniture in 
instalments, or granting reductions on wedding gowns” (Bengio, 1993: 380). This 
provision was motivated by the fact that the country witnessed widespread 
bachelorhood in the 1990s as a result of war, economic sanctions, and emigration 
“which was expected to severely hit the basis of Iraqi society and its values and 
have “disastrous” consequences” (Bengio, 1993: 380). Also, according to Bengio, 
these ceremonies were organised as part of the efforts made by the regime to help 
young people settle down and shift their frustration away from the dictatorship 
(ibid). These ceremonies were launched in “all the provinces, once a week in 
Baghdad and from one to three times a month in the provinces” (ibid), being 
attended by the governors and the Ba‘th Party branch secretaries. The collective 
wedding ceremonies were thus held with the aim of achieving political outcomes.  
 
The Shi’a NGOs in Iraq began organising collective wedding ceremonies in 2004 and 
al-Mehrab is one of the most prominent in doing so. An interviewee from the al-
Mehrab shared their motivation and values: 
 
SM M5: Marriage is important so a man can think in a normal way. Marriage 
is one of God’s gifts that we have to thank Him for. Marriage provides men 
and women with a feeling of stability.  
 
The motivation for organising these events was elicited by a staff member of the 
charity department of al-Mehrab, who explained:  
 
SM M4: We live in an Eastern society. Men and women’s social status is 
rooted in their marital status. If a man has a wife and children and if a 
woman has a husband and children, or even if they do not have children, 
their entity in the society and their social status will be complete. Marriage 




 A senior manager of al-Mehrab clarified this:  
 
SM M3: Islam recognises the family, recognises the progeny and protects 
the blood line of the descendants.  Islam does not allow for progeny based 
on individual freedoms, if that was permitted, society would be a mere 
gathering of individuals and not a society.  
 
An interviewee of the charity department of al-Mehrab explained why they felt the 
need to intervene:  
 
SM M4: Marriage is the greatest bond in Islam. Most of our youth need 
those who are able to provide them some aid. We do that [organising 
wedding ceremonies] so the young people can take care of their religion. 
 
All the interviewees from this NGO supported the Shari’a perspective that marriage 
helps in the safeguarding of lineage, intellect, religion, and the existing way of life 
(Al-Mubarak and Osmani, 2010:5). Moreover it was generally accepted that men 
who wed have satisfied a basic religious need and can then move forward to 
prosper in other parts of their lives. In other words, a person who gets married, 
according this Shi’a NGO, will have fulfilled a half of his religious responsibility and 
can now concentrate on the other half.  
 
al-Mehrab, in organising these activities, is acting in line with the dominant cultural 
norm in Arab countries that consider marriage a “a well-defined turning point that 
bestows prestige, recognition, and societal approval on both partners” (al-Otman, 
200512:217). Since al-Mehrab, as discussed above, takes the view that society is not 
a congregation of individuals and that no-one exists outside of the family, they have 
to ensure that all youth are able secure their social status by forming their own 
family (Mulderig, 2011: 3) Moreover, in Islamic and Arabic culture producing the 
genetic descendants who will inherit from the father after his death is very 
important because anyone who is not blood related is not entitled to inheritance, 
including foster children. In sum, marriage is important for “satisfying natural sexual 
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needs as well as for fulfilling the important task of bringing up children” 
(Mohagheghi, 2006: 72).  
 
Helping orphans to establish families by organising collective wedding ceremonies is 
one of al-Mehrab’s important welfare provisions. According to a senior manager of 
the NGO, the number of orphans it has helped is 6,000 out of a total of 12,000 
wedded couples it has given assistance to over the last 10 years. This provision, 
according to al-Mehrab interviewees, was initially funded personally by Abd al-Aziz 
al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI and al-Mehrab in 2004 and the father of Ammar al-
Hakim the current leader of the NGO. In the first few years, in addition to the 
ceremony, they distributed furniture, such as that for the bedroom; kitchen 
implements; fridges; and clothes for the bride, including Hijab, and also for the 
groom. In addition to money being provided for trips to Iran, each groom and bride 
receives 1 million Dinar or US$ 900 for “clothing, a bed, and other household 
goods” (Slavin 2008: 11). According to the interviewees, al-Mehrab invites the 
wedded couples with their families, and distributes the cash during the celebration. 
Al-Mehrab organises collective wedding parties for an average of 1,000 couples 
annually. 
 
However, organising mass weddings by the Shi’a NGOs appears to be a 
controversial issue. While it is seen by some as helping for young people who are 
unable to cover their wedding party expenses and hence can take advantage of the 
in-cash transfer, others perceive it as being the wrong type of provision. Opponents 
have raised two concerns: the first is economic in nature, and the second is political. 
The first is that facilitating ceremony costs for young people who lack the real 
capacity to establish a new family could have a negative unintended impact on the 
family to be because establishing a family requires much more than just wedding 
costs. A female solicitor from a women’s’ secular organisation expressed her 
concerns:  
 
SM W2: Encouraging the poor, who have not enough means to pay for their 
wedding costs is a wrong provision because if the couple are unable to pay 
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for their wedding party, how can they make their own living? How can they 
establish a family?  How can they satisfy their needs? How can they satisfy 
their children’s needs? In fact, this organisation covers one aspect of the 
wedding cost i.e. organising a party but they put the couples into more 
problems. The organisation will not take care of the rest of the couple’s 
needs.  
 
The second concern that was brought up by a number of interviewees from state 
and non-state organisations was that this type of provision is aimed at influencing 
the youth in order to mobilise their votes during elections, since al-Mehrab is linked 
to a political group. An interviewee who works for an international organisation as 
well as a local women’s organisation explained this as follows:  
 
SM W1: This kind of provision aims to gather people around these 
institutions. It would be mistaken if anybody thinks these organisations are 
only blowing empty slogans. They are religious-political organisations based 
on religious traditions. They rely on youth, on their staff, and their 
beneficiaries.   
 
The perception that organisations, such as al-Mehrab, run this kind of activities for 
political objectives to gain votes was mentioned frequently by different 
organisations and from the state ministries as well. This view could be valid given 
the process of organising these events, the selection of those who benefit, the place 
where the events are held, and the speeches of Ammar al-Hakim during the 
ceremonies.  According to a staff member of al-Mehrab, the course of the selection 
of couples who are supported to take part in the ceremonies does not begin with al-
Mehrab but ISCI. The latter manages the process of application and 
recommendation and then sends those nominated to al-Mehrab’s office in order to 
organise the ceremony. The names of those to receive support are then posted on 
its website stating the time and place of the ceremony.  
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The choice of the place and time to hold the ceremonies is significant. They are 
carried out either in the main offices of ISCI or in a stadium. The ceremonies 
normally take place, according to one interviewee, during religious events, such as 
the wedding date of Imam Ali and Fatima, Mohammad’s daughter or during Eid al-
Ghadir. In February 2013, these ceremonies were organised for the first time on St 
Valentine’s day, with Ammar al-Hakim instructing the grooms and brides to love 
one another41.  The ceremony starts with a reading from the Quran and a speech 
by Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of al-Mehrab. Through his speech, the wedding 
becomes an opportunity for raising awareness and pedagogy. al-Hakim explains the 
benefits of marriage not only in this life but also in the afterlife, confirming that 
“those who want to win the heaven and the last day have to seek an early 
marriage”42. In addition, he affirms the importance of a good family, the duties of a 
wife towards her husband, and the husband’s responsibility towards his wife. He 
also calls on the wider and extended families to help the newly wed couples, 
without intervening in their family affairs.  
 
These ceremonies are funded by Shi’a dignitaries who often wish to remain 
anonymous. The refraining from mentioning their names stems from their belief 
that according to an interviewee from al-Mehrab:  
 
SM M6: what is submitted by the right hand should not be known by the left 
one.  
 
The respondent explains, that secrecy of in cash provision is preferable since the 
aim is to satisfy God’s will, not to look for fame. Whether this might cause problems 
regarding the transparency of cash utilisation does not seem to bother al-Mehrab. 
By contrast, Muslim Sunni NGOs in Jordan for example, usually invite the donors 
sometimes from different religious backgrounds or business to the ceremony, 
announcing their names and the amount of their donated money (Harmsen, 2008). 
                                                 
41
 This was cited on the website at: http://www.watneon.com. [Cited on 22-09-2013] 
42
 Ammar al-Hakim speech on collective wedding ceremony in Iraq. Cited on: 
http://burathanews.com/news/173072.html [ Accessed on 24-03-2015].  
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Moreover, these organisations, according to Harmsen, present a “bridal gift and 
contributions of interest free loans to the newlyweds, organise lectures and 
workshops related to marriage and family issues” (Harmsen, 2010:104). The Shi’a 
NGOs seemed to have a different approach as the donors for these events are only 
known by the organisation. 
 
al-Mehrab, through the collective wedding ceremonies, has been building a wide 
network with the Shi’a middle class community which funds this provision, as well 
as the poor young people who benefit. By conducting this activity it attracts the 
trust of the Shi’a business community and gains a reputation of achieving a religious 
aim by helping young people hold their weddings. In turn, the pious Shi’a from the 
rich class, who share similar convictions with al-Mehrab, donate their religious 
taxes, Khums, or Sadaqqa to support these events. An interviewee from al-Mehrab 
told me this enables them to organise impromptu ceremonies. For example, if a 
merchant asks them to organise a ceremony for 10 or 20 young men, and he can 
pay for the cost of the celebration, then they will do so. In addition to fulfilling a 
religious duty by supporting the ceremonies, given that al-Mehrab is a group with 
close ties to ISCI, these middle and upper class people are making links with political 
power at the same time. The names of those to be wed are usually chosen through 
a process of application that is carried out in the ISCI office and often they are not 
mere beneficiaries, but potential political supporters, as some interviewees from 
other organisations claimed.  In sum, gaining political support frompoor, unmarried 
young people through paying for wedding ceremonies cost is another example of 
how this NGO uses its social service provision in a clientelistic manner.  
In general, the intention of al-Mehrab in organising these events is permeated with 
religious values because they are convinced that relations between men and 
women have to be organised in a marriage form. This means that they do not 
acknowledge any other forms of sexual relations between humans and hence, all 
such relations outside of marriage are considered a sin. This form of restricted 
relations has to be followed whether Muslims like it or not because it is a religious 
edict. With this perspective, al-Mehrab is not pro the right of choice, or individual 
freedom, but sees young people, as members of a community whose social and 
 142 
sexual relations they have to shape in line with the religious order, which is why it 
covers the costs of some of their weddings. This provision also has pedagogies value 
because the ceremony itself is a space where the leader of al-Mehrab, al-Hakim, 
delivers his speech about his vision of the good family. Given that the interviewees 
earlier in this chapter have explained that the family is the basic cell of the society, 
this shaping and informing family behaviour is a building block that helps guide 
society as a whole. Thus it can be concluded that this programme is permeated with 
faith in terms of its motivation because the organisations expect that those in 
receipt of help will become more pious and exhibit theological commitment (Sider 
and Unruh 2004). Moreover as the provision helps the poor with marriages, it 
allows them to form their own families and hence provide the basic units of the 
Ummah.  
 
While this provision installs the norm of social relations from the point of view of al-
Mehrab and ISCI, it also appears to serve political objectives in that in obtains 
financial support of the rich class who like what the NGO and ISCI are doing. It also 
creates a pool of potential voters from the youth who benefit. In sum, the collective 
wedding ceremonies serve multiple purposes: distributing religious alms as a 
religious duty to help the poor; contributing to the creation of a sacralised 
community; and helping a religious party into powerful state positions.  
 
6.5 The Shi’a NGOs’ social welfare activism influence on the poor and wider 
society  
 
The Shi’a NGOs are active in Kafala provision and helping poor youth. In doing so, 
they contribute to enhancing religious values and creating a sacralised society in the 
following two ways. 
 
a) The Kafala donation is meant to lighten the burden of Muslims so they can take 
care of their religious duty, such as worship and conducting religious rituals, 
attending mosques, praying and fasting, and visiting the holly shrines. These 
religious activities all contribute to build a good Muslim. In this way the social 
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provision itself is not targeting only the immediate and the pressing needs of the 
poor Muslims, but also achieves a higher aim, i.e. that of worshiping God by 
implementing his order. Moreover the contribution of the wedding cost is expected 
to help shape the personal life of individual Muslim in line with Islam. This is seen as 
a means to protect the family that is fundamental to creating a theological 
community. However personal autonomy and right of free choice do not exist 
because everything has to be divinely informed.  
 
b) Given that the Islamic alms distribution has to serve the community where the 
revenue has come from, a form of sectarian distribution was bound to emerge. In 
other words, the Kafala provision funded by Khums would reach some Muslims who 
are Shi’a but not all those in need. This enhances the Shi’a community cohesion 
rather than the wider community. Given the intensified sectarian environment in 
Iraq, this kind of provision has accentuated the division between the poor Shi’a and 
other poor because the latter have been excluded. However, since it is serving the 
Shari’a objective, Maqasid al-Shari’a, which is permeated with faith and is 
structured towards following the orders of God, then the Shi’a NGO workers are 
fulfilling the original mission for which they were established. In other words, taking 
part in Kafala provision or organising collective wedding ceremonies is seen as a 
blessing rewarded by Thawab and Ajr, both in this life and the afterlife.  
 
Despite the Shi’a NGOs engagement in providing for widows and orphans, they 
perceive the economic impact of the social provision as limited and insufficient. The 
economic impact of the Kafala was articulated by an interviewee from al-Thabat: 
 
SM T1: what we provide is equal to one basket of vegetables and maybe one 
kilogram of meat, no more. So, we are not really providing for the poor but 
we show them our sympathy. The money we give to orphans is not enough 
for anything. It is kind of hosting a guest in your house just to be kind and 
generous with your guest. We may be able to put a smile on the orphan’s 
face when we give him some cash but we cannot secure his living costs.  
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Another interviewee from al-Mehrab explained that what they provide is little, but 
still better than nothing. However in spite of the limited economic impact of the 
Kafala, it has a strong psychological influence on the widows’ well-being which 
would be absent were they not in receipt of help. An interviewee from al-Mehrab 
described the importance of the Kafala for widowed women: 
 
E M8: well, it is a small amount of money, and if a widow pays for the 
transport, and buys a bottle of water on her way to our office, then 
something has gone already. But if we tell the widow that your salary will be 
stopped, she would cry for it. 
 
The Kafala provision provides women with an opportunity to go out, visit NGOs, and 
take part in activities. When I visited the al-Mehrab’s office, the widows were on a 
trip with their children and received a free lunch in a religious restaurant, socialised 
with each other and met women not only from Iraq, but also Shi’a women from 
outside the country. When I told the worker that the meeting had corrected my 
gloomy image about widowed women, the worker explained that: 
 
E M8:  widowed women can go out; they do not have the previous control of 
men in their houses, so they feel more free and independent. Also these 
widows do not receive support from al-Mehrab only, they do go to different 
NGOs linked with Marja’iyya or religious families and they get something 
from each organisation. Some NGOs send the widows to Hajj, others 
distribute Hijab, or give toys and games for orphans. That is why (the worker 
said smiling) you see them happy and content.  
 
However, there is a shared perception that what is provided by these NGOs is not 
responding to the poor’s needs. An interviewee from al-Mehrab explains:  
 
SM M1: to guarantee the poor rights, welfare has to be secured by the state. 
It is not possible to leave the fate of the orphans in the hands of NGOs. 
There must be a governmental body to take care of orphans, and 
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mechanisms to distribute help to them. Despite the fact that civil society is 
carrying out this role now… it cannot take it on for very long.  
 
This vision about the Shi’a NGOs role in providing for widows and orphans exhibited 
from the experience of the two organisations, large and small, linked to a political 
party, or to al-Marja’iyya, was that they are not alternative the sate. The Shi’a NGOs 
believed that the state has to play its role given the extent of society’s needs, and 
that these could not be met by NGOs. 
 
The Shi’a NGOs, such as al-Thabat for example, are engaged in this kind of support 
to protect the fabric of society from the negative consequences if their social needs 
went unmet Their involvement was necessitated by the increasing numbers of 
widows and orphans who became victims of poverty. This diverted them from their 
original religious agenda. As mentioned above the two Shi’a NGOs studied in this 
thesis, were initially established for religious education and awareness raising. One 
interviewee from al-Thabat expressed her frustration that they had been forced 
into doing social work because it distanced them from the work they originally set 
out to do:  
 
SM T1: we do not have a disciplined state, a state that can control the 
security situation and show care for the people. If the state showed more 
responsibility, this would reduce the burden on us, we would be able to take 
a different rout.  If these problems did not exist, we would go back to our 
key aim, which is to educate people in order to create a good society, 
Mojatam’a Salih.  
 
The social welfare services, from these Shi’a NGOs’ point of view, should primarily 
be the responsibility of the state, but when it is unable to deliver this, they accept 
that individual Muslims have a religious duty to respond to the poor’s needs, in 
particular those who have sufficient wealth to do so. However, in their opinion the 
state is the richest entity in the country and should therefore shoulder the greatest 
responsibility regarding the Ummah. In addition to their religious justification, this 
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conviction could be driven by two other realities: first, as a rentier state, rich in its 
natural resources, Iraq has a long standing involvement in social welfare since the 
nationalisation of oil in 1970s; and second, there is a widespread belief that the 
government is elected to serve the people’s interests and distribute the oil revenue, 
given that the constitution of Iraq in article 111, and 112 states the following:  
 
“Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and 
governorates and the governments, shall undertake the management of oil 
and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its 
revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all 
parts of the country” (Iraq constitution, 2005)  
 
It is probably for these reasons that Shi’a NGOs see their role in social service 
provision as a temporary intervention and not permanent arrangement for 
those in need. According to the interviewees, the state is expected to carry 
out social welfare fairly and in a just manner.  
 
SM M1: we formed our organisations to provide for the poor, but this is to 
fill an institutional gap created by the absence of the state. The needs of the 
Iraqi society cannot be addressed by NGOs, no matter how much we provide 
and no matter how big financial capacities we have. The needs of society 
require a state capacity to respond to it.  
 
This perspective differs from other NGOs linked with theological political social 
movements as described in the literature, who propose their social welfare as an 
alternative to the state or to bypass the state (Davis and Robinson, 2012), or even 
to act as a state within a state (Wiktorowicz, 2004). That is, the Shi’a NGOs are not 
attempting to compete with the state in the social welfare arena, or to show the 
public a sense of what they are able to do if they reach power, because they are 
already in power through their linked political parties or the influence of the 
religious establishment, i.e. al-Marja’iyya. Finally, there is no evidence to support 
the view that Shi’a NGOs in Iraq have been attempting to act like their counterpart 
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para-state organisations in Iran who control substantial financial resources and have 
a parallel position to the state institutions (Saeidi, 2009).  In sum, the focal Shi’a 
NGOs’ social welfare interventions have been in response to urgent pressing needs 




This chapter has examined the social welfare activities provided by Shi’a NGOs in 
terms of motivations and actual provision in order to shed light on how their 
activities have influenced beneficiaries and wider society. It has been shown that 
providing for widows, orphans and collective weddings has been not only helped 
the poor, but also brings divine rewards for those involved on the delivery side 
whether they be the donors or the workers who administer it. Kafala provision or 
helping the young is seen as a religious duty that is expected to help protect 
individuals, the family and the wider society from un-Islamic behaviour. Given that 
poverty is seen as threatening not only the family but also the Ummah in general, 
this provision is expected to maintain religious order and control the social 
behaviour of the individuals and family in line with Islam as well as having a 
theological impact on the wider community However both NGOs do not see their 
role as complementary to that of the state, or believe themselves to be in 
competition with it. Instead they see their provision as temporary and once the 
need is addressed by the state and/or others then they will revert back to delivering 
religious education or raising awareness. They are of the opinion that the state is 
rich enough to provide because of oil revenues and point out that the constitution 
requires them to cater for all citizens. The social assistance of the two focal Shi’a 
NGOs, whether linked to political parties or to al-Marja’iyya, would appear to have 
been driven by similar religious motivations. Although they have some difference in 
their provision procedures these have not been very significant and thus, it seems 
that whether Shi’a NGOs adhere to the Activist or Quietist trend has not led to 
variations in the way they have been operating. Most importantly, the perception 
that these NGOs provide social services, Kafala and/or support young, unmarried 
youth to gain political advantage is commonplace. As explained earlier in Chapter 2, 
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this has been the observed practice in other countries where the state is weak and 
unable to provide for those in need. In sum, through their activities the NGO social 
service providers create a clientelistic relationship with their service users, which 


































This chapter addresses the second research questions: What are the main social 
services, religious, and political activities that they are engaged in? With a focus on 
the ethical and moral influence through religious education. This is explored 
through an investigation of the provision of education in the Madares Imam Ali run 
by al-Mehrab, and the Shi’a rituals mourning session for women conducted by al-
Thabat. I argue that teaching Islamic ethics and morals form one of the most 
important motivations for Shi’a NGOs’ social work with the aim of encouraging the 
wider society to lead their lives in line with the Shi’a doctrine. The focus is mainly 
directed towards women and female children, which reflects the reality that Shi’a 
NGOs’ key interest is in shaping women’s behaviour rather than that of males. I 
conducted interviews with activists from three Shi’a NGOs: the CDF, al-Mehrab, and 
al-Thabat in order to shed light on the importance of disciplining moral behaviour. 
This chapter is organised in the following order. In section 7.2, I explore the 
significance of religious ethics and morals for these Shi’a NGOs, whilst in section 7.3 
the moral and religious influence of the al-Mehrab schools regarding the collective 
ceremony for Hijab wearing for females or Sin al-Takleef al-Shari is explained. In 
section 7.4 the mourning session rituals for women organised by al-Thabat are 
examined and the final section provides a chapter summary.  
 
7.2 The significance of religious ethics teaching for the Shi’a NGOs 
 
Ethics occupy a central place in religion, governing individual relations with God and 
other people. Islam, like other Abrahamic religions, is based on the notion that God, 
the creator of human beings, has endowed them with the sense, reason, and 
understanding to worship Him (al-Faruqi, 2003:162). With this belief, human beings 
have a duty to follow the instructions of the creator as conveyed by His messengers 
and in the holy books.  That is, he has to show his commitment to follow God’s will 
as a religious duty, which in Islam is known as Takleef (responsibility). This implies 
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that “norms in human conduct” are to be observed (al-Faruqi, 2003:163). The 
Takleef therefore is “inseparable from religion and are built entirely upon it” (al-
Faruqi, 2003:164). In sum, the human being should be aware of his or her religious 
duty. 
 
In Islam, ethics are tasked with directing humans to organise their relations with 
each other; their daily behaviour whether in the private or public realm all have to 
be informed and guided by divine will, for the consequences of their deeds will be 
judged in the afterlife. The divine order is explained, interpreted, and transformed 
by religious establishments, religious political parties, religious NGOs and individuals 
on matters such as: food, dress, entertainment, hygiene, shelter, sex, helping the 
poor, and voting in elections. Therefore the Shi’a NGOs accept that their work is 
about convincing their audience to follow the religious order in the right way (al-
Sirat al-Mostaqim).  In other words, the Shi’a NGOs understand their role as being 
that of executing the divine instructions wherein one of the most important aspects 
is the moral one (Rahman, 1966: 243). Consequently, the Islamisation of behaviour 
that was introduced in chapter 2, is a common strategy pursued by Islamic NGOs, 
whether they are Sunni or Shi’a. The aim is to integrate religion into personal and 
public life; in effect, to Islamize both the private and public sphere. This influence is 
exercised through the Shi’a NGOs social work, which is permeated with faith in 
terms of objectives, programme choice and outcomes (Sider and Unruh, 2004). In 
fact, the interviewees from the Shi’a NGOs repeatedly emphasised the importance 
of moral education as a principle objective that guided their choice of social work 
programmes. An interviewee from the CDF explains: 
 
SM C2: what we want is to enhance religious values and strengthen 
behaviour that responds to Islam as a religion. Because we are believers 
(Motadanineen); we believe that religion has to lead life. There is nothing in 
life without a rule made by God. What God has asked us to do we have to do 
it. God leads us to the right path; the path of al-Sirat al-Mostaqim. It is a 




Education and awareness raising activities of the Shi’a NGOs are geared towards 
promoting and advancing Islam in every aspect of life, both private and public. The 
latter is undertaken by initiating a “total change in a person’s beliefs, actions, 
potential, thoughts, expressions, and everything relating to that person” (Sarwar, 
2001: 29). In other words, the NGOs endeavour to deepen people’s understanding 
and practices of Islam. Moreover, the objectives of Islamic social work, such as in 
education or raising awareness, are not separated from religious goals and should 
be “lifelong and it should begin at birth, for then the child’s mind is a precious jewel, 
free of all marks or figure” (Levy, 1962:218).  
 
The same interviewee also explains:  
 
SM C2: What we are trying to do is to help people to implement religious 
principles, to make the latter living realties; to turn words into deeds. We 
want to turn our religiosity to daily behaviour. We want to make our 
personal behaviour an example for others to follow. Those who want to 
understand what Islam is about can see this by looking at our behaviour with 
ourselves, with others, and with our enemies. 
 
The core concept of teaching and raising awareness is to implant religious 
knowledge and help Muslims to interpret and act upon the received knowledge in 
their daily lives. According to Boyle, religious education is about the  personification 
of absorbed information so that people are able to “embody, or possess the words 
of God within their very beings, where they can physically reproduce it, share it, and 
refer to it, ideally over the course of their lifetimes” (Boyle, 2006:491). The Shi’a 
NGOs’ religious education and raising awareness activities are directed both at 
children and adults so to ensure their loyalty to their denomination, the Marja’iyya, 
and the doctrine of Ahl-al-Bayt. The schools, summer courses, textbooks along with 
the indoor and outdoor activities run by al-Mehrab schools, for example, all 
contribute to framing the identity of the children as Shi’a, as they act as conveyors 
of values and knowledge about religions. As the previous regime had taken control 
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of government schools, al-Mehrab invested heavily in private schools: Madares. The 
educators organise different types of activities to state schools, with the aim of 
teaching the pupils how to commit to Islamic teachings. The focus is particularly on 
girls, who are instructed in how to preserve their modesty and chastity within the 
wider framework found in Ahl-al-Bayt. The intentions of the education provision of 
al-Mehrab will be explained in more detail in the following section.  
 
7.3 Education through Madares:  Education in line with Islamic ethics  
Education provision forms one of the most important areas for the Shi’a NGOs. The 
two Shi’a NGOs that were studied for this thesis, al-Mehrab and al-Thabat were 
established to spread the word of Islam and the Shi’a Twelver doctrine through 
religious preaching. In this section, it is argued that these NGOs endeavour to shape 
and discipline pupil behaviour, in particular that of girls. This is motivated by their 
character as religious orientated NGOs teaching and socializing the next generation 
into their religious doctrine. al-Mehrab reaches individuals at an early age through 
their schools. According to Sarwar their aim is to prepare the child to shoulder his or 
her religious obligations or Takleef successfully from childhood onwards (Sarwar, 
2001). A senior manager of al-Mehrab explains the focus on children’s education by 
stating the following: 
 
SM M7: since the child is a seed for the society, the aim of our provision of 
education is to protect the child. We will not let this seed be taken away by 
other hands from here or there, we have to put him [including girls] under 
our supervision, help him with whatever God enables us to provide for him. 
We educate the child if he needs education. We provide him with courses if 
he needs courses, and we provide him with material support if he is in need 
of that. They are [children] entrusted to us and so we have to take care of 
them.  We want to build the personality of the Muslim and enable him43 to 
shoulder his responsibility towards God, himself, his family, his society and 
his nation. 
                                                 
43
 In Arabic, pronouns have genders and the use of the subjects him and he, referring to males, does 
not exclude females.  
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According to al-Mehrab, teaching religious values is a substantial part of education 
and should begin at an early age so as to enable children to take part in the broader 
collective responsibility towards their community or Ummah.  The transmitted 
values, ethos, and teachings aim to socialise them into the ideology of the Shi’a. 
From this angle, building children’s personality is a key objective of al-Mehrab 
education provision. The focus on childhood stems from the vision that “child 
character can be formed and a standard may be established, which maintains 
validity throughout his life time” (Heeren,1976, :38).  
 
From the fieldwork that is reported in this chapter, it will become clear that al-
Madares has the aim of training and educating students to translate the knowledge 
they receive into belief, faith and behaviour that is commensurate with Islamic 
ethics. The religious disciplinary approach utilised by al-Mehrab works to integrate 
and socialise children into their faith, religious belief and the traditions of the Shi’a. 
In this way, al-Madares prepares the child as a carrier and agent for the wider Shi’a 
denomination by “moulding the ideological orientation of individuals” (Ghidi, 2009: 
2). By ideology, Ghidi means the “process of implementation and preservation of 
beliefs, norms, and values in social life by divergent groups that characterize the 
individuals' behaviour” (Ghidi, 2009: 2). 
 
In this process of transmitting their ideology, autonomous thinking appears to be 
absent as the children have to learn and uphold the same common and sacred 
values that enable them to integrate within their wider denomination. al-Mehrab 
operate this process by teaching pupils in the schools or Madares to pray, 
organising wearing Hijab ceremonies for girls who have reached the age of nine, 
segregating girls from boys and by instructing them in the basics of the Shi’a 
doctrine.  
 
The motivation behind Shi’a NGO education, as expressed by a number of 
interviewees from al-Mehrab, is to enable the children to read, write and think in 
order to protect themselves from the influence of others and to take their 
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responsibility towards the future state and society. It is therefore geared towards 
helping them stay on the righteous path of Islam and in particular, deterring them 
from succumbing to Western cultural assaults, which exist because of Internet and 
satellite communications. Moreover, it prepares them to take a leading role in state 
and society. These objectives were put forward by the representatives from 
Madares al-Imam Ali schools run by al-Mehrab, but before considering the 
particular provision of these Madares, I provide a brief description of them.  
 
7.3.1 Madares al-Imam Ali  
 
The name Madares was taken from the first Imam in the Shi’a denomination. 
According to al-Mehrab interviewees, the idea of establishing Madares was 
proposed by a number of philanthropists who approached their leader, Ammar al-
Hakim and asked him to open an Islamic elementary school. The proposal was 
accepted by him and the first school of Madares al-Imam Ali was established in 
2005 with a total intake of 1,200 students, both boys and girls. The funding for the 
Madares was not specified by the interviewees, but the NGO interviewees did 
mention that the main sources are donations from dignitaries and generous Muslim 
donors such as merchants, giving in the form of Khums revenues. The Madares are 
private schools that are mainly attended by children of the Shi’a middle classes. 
Children from the poorer classes are less likely to attend these schools because of 
the cost and those from other denominations are entirely absent. However, 
orphans with excellent levels of achievement are also given opportunities to study 
in Imam Ali Schools through fee waivers which are approximately US$ 1100 -1300 
per student per annum.  
 
Madares have permission to deliver education from the Ministry of Education, 
which is a necessary requirement for a school to operate under the formal state 
curriculum. The main locations are in the middle and southern parts of Iraq, which 
are dominated by the Shi’a. The current number is 14, located in 3 provinces, i.e. 10 
in Al-Najaf, 2 in Babylon and 2 in Diwanyia, with a total number of 3,500 students. 
This information is published on the Al-Hakim Foundation website. The Al-Hakim 
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foundation is the second name of the al-Mehrab foundation; the first name is 
registered with the United Nations and the website. The teaching in the Madares is 
based on two components: the first being the state curriculum and the second 
pertain to al-Mehrab’s own teaching. Regarding the former, completing the state 
curriculum is required in order for students of Madares to be able to move between 
the state and non-state school, or even to move on to higher education at state 
universities. However this obligation was not approved by the Madares senior 
managers who were of the view that since they are private enterprises they should 
enjoy the freedom to decide what to teach. They explained that they were in the 
words of the one of the interviewees only ‘given permission’ by the Ministry of 
Education to alter the governmental curriculum by 20%.  
 
The Madares educational activities are divided into two types: indoors and 
outdoors. The former include teaching the governmental curriculum, such as 
mathematics, sciences, Arabic, English, history and geography, with the textbooks 
being those officially prescribed in the national curriculum. The outdoor activities 
organised by al-Madares involve teaching the boys and girls Islamic values, such as 
praying, fasting and the preservation of dress codes for girls, which are not normally 
taught in state schools. This section analyses one of the outdoor activities organised 
in the focal Imam Ali primary school: collective ceremonies for reaching the age of 
religious responsibility. This is a new and unprecedented kind of delivery by the 
Shi’a NGOs for girls who reach nine years old. In addition, another outdoor activity 
for girls in secondary schools is provided, that of drama lessons, which instruct 
them how to behave towards boys.  
 
 
7.3.2 Collective ceremonies for reaching the age of religious responsibility: Sin al-
Takleef al-Shari 
 
al-Mehrab is responsible for organising a new and important activity launched for 
the first time in Iraq, that of collective ceremonies for girls who reach the age of  
nine. This is considered to be the age when girls have to shoulder their religious 
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responsibilities or Sin al-Takleef al-Sha’rie. This, according to an interviewee from 
al-Mehrab, was started by their organisation and subsequently, taken up by a wide 
range of state and non-state organisations44. At this age, according to al-Mehrab, 
girls become adults, and have to start to act and behave as mature Muslim women. 
The first action they are instructed to do to manifest this maturity is to wear the 
Hijab.  
 
al-Mehrab and the Madares jointly organise the al-Takleef al- Sha’rie ceremonies, 
which are publically announced and attended by the leader of al-Mehrab or his 
representative. The ceremony is attended by school staff, girls and their mothers, 
the public including officials from the city council, and dignitaries from different 
state and non-state organisations. The total number of those present amounts to 
more than a hundred and they are accommodated in a large, well decorated hall. 
The ceremony is usually broadcast on the ISCI TV channel satellite. All the unveiled 
girls that have reached the age of nine are made to wear white or colourful long 
dresses that cover the head and the whole body. The girls sit during the celebration 
listening to the speeches of the leader of al-Mehrab or his representative and watch 
other acts such as poems readings and theatrical plays, as well as anthems, 
presented by the students. According to one interviewee from al-Mehrab: 
 
SM M9: We give them Chadors (type of Islamic Hijab) as gifts from our 
organisation. The girls love to wear al-Hijab; they are white clothes, they 
look like brides. The girls participate in poetry, reading and some acting.   
 
The ceremony starts with the president of al-Mehrab, Ammar al-Hakim or his 
deputy, explaining to the audience the importance of the ceremony, which is to 
watch over their girls’ behaviour from now on since they have reached the age of 
nine. An interviewee reported the following regarding this: 
 
                                                 
44
 Al-Mehrab was the first in organising these ceremonies and then other Shi’a organisation followed 
its steps, and more recently, the governorates of Basrah city and Baghdad have held similar 
ceremonies. 
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SM M9: the speeches are directed at both girls and their mothers alike. We 
explain to the mothers that once their girls wear Hijab they have to watch 
over their religious behaviour as they have become adult women. We ask 
them that to take their girls behaviour seriously and not to be too relaxed 
when it comes to religious obligations. For example, mothers have to watch 
that they pray, fast and wear their Hijab in the proper way.  
 
Another interviewee from al-Mehrab states:  
 
 SM M3: The reason we do these ceremonies is because sometimes families 
are unaware or ignore the importance of this age for wearing Hijab. So by 
organising these events we draw their attention to the divine order. As you 
know we are subjected to cultural invasions which we consider more 
dangerous than military occupation. We have to protect our girls and boys 
alike, but our focus is on girls because they are more emotional and need 
extra attention than boys. This is because Islam wants to protect girls and 
women. Hijab protects girls and women like diamonds. Some accuse Islam of 
hostility towards women. On the contrary, Islam respects women. That is 
why we protect them. An unveiled woman is like a commodity that invites 
all eyes to look at her. Women, to be protected, have to be veiled.   
 
al-Mehrab interviewees described the reaction of the families to such an event as 
one of enthusiasm. In the words of an interviewee of al-Mehrab:  
 
SM M9: Mothers of the girls who are to wear Hijab feel very happy when 
they come here and the girls loved it a lot. The girls feel very excited to wear 
nice white clothes.  
 
By organising these ceremonies, al-Mehrab serves three connected objectives. First, 
acting upon the notion that shaping adult behaviour has to start at an early age. 
That is, Sin al-Takleef al-Sha’rie is geared towards creating a generation that acts in 
line with the rules of Islam as interpreted by al-Mehrab. In Islamic thought parents 
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shoulder the responsibility to teach their children, because the family in the Islamic 
context is the first place where Muslims receive their religious pedagogy.  Parents 
not only have to guide and direct their female children to wear Hijab, pray and fast, 
but also to abide by a wide set of Muslim behaviour, including visiting the Imams’  
shrines, becoming engaged in social work and even performing Hajj (Abdul Bari, 
2002; 64).  
 
The second objective is that al-Mehrab can also influence families through 
educating and raising parents’ awareness about their religious duties and bringing 
their attention to their responsibilities towards their female children. The parents 
are advised by al-Hakim to observe and watch over their daughters’ behaviour, for 
covering the hair, and the modesty of today’s behaviour in clothes, in Husain’s 
words “is connected to the judgment in the afterlife” (Husain, 2004:273). That is, 
families are told to watch for their daughter’s Hijab since in Islam allowing hair to be 
seen in public is a sinful act. (Husain, 2004: 266). From this it can be seen that, Sin 
al-Takleef al- Sha’rie is not simply about taking parental responsibility in shaping the 
female children’s dress code and beliefs, but also pertains to bringing their parents 
under the influence of the vision of al-Mehrab.  
 
The third objective is bringing the wider community to listen to the leader of al-
Mehrab who is also a political leader linked to a party that occupies both ministerial 
and legislative posts. Consequently, those attending the ceremonies are listening to 
the vision of an Islamic party on a wide range of issues related to society and Islam. 
In Iraq the age of maturity is 18 years old, however al-Mehrab through Sin al-
Taqleefal- Sha’rie proposes the age of nine as the age of maturity for girls. Thus, 
while influencing children and their families, sin al-Takleef al- Sha’rie is also 
sacralising wider society in line with the Shi’a doctrine. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that the one of the Shi’a political group, al-Fadhila party before the 
elections of April 2014, proposed al-Jafari law, following the jurisprudence of the 
“the sixth Shi'ite imam Ja'afar al-Sadiq, who founded his own school of 
jurisprudence (Shi'ite)” (Zangana, 2014).This law is directed only to the Shi’a, and  it 
is to deal with issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance and adoption (Al-Ghazi, 
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2014). More specifically, the proposed Ja’fari bill aims “to decrease the legal 
marrying age from 18 to nine for females and 18 to 15 for males”45.   
 
As mentioned above, during the ceremony poems are read and some acts 
presented and these are to show the importance of wearing Hijab as well as acting 
as a good Muslim. The poems express admiration for girls who wear Hijab because 
real Muslims should follow the lead of the Prophet’s daughter and the Lady Zainab, 
his granddaughter as a model symbolising perfect Muslim behaviour for women. At 
the same time, al-Mehrab leaders criticise those unveiled as “westernised; lacking 
religious morals; feeling no shame for showing their bodies to boys; and being 
committed a sin’”, according to a booklet distributed about Sin al-Takleef al-Sha’rie. 
 
Sin al-Takleef al- Sha’rie is taught also during summer courses that are organized by 
al-Mehrab schools in a class that is specified as teaching Shi’a doctrine in which a 
textbook called Fiqhona is distributed to the girls. It confirms that by reaching the 
age of nine, God will talk to girls as women directly and that they must listen and 
follow His instruction to do the right thing and avoid any wrongdoing. Moreover it 
tells them what this right behaviour is that she needs to adhere to now that she has 
become a mature woman. These obligatory duties cover the following areas: 
praying; fasting; paying Khums and Zakat and helping the poor; Sadaqqa and Kafalat 
al-Yateem (religious donations and sponsorship; avoiding any wrongdoing such as 
theft, backbiting, unveiling, adornments; avoidance of the delay of marriage, not to 
ask for an expensive dowry, not to shake hands with Mahram men, avoid looking at 
men apart from their heads and hands and without any sexual attraction and to visit 
female doctors instead of male ones. The textbook allocated for girls to study is a 
beautifully written, colourful and designed with Islamic illuminated manuscripts, full 
of quotes from the Quran and Imam’s Hadith, the talks of Imams including many 
pictures of girls wearing white clothes and white Hijab sitting on their own or with 
other girls listening to a mother who acts as a teacher.  The textbook is written in a 
story telling format, namely a conversation between a girl and her mother, where 





the girl poses questions and the mother answers. Each question forms a topic for 
discussion and teaching that al-Mehrab is keen to teach girls at the age of nine.  
 
During the summer courses, the right morals are also taught in a class specifically 
dedicated to this and a textbook is also allocated to teach this issue, which advises 
pupils to adhere to their moral obligations. The class and textbook advise young 
Muslims to observe the following in their life: to believe in the oneness of God, to 
worship him, to sacrifice themselves for his sake, and to follow the Imams’ 
instructions. In addition, they are told how to: shoulder their responsibilities; 
control their personal behaviour; raise their self discipline; and how to control 
sexual feelings in the righteous way. It warns children against loving this earthly life 
at the expense of the afterlife; not to be a slave to money, fame, or power; to avoid 
forbidden relations; and to avoid alcohol. It instructs them to sympathise with the 
poor and to feel the pain of hungry people. This list of religious instructions, 
containing advice and warnings for wrong doing, are all guided by Islamic ethics as 
interpreted by al-Mehrab.  
 
This intention of influencing the religiosity of girls’ behaviour continues into 
secondary schools. Given that girls are all veiled at this stage, the focus of al-
Mehrab moves on to another concern that they feel they need to address, which is 
to control the emotional and sexual feelings of these girls. This is carried out also 
during outdoor activities and is the focus of the next subsection.  
 
7.3.3 Self disciplining of emotional and sexual behaviour for secondary school 
female teenagers  
 
Secondary schools attended by girls and boys aged from 13-18 years old are 
segregated. This age range, according to an interviewee of al-Mehrab, is a critical 
age because it is when the personality of the human being is shaped. One of the 
outdoor activities organised by the Madares Imam Ali is drama for girls. The 
manager of a Madrasah explained in her interview that they organise theatre cast 
by and for girls at the intermediate and secondary levels in order to teach them 
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how to protect themselves from any forbidden contact with males who are not 
their family members. The theatrical plays warn them about the immoral intentions 
of boys or men alerting them to their devilish desires and teaching them not to trust 
or expose themselves to them since this will damage their family’s name and 
honour. One staff member of the Madares states the following: 
SM M10: In secondary schools, we teach girls how to keep their dignity and 
chastity and how to protect themselves from the influences of Western 
values that bombard us through satellite and websites. The girls play the 
roles of boys. We show the girls what kind of tricks the boys use and how 
they should be aware of these tricks, and not to fall for them.  
It is considered crucial in the Islamic context to “channel and control sexuality 
through gender segregation” (Beckman, 2010:620), because the notion of boyfriend 
and girlfriend does not exist, at least publicly. As a result, in the Islamic way of life, 
attraction to the opposite sex is organised and legalised in “lawful marriage that 
satisfies sexual, emotional and social needs” (Abdul Bari, 2002: 8). The control of 
sexuality, which is perceived to “be an ambivalent force, dangerous” (Beckman, 
2010:619), is one of the most important motivations for the moral education of girls 
in Shi’a NGO schools.  
 
According to the manager of the Madares, families are content to receive this kind 
of education as it provides the parents with assurances that the schools are playing 
a complementary role in teaching the girls how to behave in a moral way. In fact, 
this was put forward as the reason why many families are willing to register their 
daughters in these schools in preference to governmental ones. The staff member 
clarifies this as:  
 
SM M10: The families in Najaf are willing to register their children in our 
schools, because we focus on two aspects: education and Tarbaia 
(pedagogy). In fact we consider that pedagogy is more important than 
education: we teach children the right behaviour. If we do not pay attention 
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to Tarbya, education will suffer. The parents feel confident to send their 
children to us because they know we have a proper surveillance system in 
place. 
 
The staff in Madares receive regular training from al-Mehrab. According to the 
manager of one Madrasah this training is “to ensure that staff work in line with 
Islam”46 and are motivated to do so for religious and/or economic reasons. In an 
interview with a local newspaper in Najaf, a teacher at a Madres explained how she 
felt about working with Madares Imam Ali: “it is enough for me, that the Madares 
carries the name of Imam Ali to work even for less salary”. However the job 
opportunities that these schools provide might be another reason given the high 
level of unemployment in the country. 
 
From the above, the education of girls and the outdoor activities, supported by 
summer courses, provide evidence that the choice of Shi’a NGOs programmes and 
the expected outcomes are permeated with the religious objectives of shaping and 
policing the female children’s behaviour, beliefs and actions in line with their vision 
of Islam. Furthermore, al-Mehrab aims through the school outdoor activities to 
engage and bring families and the wider society to sit and listen to their religious 
discourse. Following the analysis of al-Mehrab’s objectives in disciplining female 
children’s behaviour, guiding their families, and influencing the wider society. I will 
focus next on al-Thabat’s religious role through conducting the Shi’a rituals of Imam 
Hussain mourning sessions.  
 
7.4 al-Thabat’s disciplinary role through mourning sessions of Majalis al-Hussain  
 
This section explains the utilisation of the Shi’a rituals to influence individuals, in 
particular women, morally and shaping the values of the wider society in line with 
the Shi’a doctrine. The reason for focusing on these rituals stems from the fact they 
are conducted widely across Iraq and thus provide insights into phenomena that 
influences much of the Shi’a population. The rituals are practices that have been 
                                                 
46
 A comment made in an article about Imam Ali schools. 
http://www.burathanews.com/news_article_142693.html. [cited on 23-09-2013] 
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taking place freely and openly since the changes in the country post 2003, came 
into being when, according to interviews with the CDF, a number of Shi’a NGOs 
were formed as organisational frames for practising them. They are very significant 
for the Shi’a and today are organised not only by NGOs, but also by the state and 
more affluent Shi’a pious individuals. The extensive practising of these rituals is 
symbolic of the Shi’a revival in recent years, and represents in Tugal’s words a 
“process by which the religious ritual comes to occupy a greater place in every day 
life” (Tugal, 2006: 252). al-Thabat is an NGO run by educated middle class Shi’a 
women and has the aim of spreading the word of the Shi’a through organising the 
rituals, before they became aware of NGOs as new form of ‘civil society 
organisations’. They began practising the religious rituals once the political climate 
allowed them to do so, because the previous regime had heavily restricted the Shi’a 
so they could not be used as cover for political activities (Batatu, 2004).  
 
Before analysing the Shi’a rituals as practised by al-Thabat, they are defined and the 
impact of their outcomes is explained. Perllerin and Edmond define a ritual as “a 
behaviour that is repeated in a precise order and frequently involves performing an 
action to the body or mind to fulfil a religious obligation” (Perllerin and Edmond 
2013, e 948-e9454). Further, it is understood as an activity in which  both  physical 
and spiritual aspects of religion come together. Religious rituals are part of any 
religion and the outcomes of practising religious rituals varies, because they  “serve 
numerous purposes…communicate; teach; socialise; instil gender beliefs…create 
sacred spheres; sacralise; build relationships; produce social order and bonds; 
organise; control or oppress…” (Hoffmann, 2012: 3). In general, they aim to make 
change in the participants who take part in them by acting as a medium 
(Feuchtwang, 2007) to influence people’s behaviour. This involves, according to 
Schubel “an external change of status, but it also may involve an internal, invisible 
change of state or perhaps a reconfirmation of a condition that is expected but not 
fully experienced or articulated” (Schubel, 1993:3). They also create feelings of 
solidarity amongst those who practise them through “acts of corporate devotion” 
(Schubel, 1993:2) and they are loci where the person might be more informed 
about his or her own religion (Schubel, 1993:3). 
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With regards to Islam, Tugal explained that rituals serve the objective of 
strengthening Islamic culture by using religious language, and symbols (Tugal, 2006: 
252). The outcome of practising them is to Islamisize the behaviour of Muslims, 
whereby the participants will hear lectures about such matters as Islamic history 
and ethics and thus become better informed about the nature of their faith 
(Schubel, 1993:5). The intended outcomes from participation in al-Majalis is to bring 
the Shi’a, as expressed repeatedly by the interviewees, “closer to God” and in 
Schubel words, it “allows participants to manifest solidarity with the Prophet and 
his family and thus with the Shi’a community –for them the ‘true Islam’” (Schubel, 
1993:6).  
 
al-Majalis is a plural Arabic word meaning assemblies, which take the form of 
religious congregations “where Shi‘is gather to listen to a sermon and lament the 
events of Karbala” (Szanto Ali - Dib, 2012: 37). In other words, they are organised to 
remember the murder of the Shi’a third Imam al-Hussain and his companions who 
were killed in Karbala in Iraq in the first month of the Islamic calendar (Muharram  
in 680) by the Umayyad Muslim caliph: Yazid. Since the murdering of Hussain and 
his companions, the Shi’a commemorate their deaths every year in Muharram. 
Remembering the events of Muharram across fourteen centuries is an opportunity 
to remind them about the struggle against the abuse of power by their oppressors. 
In the commemoration of the murder of Hussain, hundreds of events are held every 
year including: carnivals; passion plays, poetry readings, speeches, and discussions 
in different parts of the world. Muharram represents a “spiritual awakening, 
strengthening of faith by condensing and intensifying religious events, unifying and 
empowering the Shia identity” (Elbadri, 2009: v). It also forms a venue wherein the 
Shi’a are urged to enact higher moral standards (Howarth.2005:134), as advocated 
by the preachers, speakers in mosques, in Hussainaia, and in private houses.  
 
al-Majalis have been considered by al-Shirazi (1926) as important venues that are 
like schools that provide religious knowledge to the public. The Majalis of 
Muharram are not only commemorations of intense sorrow but also provide 
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opportunities for the Shi’a to launch annual educational campaigns introducing and 
aiming to convince other Shi’a and even non-Shi’a about the historical role played 
by Imam Hussain in defending justice. As such, a Majli is considered to be a 
“complete university” (Howarth, 2005:136) where education and preaching 
intensively work together. al-Shirazi (1926) explains in his book Lyali Peshawar (the 
Nights of Pishawar) “ the benefits of the al-Hussainaia Majalis” as follows:  
 
“These Majalis are like schools; the speakers [preachers, or Mullaya] deliver 
lectures about religious instruction; the history of Islam; the history of 
prophets and their nations; they explain and interpret the Quran; raise the 
issue of oneness; they show the divine justice; they explain Prophecy and 
the Imamate; and the final day. They also explain what is expected from the 
believers; they show the attendees the impact of bad deeds; they compare 
Islam with other religions, and approve with evidence the superiority of 
Islam over other religions” (al-Shirazi, 1926)47. 
 
The Majalis al-Hussain are the most important carnivalesque events that allow the 
Shi’a to work intensively to introduce their interpretation of the Quran, the 
Imamate, their historical oppression and their identification of the enemies of Islam. 
In practising these rituals, the Shi’a express their loyalty, love, and cling to Ahl-al-
Bayt, the family of Mohammad. The love of Ahl-al-Bayt or (Hub Ahl-al-Bayt) 
demands that Shi’a Muslims follow the instructions of their Marja’iyya whether this 
relates to personal or public matters including helping the poor, caring for each 
other and having modest personal behaviour. They even promote the notion that to 
ensure these values are upheld they should make political choices in line them, i.e. 
they should follow the stance of al-Marja’iyya. Those running Majalis al-Hussain 
utilise the Shi’a martyrs Imam Ali, and Imam al-Hussain as well as the Shi’a virtue 
women, Fatima, the wife of Ali and Zainab his daughter and the sister of Hussain, as 
role models for the lay Shi’a to follow. The devotion to Ahl-al-Bayt and emulation of 
                                                 
47
 The article is cited on http://www.al-shia.org/html/ara/others/index.php?mod=maqalat&id=94, 
but the name of he author is not mentioned. Accessed on [06-10-2013]. 
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their exemplary figures contribute to the discipline and morality of individuals as 
well as to enhancing Shi’a community cohesion. 
 
Karbala city in Iraq hosts around two million people of the Shi’a faithful every year 
who come to remember the death of Hussain (Pierre, et al., 2007). It marks the 
place where the Shi’a Imams lived and were buried in 650 when Imam Ali, the 
cousin of Mohammad was killed and then his sons buried in Karbala and a number 
of other Imams were buried in Iraq until the Twelver Imam went into hiding in 
Samarra city, north of Baghdad. For the Shi’a, the rituals serve to meet significant 
objectives, in particular, consolidating theologically their identity, through 
disciplining individual behaviours, with women being considered an important 
group for achieving this aim. Given the focus of this chapter, the next subsection’s 
analysis concentrates on how the rituals are utilised to inform adult women about 
personal behaviour through a description of the process. 
 
7.4.1 Accessing the site of women Shi’a rituals organised by al-Thabat 
 
al-Majalis normally take place only during Muharram (the first month of Islamic 
calendar), however, this was not considered enough for Shi’a NGOs, such as al-
Thabat, as they believe that limiting the rituals to only a month a year has led to the 
notion that the “Shi’i neglect their religious duties throughout the majority of the 
year and then attempt to make up for them during Ashura48” (Schubel, 1993:89). 
Before 2003, al-Majalis were permitted for both men and women, but they were 
usually watched by the state’s agents and were allowed only during Muharram. 
However, nowadays al-Thabat organises them all year long and as was explained by 
the interviewees from al-Thabat, they are the place where women come to listen to 
a Mullaya (female preacher). The women listen to the Mullaya talking about the 
tragedy of Hussain, his companion and his family. The feelings of sorrow expressed 
by those attending are a sign of their love for al-Hussain and his family, for which 
the Shi’a believe they will be rewarded both during life and in the after life. These 
                                                 
48
 Ashura is the first 10 days of Muharram, whereby the Shi’a Imam, the grandsons of Mohammad 
were killed in Iraq.  
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rewards are said to come through the Shafa’ah (intercession) of the Imams, whose 
spirits are believed to still be alive, and hence are present to help women who share 
their sadness about the Imams’ fate. The term intercession refers to the belief that 
the Imams will act on behalf of these women to ask God to help them reach their 
destinies. Consequently, al-Majalis are framed to be places where women can ask 
for the intercession of the Imams so as to achieve this goal. In addition, by 
attending the mourning session Shi’a women believe that God will forgive them for 
their lapses (Schubel, 1993:6). 
 
When I entered al-Thabat’s office, based in an al-Hussainaia, a big billboard was 
hanging on the wall with this exhortation to Muslim women: “Zainab has led her 
revolution by supporting Hussain in Karbala, and you, Muslim women, do your 
revolution against Sofoor (the unveiling)”. The images, symbols, and example of the 
two Shi’a virtue ladies were consistently used to show the women attending the 
Majalis how they should act and behave. The emulation of the example of these 
Shi’a ladies involves a wide list of actions that modern Iraqi Shi’a women are 
advised to apply, including: watching their make up, veiling, not committing 
adultery, not to ask their husbands for expensive clothes or furniture, standing 
firmly beside their husband, watching over their daughters’ behavior, taking care of 
their children needs, and voting in elections. An interviewee from al-Thabat explains 
the importance of al-Majalis to women:  
 
SM T1: We have lived under economic sanctions. This has destroyed society 
financially and morally; it has impacted on the ethics of the people. Thus we 
have to focus on the religious education because we believe religion means 
morality. In our Majalis many women attend and the Mullaya (female 
preacher) can be heard widely in our Hussainaia. We do not talk only about 
Hussain, peace be upon his name, but about the problems in the society. 
The Mullaya always links her speech about Karbala, back to our problems 
now. This is for us so we can learn lessons from our martyrs, peace be upon 
them.   
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Another member of the organisation explains:  
 
SM T2:  In our Majalis we advise women and young girls. We do not talk 
about politics unless there are pressing issues that force us to talk about 
them. The Mullaya talks about good morals because families need to embed 
religion and its morals in their behaviour. Good morals help us to live with 
each other. This means that the wife knows how to take care of her 
husband, to take care of her boys. Morals mean for us how we act within the 
family, in society, and it governs our relationship with God. Those who want 
to become closer to God have to enjoy good morals; they should follow the 
example of our Prophet and our lady Zainab and follow her path.  
 
al-Thabat organises al-Majalis two days a week all year long. The gatherings usually 
assemble in al-Thabat’s Hussainaia, which is similar to a mosque. al-Thabat 
organises the event, providing space, a preacher, inviting women, hosting the 
attendees, and also utilising the whole event to disseminate their religious message 
to women in the session; the attendees of al-Majalis, on the other hand, have 
multiple roles in conducting these mourning sessions; they act as donors, 
propagators, audience, serving the sermons, and most importantly as listeners and 
learners for the experience that told in Majalis by the preacher or Mullaya. Women 
participating in the Majalis show their devotion through their financial contribution 
towards the costs of Majalis and the fees of Mullaya which amounts sometimes to 
$200 for each session. The sessions last approximately 30 minutes. The educational 
level of the attendees, according to al-Thabat, ranges from elementary to higher 
education. 
 
al-Mullaya, as a preacher, has a central role in al-Majalis, for she leads the mourning 
chants “in remembrance of the Ahl-al-Bayt” (Szanto Ali-Dib, 2012: 215). During al-
Majalis, she is the only speaker/actor/ lecturer/poet/show-woman thus getting all 
the attention (Scuble, 1993:106). She talks about the past history of the Shi’a Imams 
and their tragedies, as well as linking the past experience with the current one. 
Consequently, she has to have a number of qualifications. First of all she has to be 
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either graduated from the Hawza (a religious academy for Shi’a that is located in 
Najaf city) or considered to have sufficient religious knowledge about Shi’a doctrine. 
In addition, she is expected to have the ability to deliver public speeches and have a 
good voice as she needs to read poems with musical rhythm and make clear 
recitations. 
 
The Majalis setting is “a teaching mood” (Howarth, 2005:135) with the gathered 
women sitting on the floor beside one another, and al-Mullaya standing in front of 
them introducing her session. She acts as an instructor and uses a black notebook, 
which contains hand written poems about the tragedies of Hussain. In her speech 
she explains the morals of Hussain, his values, bravery, praises his faith and his 
readiness to sacrifice his soul for his religion. She usually reads the poems with a 
sad rhythm tapping on her black book, and her voice rises and cracks in grief 
(Hegland, 2003). The stories told in the session portray details of the battles of 
Muharram, the role of Zainab in supporting her brother, featuring the bravery, the 
heroism, and self sacrifice of the Shi’a (Al-Haydari, 1999: 97). An interviewee with a 
woman who attends al-Majalis organised by al-Thabat on a regular basis presents 
her account of these happenings:  
 
SU T3: al-Mullaya greets our Imams, God bless them all, one by one. She 
speaks about those who passed away sacrificing their life for Ahl-al-Bayt. al- 
Mullaya tries to present her speech in a way that can touch the feelings of 
women. She emphasises Hussain’s heroic stands, his human stand towards 
others; the brutality of his enemies. She explains that al-Hussain was 
defending the poor and the oppressed and defended his grandfather’s 
religion [Mohammad]. She then talks to the women, advising them to 
observe their roles as wives, sisters, mothers, and daughters. For example, 
she might talk about family problems emphasising the role of the real 
Muslim woman’s duty in observing her family needs, obeying her husband, 
looking after her girls and making sure that they are veiled, and act in a 
proper way.  
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An interviewee from al-Thabat explains the role of Fatima as follows:  
 
SM T1: al-Mullaya’s speech always refers to the experience and quotes from 
Zainab and Fatima so women can learn from our ladies as a role model in 
their daily life. al-Mullaya speaks about Zainab’s suffering, reminding 
women how she made sacrifices beside her brother and endured a difficult 
life. When Imam Ali was denied political power [after the death of 
Muhammad], Fatima, peace be upon her name, went to a mosque and gave 
a speech defending her husband’s right to govern the Ummah. She was with 
Muslims in the war field playing an active role teaching and delivering 
pedagogy. 
 
Fatima and Zainab provide a powerful image of how Shi’a woman should act; they 
are seen as “role models for women’s loyalty to men (Rahimi, 2007:223). Women 
are educated to have an active role in maintaining and observing their role in the 
family and the community, which serves as both a religious duty and a social 
positioning, because a wife needs to support her husband, in particular, in his duty 
to protect Islamic values. This role for women is considered in Hiba Izzat Rau’f’s 
book (1995) as a political responsibility, which includes a wide range of duties, at 
the heart of which is ensuring that their behavior is in line with Islam.  
 
Another interviewee from al-Thabat explains:  
 
SM T2: We ask al-Mullaya to talk about any inappropriate behaviour that we 
become aware of. For example, not wearing Hijab, committing immoral 
behaviours, such as adultery and she warns women of the severe 
consequences if they perform these deeds. Sometimes, because girls are 
better educated than their mothers, the mothers lose their authority over 
their daughters and the daughters end up controlling their mothers. So we 
educate women in these sessions. If a mother has a son who is an addict she 
might hear from us something that helps her and helps her son; a mother 
who allows her daughter to go out unveiled is warned that veiling is a 
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religious duty and is important to protect her daughter from bad men who 
would harass her in the streets if she goes out without Hijab. Whatever 
subject the al-Mullaya talks about, she will link it back to religion. so… can 
you see how religion has a say in every aspect of our life?  
 
The intention to deepen women’s religiosity was further elucidated by one of al-
Thabat service users:  
  
SU T3: al-Mullaya stresses how women should observe their chastity, not to 
wear make up and go out of her house, not to gossip against one another, 
not to be demanding of their husbands, and observe that their clothes and 
Hijab as required by Islam.   
 
The outcome of raising awareness of women participants in al-Majalis is that first of 
all, women wear Hijab and so do their daughters. This is perceived as a clear 
expression of religious commitment and devotion to Islam. The intention of the 
aforementioned billboard in al-Thabat’s Hussainaia is to remind Shi’a women that 
the ‘revolution’ of Karbala in 680 against the tyranny of Yazid is interpreted today as 
a committed stance against Sofoor, which means unveiling. Second, women should 
control their sexuality and refrain from both premarital or extramarital relationships 
as these are considered sins and crimes. Obedience to these conditions, in addition 
to the regular religious duties, such as prayer, fasting, and not gossiping as well as 
visiting the Shi’a shrines, were mentioned by the interviewees as religious duties 
that women have to adhere to in order to receive and secure the intercession of the 
Imams. I was also told by them that sometimes women feel guilty if they face 
problems, seeing it as a punishment from the Imam, because they have done some 
thing wrong. In sum, women are obliged to commit to high standards of religious 
morals that measure up to those of the virtuous ladies Zainab and Fatima, if they 
want to receive their Imam’s expressions of pleasure and satisfaction.  
 
al-Thabat’s intention is to permeate their audience’s choices with religious 
meaning, instilling faith and informing their practice from the Shi’a NGO’s point of 
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view so as  to bring them closer to God. Consequently al-Majalis sessions are loaded 
with religious significance, with obedience and the commitment to its ethical, moral 
and values, performing a central pillar. The knowledge received during the rituals 
has to be fed back into the daily lives of the women so that their behaviour is in line 
with the discourse of the Shi’a obligations towards Ahl-al-Bayt values. In taking part 
in al-Majalis, it is expected that the religiosity of the participants will be enhanced 
as the pious Shi’a present themselves “before the holy family and offer obedience 
to them” (Schubel, 1993:113). Thus, it can be seen that the utilisation of rituals, in 
Tugal’s words, “is one of the mechanisms that is used by Islamists in their function 
in everyday life…and they are integral to the workings of power and to Islamist 
popularity” (Tugal, 2006: 249).  Through this religious advocacy it is hoped that a 
“scared community” will be created which adheres to Ahl-Al-Bayt teaching and 
values.  
   
These sessions bring women together away from their ordinary housework to meet 
other women from the same or other suburbs to socialise, to exchange their 
experiences, to think beyond their normal and daily life about its meaning as well as 
to give them an identity, sense of belonging, and a cause. Women who fund these 
Majalis are expecting practical results. For example, a wife hoping to have a child, a 
mother waiting for her son to come back home safe or a young woman looking for a 
husband. As such, these sessions provide them with solace and comfort, which 
spurs them to adhere to Islamic ethics and values highlighted in al-Majalis. This 
intention of the Shi’a women NGOs of implanting a discipline in both individuals and 
the collective community (Pinault, 1999: 4), contributes to making women 
important agents for enhancing the patriarchal system, wherein they are beseeched 
to be loyal to both family and their religious community. Hegland explained in her 
research about Shi’a women mourning sessions in Pakistan, that their “crucial and 
unique ritual role advances Shi'a identity…serving the interests of their beleaguered 
Shi'a community, and women's deep devotion to their community” (Hegland, 2003: 
413). In this way, lay Shi’a women and Shi’a NGOs have become agents of 
patriarchal control themselves (ibid: 414). The women in Shi’a NGOs promote Hijab, 
which is one of the most important signs of Islamic ideology, as well as by 
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enhancing the segregation based on gender, are evidence of the patriarchal culture 
that thee NGOs promote. The intervention in women dress; makes up; as well as 
choosing female doctors over male, and warn female children and teenagers are all 
forms of patriarchal control that these NGOs practice. The notion of women role in 
serving the husband and children and watching over her daughter behaviour are all 
advocated by Shi’a NGOs, including women’s ones.   
 
This shows that the aim of the Shi’a NGOs is to turn Shi’a women into active 
implementers of these theological ethics in society at large. Thus, in the final 
account, women, whether individuals or as members of modern NGOs, provide a 





This chapter has provided analysis of two kinds of provision of Shi’a NGOs, that is, 
al-Mehrab’s education provision through the private schooling of al-Madares, and 
al-Thabat’s provision of Shi’a rituals for women. The former represent the Activist 
trend, and the second represent the Quietist trend. Both trends NGOs share the 
intention in creating secularised community. Thus, the first key finding of this 
chapter is that the Shi’a NGOs’ provision is permeated with religious objectives 
aimed at shaping individual behaviour, especially that of female children and 
women. The focus on women stems from the NGOs’ vision that women need 
protection, and that enforcing strict norms from an early age will assist in protecting 
them from such things as Western culture and male bad behaviour as well as help 
them to control their sexuality. The focus on children in the Madares stems from 
their conviction that what children learn in their childhood will remain with them 
the rest of their life. The second key finding of this chapter is that Shi’a NGOs, such 
as al-Mehrab, endeavour through organising Sin al-Takleef al-Sha’rie for female 
children, not only to dictate the children’s choice of dress as well as sacralising their 
daily behaviour, but also to influence their families choices and to disseminate their 




The experience of al-Thabat, through organising the rituals of al-Hussain mourning 
sessions, shows the power of utilising such ceremonies to enhance the religious 
order. These are sessions aimed at women attending and participating in Majalis to 
transfer the knowledge they receive into their daily life. This is achieved by the 
participants being told of the importance of their loyalty to the Shi’a Imams, by 
emulating the Shi’a virtue women’s example in observing chastity and modesty, as 
well as the essential acts of being faithful to their husband, family and their 
denomination. They are also informed that such loyalty will be rewarded if they 
need the intercession of the Imams to help them deal with any problems they face. 
Thus, it is concluded that the Shi’a NGOs’ choice of programmes is imbued with 
faith and the outcomes of these activities serve to make the Shi’a, in particular 
women and girls, agents of a sacred society in which Shi’a values and ethics 
dominate. Moreover, sacralising individual behaviour of children and families from 
the middle class is not void of political influence. That is, the women have been 
asked to interpret their religiosity and devotion to their Imams as well as emulation 
to al-Marja’iyya in a political manner, particularly during election times, owing to 
the post war increased sectarian division between the two main Moslem sects. This 
influencing of poor families and women from the middle class by NGOs is aimed at 
wider society, under the belief that educating children to build the future Shi’a state 
is an important mission.  
 
The ethical and moral theological influence of the Shi’a NGOs revealed in this 
chapter mirrors David and Robinson’s (2012) contention that the role of religious 
NGOs is that of endeavouring to disciplining individual personal behaviour by 
bringing it into line with religion. As with welfare assistance, although the two focal 
NGOs belong to the Activist and Quietist trends, there would appear to be little 
difference in their overall goal, which is the sacralising of Iraqi society; while al-
Mehrab uses formal education to spread their word through its Madares, the 
Quietist utilised moral informal approach by utilising the religious rituals of al-
Majalis to inform women’s choice and way of life.. 
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Chapter 8: Shi’a NGOs political role in promoting the Shi’a led state 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter is dedicated to another aspect of the Shi’a NGOs’ activities, i.e. their role at 
the political level. The strategies that they have utilised to influence their constituency 
are discussed. These include their engagement in mobilising people for the elections, and 
voting for the new constitution; promoting the new Shi’a led state; and preparing a new 
generation to lead the future state in Iraq. The role of the Shi’a NGOs in promoting the 
role of al-Marja’iyya will be also evident in the discussion of the above three strategies. 
The political influence of these Shi’a NGOs is examined through considering the activities 
of: al-Mehrab, al-Thabat, and the CDF. To understand the political role of the Shia NGOs, 
in particular, during the post war election period and in empowering the role of the 
state, it is important to highlight two underlying circumstances: the sectarian 
environment following the war on Iraq and the importance of the Shi’a religious 
establishment in leading the Shi’a denomination.   
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 focuses on al-Marja’iyya’s role in the 
Shi’a denomination. Section 8.3 discusses the Activists role in the elections, i.e. the case 
of al-Mehrab’s engagement in the first post war elections and voting for the new 
constitution, whereas section 8.4 considers the Quietist role in the elections, i.e. the 
efforts made by the CDF and al-Thabat to empower the state, in particular, by the 
former. Section 8.5 explains the Shi’a NGOs electoral campaign discourse for political 
mobilisation, whilst section 8.6 discusses the voting for the new constitution. Section 8.7 
considers the Shi’a NGOs’ role in making citizens that respect the state and section 8.8 
explains how some have put themselves forward as the fifth authority of the state. 
Section 8.9 covers the Shi’a NGOs’ strategic planning aimed at protecting the future of 
the Shi’a-led state, with the focus being on the utilisation of education to create a new 
generation for the future Islamic state through al-Madares by al-Mehrab. Finally, there is 
the chapter summary.  
 
 176 
8.2 The leading role of al-Marja’iyya in the elections in Iraq 
 
It is necessary to understand the role of the Shi’a religious establishment or al-
Marja’iyya in guiding the Shi’a denomination’s affairs when the opportunity arose 
for them to consolidate their political power. al-Marja’iyya countenanced the Shi’a 
about the importance of holding the elections and taking part in voting and 
provided the impetus for Shi’a NGOs to carry out their political role. al-Marja’iyya 
gained its prominence as an institution after the disappearance of last Imam al-
Mahdi in 961 (Kelidar, 1983). In other words, it was in existence well before the 
establishment of the modern state in Iraq in 1921. al-Marja, as a person is 
considered by the Shi’a as a point of reference to guide them in different aspects of 
their affairs: socially, religiously and politically. He holds an authoritative position 
not only for his followers or emulators in Iraq, but for Shi’a all over the world. This 
authoritative position is acquired through three qualifications comprising “ijtihad, 
i.e. 'ilm (knowledge of the law and the issuing of new ones), 'adl (justice in the 
practice of law) and wara (piety)” (Litvak, 1998: 15). According to his religious 
knowledge, the Marja has ijtihad, i.e. the ability to interpret and make religious 
edicts and to issue Fatwa (legal judgments). The role of al-Marja is to pass new laws, 
guide, make edicts as well as pass legal judgments or fatwa for emergent issues that 
the Shi’a have not had to face before. Since al-Marja’iyya were perceived to have 
the capacity to understand and pass religious laws, those without “specialised 
religious knowledge were expected to submit to his judgment” (Walbridge, 2001: 
4). That is, lay Shi’a, women and men follow al-Marja49, and since there are a 
number of them50  both inside Iraq and outside Iraq, they are free to choose the 
one that they want to emulate or follow, which is called al-Taqlid. The Shi’a 
                                                 
49
 al-Marja refers to the clergyman as individual; al-Marja’iyya refers to his institution as a network of 
religious activities and religious education, such as running al-Hawza, a school for Shi’a doctrine 
teaching.  
50 The other three Marja’iyya based in Iraq, in addition to al-Sistani born on August 4, 1930, in the 
north-eastern Iranian city of Mashhad (Rahimi, 2007: 4), are: “Sayed Mohammad Said Hakim, 
grandson of Sayed Mohsen Hakim (born in Najaf, 1935), Muhammad Ishaq Fayyadh (born in Qaznei, 
Afghanistan, 1929), and Bashir Najafi (born in Jalandhar, India, 1942). None of them have Sistani’s 
popularity and financial network” (Khalaji,2006). Moreover “in fact there is little the other leading 
figures can do or say in contrast to him[al-Sistani].. as.. it would be rare and unusual for the other 
three main clerical leaders to follow an independent political line or to engage more directly in party 
politics. The marja‘iyya in Najaf works as a collective run by Sistani” (Rizvi, 2010: 1307) 
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considers the execution of a Fatwa as a religious duty, which they are committed to. 
As such, the Marja'iyya, in Sakai’s words, is “the most systematized leadership… 
which may decide the political direction of the whole community” (Sakai, 2001: 42). 
Consequently, al-Taqlid, or emulation, is an important tradition for the Shi’a and 
forms a powerful link that is available only in their denomination as it does not exist 
within the Sunni sect. Thus, if al-Marja’iyya is politicised, it can be very influential 
and “can be an alternative or even a rival for a political party” (Sakai, 2001: 42). al-
Sistani, without associating himself with any particular political party, advocated for 
a wider coalition of Shi’a political groups and individuals to form an overarching 
united alliance to contest the elections in 2005. This was in order to increase the 
likelihood of the Shi’a denomination political groups winning the elections, which 
emanated from the fear that “intra-Shia divisions would give the Sunnis a path back 
to power” (Dawisha, 2010: 34). In fact, al-Sistani is believed to have played a direct 
part in the formation of the coalition of the Shi’a political parties that stood for 
election at that time (Rizvi, 2010).  
The most powerful mobiliser for the Shi’a from both the Activist and Quietist sides 
to convince their constituencies to vote was the Fatwa issued by al-Sistani stating 
that voting for the Shi’a bloc was an obligatory duty for every Shi’a man and 
woman. The Fatwa emphasised “the virtue of participation in the elections and 
advised Shiites to vote for the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)” (Schmidt, 2008:17). In 
fact, al-Sistani has been attributed as saying that participation in the elections of 
2005 was “more important than fasting and praying” (Ghanim, 2011: 127). 
Moreover, he advocated the principle of one man - one vote, and that women had 
should have equal votes to those of men, apparently describing the voices of the 
voters as being ‘made of gold’ (Sawtoka min Thahab). The Shi’a NGOs, whether 
belonging to the Activist or Quietist trend, were obliged to submit to his will, and 
inspired by his Fatwa worked actively within the Shi’a community to mobilise 
people to vote for the Shi’a political parties. There are four Shi’a political parties: 
“The Da’wa Party; ISCI; the Sadrist Trend (Office of the Martyr Sadr; Moqtada al 
Sadr), which is linked to Jaysh al Mahdi (including many regional splinter groups); 
and the Fadhila party (Fact sheet. 2008:2). In sum, the Shi’a NGOs entered the 
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political arena of the elections empowered by a religious order: the Fatwa of al-
Sistani. In the following the role of the Shi’a NGOs in the elections is examined.   
 
8.3 The Activist role in the elections: The case of al-Mehrab 
 
The first and most important political role of the Shi’a NGOs was their contribution 
in the elections of 2005, and voting for the new constitution. To achieve this 
outcome the Shi’a NGOs worked hand in hand with al-Marja’iyya, the political 
parties, the media, mosques, and the lay Shi’a. This strategy proved to be powerful 
for it has delivered the Shi’a political parties victory in all elections since 2005. 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 (see appendix 1) shows the results of the elections of 2005.  
In this section, the role of al-Mehrab is discussed in terms of its political motivation and 
activities. Its involvement in the elections stems not only from theological emulation of 
al-Sistani, but also from its links with the Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). al-Mehrab, as 
explained in chapter 3, was formed by the leader of ISCI in Iran before the war in 2002 
and has been always led by the latter. It depends financially on ISCI, with its aims and 
functions being determined by the political leader of the party who comes from a 
religious- political family. Responding to both the religious order and its political ties, al-
Mehrab intensively engaged in mobilising the public for the elections in 2005.  This role 
was explained by one of the interviewees from the NGO as an important one, aimed at 
creating a good society by showing people what was the right choice to make. 
SM M2: We introduced our vision to the people; we told them what was 
wrong and what was right; we showed them who was a Salih (religiously 
good) candidate and whose was Taleh (religiously bad), and helped them to 
differentiate between them. We applied an Islamic vision, and we had to 
show them who was compatible with Islam and who was not. We of course 
do not do political work. We do awareness raising work. This is a 
demarcating point and it is very important. The body that carries out the 
political work is ISCI. al-Mehrab is part of a wider network, therefore, we 
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inform and educate people inside and outside our organisations about the 
importance of the elections, and taking part in voting. 
 
While an interviewee from ISCI, the political party, explained its relation with the 
NGO, i.e. how the political party and the NGO have divided the labour between 
themselves. He stated: 
 
SM I1: One of the most important steps that al-Mehrab took was to educate 
the public on how to participate in the elections. It is true that al-Mehrab is 
supporting a political entity, but this support comes definitely from a real 
ideological issue that we share. For this reason we organised hundreds of 
meetings with people in order to establish a new system in this state, which 
the legislative authority [parliament] is part of. The political party [ISCI] is 
unable to do all the needed activities since there is a lot to do such as 
ideological and religious education. So we have taken advantage of this 
organisation [al-Mehrab] to spread the word of religious thought and 
religious tolerance, and to spread the sentiment of love amongst different 
sects in the society. al-Mehrab delegates its preachers to go out, urges 
people to adhere to their Islamic values, and gives advice on the best thing 
for people to do, be it on the social, religious, or political level, al-Mehrab’s  
role is undeniable. 
 
The organisation put all its departments into action during the election campaign. 
The Department of Preaching Affairs of al-Mehrab, according to al-Mehrab 
respondents, sent around 3,500 Mobalgheen (preachers) men and women to all 
cities of Iraq that are populated with the Shi’a in order to meet with the public and 
talk in mosques as means to mobilising people to take part in elections. They based 
their calls to support the Shi’a bloc on the Fatwa of al-Sistani, arguing that it was a 
divine order that they had to submit to, thus utilising religious discourse for political 
objectives. As a religious preacher, this NGO dedicates itself to showing people 
what is right and what is wrong, explaining to the public who acts in line with Islam: 
(al-Amar be al-Maroof wa al-Nahi an al-Munker). This is considered a religious 
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responsibility of all Muslims. al-Mehrab presents itself as, firstly, an interpreter of 




The Charity Department of al-Mehrab also organised meetings with women service 
users. In these meetings the women would sit on the floor while the speakers sat 
behind tables talking to them about the importance of participating in the elections. 
They would urge them to follow the instructions of al-Marjaia to participate in the 
elections, articulating that this would be seen as an expression of their support for 
him and his efforts to consolidate national unity, thereby eradicating sectarianism.   
 
To mobilise service users, al-Mehrab’s employees send buses to collect them and 
transfer them to the meeting places. Here, two factors come into play. First, most of 
those involved are widows who are in receipt of Kafala provision. Under this 
arrangement, those receiving charity support from al-Mehrab might feel obliged to 
do what the NGO has asked them to do, in this case, to vote as they have been 
advised. Second, whether from poor or the middle class backgrounds, the women 
are content to translate their devotion to their Imam and al-Marja’ into support for 
the Shi’a political groups or personnel. In both cases, it would appear that the 
participants willingly accept their part in the clientelist relationship established by 
these Shi’a NGOs. However, as I did not interview any of the women concerned, it 
cannot be concluded categorically that none of them resented the arrangement.  
 
 The literature shows clearly how the Fatwa of al-Sistani was used by the Shi’a 
political groups to secure votes for the Shi’a bloc in 2005 (Ghanim, 2011). An 
interviewee from al-Mehrab working in Charity Department explained this as 
follows: 
 
E M8:  as part of our work is to gather women and mobilise them (Tahsheed) 
when the organisation tell us to do so. We have the widows’ contact details; 
their telephone numbers and addresses, we contact them we tell them what 
 181 
we need them for. We usually gather them in our place and we take them by 
buses to our events. So, when we go to a meeting, for example, if we have 
meetings before the elections, or a conference, we gather them and take 
them by buses to the place. Sometimes, we took about 18-20 buses. This is 
important, so we can show how many people we have. Then when we go 
the meetings, it is the speakers’ responsibility to convince and influence 
women.  
 
Despite the statement of some interviewees, like the one above regarding the 
widows’ mobilisation for elections, others from al-Mehrab claimed that they have 
not been engaged in political work. Thus, whether they consider themselves as 
players on the political scene would appear to be contested within the organisation. 
The mobilisation of service users, was perceived by some of the interviewees as a 
given right for the organisation, since the NGO had helped them when they needed 
it. Regarding this stance, an interviewee from al-Mehrab explained: 
 
SM M5: Our main aim is to help people, and we help those in need. 
Therefore, I reserve the right to ask for their help whenever I need it. I 
believe this is a legitimate request, which should not provoke any concern. 
Sometimes we need the help of those whom we have already helped.  
 
Others rejected the view that there should be a relationship between social service 
provision and politics. One interviewee stated: 
 
E M8: Why should widowed women be asked to vote for a specific political 
bloc? Are we not living in a democratic system? So why are people not free 
to elect whoever they want?  Is this not what political freedom is all about? 
Each person should make up their mind. Widowed woman or poor people 




Whether this rejection was widely shared by others working for al-Mehrab is 
unknown. However, what is known is that al-Mehrab invites its service users to the 
meetings where speakers from their organisation, ISCI, or their electoral bloc speak 
to them on political matters.  The Activist NGOs have not been the only NGOs who 
have mobilised people including service users, for the Quietist NGOs would appear 
also to have been engaged in these efforts, as is explained in the following section.  
 
8.4 The Quietist role in the elections: the CDF and al-Thabat  
  
In this section, two examples of Quietist NGOs provide the focus: the CDF and al-
Thabat. The latter was established immediately after the war in 2003, whereas the 
former was inaugurated on the eve of the first national elections in 2005 prior to 
the writing up of the constitution. Both NGOs are emulators of al-Sistani, they are 
not linked to any political group, and are in favour of the perspective that the 
country should not be ruled by clergymen. In my interviews with al-Thabat, 
respondents explained to me that they would often meet with the Wakil, the agent 
of al-Sistani, for advice when they were faced with a critical issue. They also 
explained that he would inform them as to who were the preferred groups or 
individuals according to al-Marja’iyya. al-Thabat, would then endeavour to convey 
his message to their service users and their wider social network. Whether these 
proposed names were really preferred by al-Marja’iyya or just the favourites of the 
Wakil himself, is unknown. Whatever the case, al-Thabat would follow his advice, 
which they would see as a religious order and thus, should not be countermanded. 
A member of al-Thabat stated the following:  
 
SM T1: We have to convince women to vote, because some are not happy to 
go to cast their votes. We tell them they have to vote for those who are 
good. We tell them, sweethearts, you have to vote, al-Marja’iyya told  us we 
have to vote; so the political situation can be settled down, especially if we 
vote for those who are recommended by al-Marja’iyya.   
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While al-Mehrab mainly mobilises widows from the poor classes, al-Thabat 
approaches women from the middle class in addition to their service users. 
Consequently, although the latter organisation only supports a limited number of 
widows during the mourning sessions their numbers are swelled by women who are 
not in need of the NGO’s support, In fact, many of the women attending al-Hussain 
mourning sessions, as explained in the last chapter, have a high level of education, 
with some of them being doctors and teachers. These women are told that voting 
for Shi’a candidates will not only please al-Marja’iyya, but also will bring political 
conflict to an end. al-Thabat, by talking to these women, exploits their religious 
feelings in relation to their devotion to the Shi’a doctrine by using this as key driver 
get across their political message. 
  
The political discourse utilised by the Shi’a NGOs, whether they were linked to al-
Marja’iyya or to the political parties, revolved around the notion that if people 
voted for their Shi’a political parties and won the elections, this would guarantee 
that the old regime would not be revived again and hence, there would be political 
stability with the Shi’a in charge.  
The CDF also took an active role in the elections despite the sectarian violence and 
an interviewee from the organisation explained their engagement as follows:  
SM C1: Our organisations’ members endured threats and dangerous 
situations. There was terror, explosions, but our organisation activists did 
not stop going to dangerous areas to inspire and encourage men and 
women to participate in the elections. For example, 70 or 80 percent of our 
organisations, such as al-Bayan, al-Thabat, ahali al-Madina and others 
focused on the elections.  
 
The CDF umbrella, which consisted of 26 Shi’a NGOs, was not linked to any Shi’a 
political party. However, their members were active, organising many meetings 
with their community members in the suburbs, mosques and in the Hussainaia as 
well as talking on the TV satellite channels. The CDF, however, did not see their role 
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as only influencing the voter’s choice, but also organising people’s participation, by 
for example, checking the names of the voters against their lists in the ration 
distribution shops, where the ration card was used as the basis for forming the 
electoral roll. They also organised transportation and sent about 5,000 people to 
the voting centres to supervise the elections. All the supervisors, according the CDF 
interviewees, worked on a voluntary basis seeing it as a religious duty that needed 
no financial return.   
 
The CDF also nominated people for membership of parliament. Interviewees from 
the members of the organisation described their role as “manufacturing statesmen 
and stateswomen” by putting forward nominees for the elections. They prepared 
their preferred candidates by providing education and training so that they would 
be able to occupy places in the state and non-state organisations effectively. An 
interviewee from the CDF explained their process behind nominating men and 
women as governmental officials as follows:  
 
SM C2: We act like a football coach; unless we go to the cities’ leagues and 
find who the potential good footballers are, where else can we find players 
for our national team? We have to find men and women who we can train, 
teach, and send to be state decision makers. We train people in line with our 
religious thoughts. If we have well equipped Muslims they will shape the 
state’s policies according to Islam on a grassroots level. In this sense, we do 
not need to establish an Islamic state top down as it happened in Iran. If the 
candidates are already representative of Islam they will reflect their vision in 
the state’s daily work. Thus we do not need to establish an Islamic state. We 
will have an Islamic state de-facto. 
 
The CDF, having their own social and religious network of independent individuals 
who emulate al-Sistani, concerns itself with finding lay Shi’a to run for public office, 
because they are not in favour of clergymen occupying official positions and they 
are not linked to any political party. However, they promote only those considered 
religious enough in their devotion to Islam for government posts. Thus, the CDF can 
 185 
be seen as playing the role of the middleman that transfers the advice and guidance 
from al-Marja’iyya to the state and society.  
 
Light can be shed on the role of the Shi’a NGOs during the elections and after by 
considering the electoral campaigns run by the two camps: the Activists and the 
Quietists. That is, the following analysis of their campaigns provides understanding 
of the ensuing the sectarian conflict that has been shaping the social and political 
features of Iraqi society, reaching its peak with the insurrection by Islamic Sunni 
Militias that started in June 2014.  
 
8.5 The Shi’a NGOs electoral campaign discourse for political mobilisation   
 
The Shi’a NGOs launched widespread electoral campaigns, which were heavily 
imbued with a religious discourse, despite the fact that the election commission 
issued a ban on any use of religious symbols in the elections. An interviewee from of 
al-Thabat, stated:  
    
SM T2: We organised lectures on elections, we talked about the importance 
of the vote… and how this vote should not go wasted. If there is an 
organisation that people trust, they will listen to it, and they will go for 
elections. Our Hussainaia became a site to galvanise people for the 
elections. We told people to go and vote.  They listened to us because the 
organisation is reliable…our place became a place for mobilisation 
‘Tahsheed’.  
 
The utilisation of Hussainaia and mosques as religious places for political purposes is 
not new, for they have often been used as places for political mobilisation by both 
Shi’a and Sunni Muslim organisations for a long time (Hoffman, 2014; Jabar, 
2011).The elections campaign’s discourse reminded the Shi’a voters of their history, 
struggle and tragedies. Moreover, participation in the election was purported to 
grant a “victory to the religion of God, his messenger, and his progeny” (Ghanim, 
2011: 127). Hence, voting for the Shi’a bloc in the elections was “explicitly equated 
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with the sacred act of promoting Islam” (Ghanim, 2011: 127). My interview with a 
representative of the ahali al-Madina Assembly, a member of the CDF in al-Sadr 
city, revealed some of their key work. 
 
SM AM1: We encouraged people to vote. We played a role between our 
Marja’iyya and our people. Our work was to maintain the relationship with 
the people. People started to know us and we began to encourage them to 
participate in the elections. We were working with our social bases and we 
carried out the biggest task to educate the public. We attended many 
training courses on the election process and the observation of the 
elections.  
 
During the Shi’a NGOs’ campaign, special attention was paid to women’s votes, 
“going so far as to tell women that they were religiously obligated to vote, even if 
their husbands had forbidden them to do so” (Nasr, 2006: 136). The image of 
Zainab was extensively utilised to encourage women to vote, with flyers being 
circulated in the Shiite cities claiming that “women who go forth to the polling 
centres on elections day are like Zainab, who went forth to the field of battle at 
Karbala” (al-Rahim, 2005). 
 
The other data, drawn from speeches made by imams in mosques during Friday 
prayers in the mainly Shi’a southern cities of Iraq and broadcast on TV satellite 
channels, show that the electoral campaigns encouraged people to vote for the 
future state of the Shi’a. They were constantly reminded of the consequences if 
they did not and were urged that this was a religious duty, an examination from 
God, to separate who was faithful to ahl-al-Bayt (the Family of Mohammad) from 
those who were not Moreover, the elections’ religious - political discourse warned 
the Shi’a that if they did not participate and vote for the Shi’a candidates, they 
would “end up in hell” (Ghanim, 2011: 127). Even the Imams of mosques warned 
the Shi’a of the outcome if they lost in the elections, claiming that the opponents of 
the Shi’a were just around the corner and would deprive them of being able to 
exercise their rights and ban them from practising their rituals, such as holding 
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mourning sessions and visiting the Shrines of the Imams. As has been explained 
previously, these are two of the most significant Shi’a rituals. Given that the Shi’a 
had already had a taste of freedom from 2003-2005, they were threatened that 
they would definitely lose this if they lost the elections. They were continuously 
reminded that if you do not vote, Saddam will come back in a different guise. 
Finally, the discourse warned the Shi’a that worse than Saddam, a Sunni Islamist 
tyranny of an al-Qaida type, bent upon destroying them, as they considered them 
infidels, would take power if they did not vote (Murphy, 2004).  
 
The Shi’a TV channel satellites frequently highlighted the atrocities of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime by continuously reading poems and showing horrific images of his 
deeds. Karbala TV51 channel, for example, repeatedly broadcast the following poem 
with music and documentary images of mass graves, and the Iraqi army torture of 
Iraqi people during the 1991 uprising52.:  
 
If I do not vote 
I will be forbidden from visiting Hussain (the second Imam Shrine) 
If I do not vote 
The mourning will be banned (sessions) 
If I do not vote 
The ‘comrades’ will come back (the Ba’th party members) 
If I do not vote 
There will be no pans to cook food for Hussain 53 
What is wrong with you Iraqi People? 
Your wounds are still unrecovered  
And they are still hurt ever day 
                                                 
51 The channel belongs to the holy Shrine in Karbala. It is funded by the Shi’a Waqf and aims to 
introduce Shi’a religious discourse to the public, being inspired by al-Sistani. [Online] Available from: 
on http://www.karbala-tv.net/about.php. [Accessed 23 Aug2013]. 
52
 This discourse was recorded and distributed on youtube: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvMZYHO_xH8 
53 Shi’a ritual practised in Muharram, which includes cooking food and distributing it to the poor and 




We will go 
We will vote 
We are ready to die on the ballot box 
So the Ba’th party will not come back again. 
 
The Shi’a NGOs engagement was part of a comprehensive electoral campaign, 
which was not only aimed at getting out the vote for the Shi’a political bloc in the 
elections, but also helped ensure that they were eligible to vote as well as providing 
transport for those living in remote areas. In addition, they took part in supervising 
the elections in order to making sure they were conducted smoothly. These NGOs 
also had a role in mobilising people to vote for the first constitution in October 
2005, the importance of which is explained in the following section. 
 
8.6 Voting for the new constitution 
 
The constitution committee was elected following the first elections to the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in January 2005, which took on the 
responsibility of writing a constitution before general parliamentary elections. The 
Shi’a NGOs studied in this chapter had different inputs to this, for while al-Mehrab 
is linked to a political party it had no need to be involved and simply promoted its 
acceptance by the masses. As the Quietists have no links to a party, they were not 
represented on the committee in charge of drawing up the constitution. This led to 
these Shi’a NGOs coming together in Baghdad in July 2005 to propose a number of 
articles that they wanted to be included in it. This was explained in my interviews 
with the CDF members, who stated that although they had no experience in this 
field, they made their points and submitted their proposals to the committee in 
charge. The committee was dominated by Shi’a as the Sunni had boycotted the first 
elections. The most significant point of the constitution was the affirmation of the 
role of Islam and the July conference led to the announcement the formation of 
CDF as a new umbrella organisation. In the following, I shed the light on the Quietist 
NGOs involvement in writing the constitution by explaining their role at this 
conference.   
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The Quietist Shi’a NGOs’ First National Conference  
The Shi’a NGOs gathered in Baghdad, the capital city of Iraq, on the 29th and 30th 
of July 2005. The conference was held under the motto of ‘The constitution is a 
responsibility and fate’, and was broadcast live over two days on the Iraqia TV 
satellite channel54. It was attended, according to an interviewee from the al-Thabat 
organisation, by a number of political groups even though the participating NGOs 
themselves were not affiliated to political parties. An interviewee from the CDF 
explained: 
 
SM T2: the conference was attended by a number of persons from different 
political parties, across different affiliations, such as Hussain al-Shahrastani, 
the minister of oil, Jalal al-din al-Saghir, a leading member of the SCIRI, and 
Khuthair al-Khuzai from the al-Da’wa party, who became the deputy to the 
Iraqi president as well as others who became ministers.  
 
The conference, according to an interviewee from the CDF, was also attended by 
participants who were loyal to al-Sistani. At least 60 percent were his emulators 
(Moqaldin) and these people had to follow his instruction as an integral part of 
Taqlid tradition. A number of issues were debated of which the most important 
ones were: the role of religion in relation to the state; the role of women in the new 
state and the acknowledgment of the Shi’a rituals in the constitution. Also, the issue 
of the state’s responsibility for providing welfare, and what was the basic unit 
entitled to state provision - the individual or the family - were discussed. The 
majority of the attendees favoured considering the family over individuals as the 
unit entitled to such provision. An interviewee from the CDF talked about the 
debates as follows:  
 
SM C2: All the NGOs were busy with the constitution. If we succeeded in 
writing a constitution written by Iraqi hands and with an Iraqi spirit, we 
would make the achievement of the century. Because the constitution is the 
guarantor to ours’ and the next generation, it was a response to al-
                                                 
54
 The government TV satellite channel.  
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Marja’yyia’s voice. We proposed a number of motions, such as: there will be 
no law that contradicts Islamic Shari’a. Our constitution is our Quran and the   
constitution is superior over any law in the state, such as the Personal Status 
Code55. We wanted an official recognition of Hussain rituals.  Even for 
human rights, Islam calls for human’s rights, but from which prospective? 
We know that democracy does not always fit with Islam 100 percent. 
However, we insisted on the adoption of democratic values that did not 
violate Islamic principles. 
 
A number of workshops were organised at the two day conference, with each 
having about 30 to 50 participants, both men and women and there was, in 
particular, intense debate about the previous law of family affairs, which was 
considered as secular and pro-women. Despite the debate about the role of Islam, 
especially in relation to women and family affairs, the conference succeeded in 
reaching a unified vision about what they wanted in the constitution. As the one of 
the CDF interviewed explained, they subsequently forwarded their proposals to the 
Constitutional Committee, several of which became articles in the final draft of the 
constitution.  
 
The conference was not only inspired by al-Sistani’s political vision, but was also 
partially funded by him as well as by the constitutional committee, which had 
already been formed by the Shi’a political parties following the first elections of 
January 2005. The CDF helped the Shi’a Quietist NGOs to advocate al-Sistani’s views 
in polities, in particular regarding the elections, the writing of the constitution and, 
most importantly, to institutionalise their links with his office through his Wakil. In 
the words of an interviewee for the CDF, the link with al-Sistani had provided them 
with considerable weight in the eyes of the Shi’a political parties. Thus, given the 
                                                 
55
 The Personal Status Code was issued in 1959, a year after the revolution of 1958; it “introduced a 
wide range of progressive regulations. Among these were strict conditions for marriage to a second 
wife, the stipulation of 18 years as the normal minimum age for marriage, prohibition of forced 
marriage, and the right of women to make a request to the court for divorce.” (Fischer-Tahir, 2010: 
1382). 
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CDF’s close ties with al-Sistani’s very popular Quietist trend, the former was 
conferred high status whilst pursuing their goal of state building.  
 
The experience of the Shi’a NGOs shows clearly that writing the constitution in line 
with Islam was taken seriously as it was generally agreed that there needed to be a 
consensus on of the role of Islam in the state. This eventually manifested itself in 
three ways: firstly, in a number of articles that stated its role explicitly; confirming 
that “Islam is the official religion of Iraq and it is a fundamental source of 
legislation” (Ghai and Cottrel, NY:6); secondly, articles that limited other provisions 
if they contradict Islam, stating that there will be no law that contradicts the rule of 
Islam (Article 2 (1) affirms that “no law may be enacted that violates the established 
rulings of Islam” (Hamoudi, 2011:1282), and thirdly, the institutionalisation of a new 
authority pertaining to Islamic Jurisprudence to ensure the application of Islam, that 
is, the formation of the Federal Supreme Court. The latter was to be made up of “a 
number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and law experts” (PILPG Report: 
30).  The constitution was put to a nationwide referendum on October 15, 2005, 
and was approved by the majority of those who voted: 78.6% in favour and 21.4% 
against.  
 
In addition to their role of mobilising people to vote for the constitution in the 
referendum, the Shi’a NGOs exercised their political power in other ways. The CDF, 
for example, took on the task not only of proposing nominees for the elections and 
advising people to choose the best candidates, but also engaged in raising 
awareness campaigns to educate the Shi’a citizens in how to behave politically. This 
is explained in the following section.  
 
8.7 The Shi’a NGOs’ role in building citizens who respect the state  
 
The interviewees from the CDF explained to me that they were not only engaged in 
influencing the citizens during the election times, but they also focused on 
educating them about the ways in which they could express themselves politically. 
The CDF, as an umbrella organisation of NGOs, has used its members’ social 
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networks, membership lists, as well as their service users as an audience to deliver 
their message. Since the CDF has a membership of 1256 Shi’a NGOs in at least 6 
cities in Iraq its influence is widespread. al-Thabat, for example, has often provided 
an audience for the CDF to listen to their views. Its interviewees told me that they 
have good relations with the CDF and if the latter want to talk to the community 
about specific issues, they send buses to al-Hussainaia where al-Thabat is based to 
collect women and then transfer them to the meeting place.  
 
This arrangement resonates with that used by al-Mehrab’s charity department, 
whereby it mobilises its service users for the sake of the political party or ISCI. 
However, the CDF does not usually provide social services or Kafala and does not 
organise mourning sessions, but al-Thabat provides it with a social base that they 
can rely on to mobilise during the elections time or, as has been seen when voting 
for the constitution. Thus, both the CDF and al-Thabat can be perceived of as 
engaging in a clientelistic relationship with those involved with their organisations.  
 
The CDF representatives asserted that they would talk about democracy, the right 
of expression and utilising the elections as a way to choose those who would best 
represent the values of Islam and to punish those who misused the voters trust by 
not voting for them again. These awareness raising activities of the CDF were 
intended to create a new relationship between the citizen and the state. In this 
regard, a member of the CDF explained their intention as follows:  
 
SM C1: Our work is to create a generation that understands that if they want 
to punish the government, they should do that through ballot boxes not 
through joining demonstrations or swearing at the government or saying 
bad things against the state on Facebook. We want to create a generation 
that knows what to do in a democratic state and knows how to interact with 
the government.  
                                                 
56
 When I had my interview with the CDF in October 2011 they stated that their number when they 
established their organisation was 26. In my interview with them in 2013, they stated the number 
was now 12.  
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However, it advised against the employment of other mechanisms that are common 
in democratic systems, such as demonstrations or using social media networks, as a 
means of legitimate political expression. That is, the different kinds of political 
expression common in the West, away from elections, have been perceived by the 
CDF as inappropriate. The elections themselves did not provide the Shi’a with a lot 
of choice since their vote was already determined by al-Marja’iyya, who claimed to 
speak on their behalf. Consequently, the CDF performed the role of defender and 
protector of the state at the expense of failing to protect citizens’ rights. Instead of 
carrying out advocacy work to support citizens, it has endeavoured to convey the 
message of having to give up the rights that the new democratic system could 
supposedly afford them and narrowing their input down to just voting in the 
elections. As such, the CDF has been shaping citizens’ political behaviour and right 
of expression for the sake of state and hence, it has become its representative 
working to ensure that the public conforms to its vision. In sum, the motivation of 
CDF NGOs is to promote the state’s power such that they have become pro-state 
NGOs.  
 
Given that the CDF is linked to no political party, unlike al-Mehrab, it seems that 
their work with citizens is geared towards empowering the new state. It, however, 
has not only been occupied with raising awareness of the Shi’a citizens in order to 
create a new kind of relation between them and the state, for it has also focused on 
building the capacity of the state, as the next section explains.  
 
8.8 The NGOs as a fifth authority or as a state’s twin  
 
The CDF’s desire is that the new state considers the NGOs as a fifth authority that 
enjoys a significant position alongside its four others: legislative, executive, judicial, 
and media. To reach this stage, it has been lobbying the state to allow this sector to 
become involved in the drawing up of laws, surveillance of government 
performance as well as raising awareness amongst statesmen and stateswomen 
about the importance of their partnering with the sector. The purpose of the 
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partnership, from the CDF’s point of view, is to help build the state’s capacity to run 
its affairs and to enable it to implement its programmes. To this end, the CDF has 
been offering to train state departments about a variety of issues, such as how to 
fight corruption, how to use their financial resources effectively, drawing attention 
to the importance of education and the necessity of changing the curriculum to fit 
with the new post war era. The CDF interviewees reported that they have organised 
workshops, run training courses, sent professional NGO activists to advise the 
government institutions, shadowed decision making committees, attended 
parliament and been invited to government meetings. Moreover, they have hosted 
meetings and conferences for statesmen and stateswomen, such as members of 
parliament, ministers as well as the media, university lecturers, clergymen, and 
NGOs activists, to talk about variety of issues related to the state and society.  
 
Given that the Activist NGOs have had direct access to the state institutions through 
their political parties, the CDF’s hope is that through the aforementioned form of 
partnership, or twinning as they call it, this will compensate them for not having 
political parties or clergymen in the state apparatus. Through the partnership, it 
aims to transfer the vision of al-Marja’iyya to the state decision makers. This was 
expressed by the CDF interviewees, claiming that their link to al-Sistani is known to 
the statesmen and stateswomen and that this is significant as it provides the 
organisation with credibility and political weight. Thus, acknowledgment by the 
state of the partnering role would provide the Quietists with a competitive 
mechanism to shape the political future of the state and society driven from the 
outside. The persistence of the CDF to partner or twin with the state brings to mind 
the experience of Bonyads  in Iran (Saeidi, 2004; Messkoub, 2006), which were 
tasked with integrating religion into the state by creating parallel organisations to it. 
Bonyads were formed top down by the supreme leader of Iran, al-Khomeini, and 
the leadership of these NGOs was held by clergymen with huge financial resources 
and significant independence from state control. The CDF represents a different 
type of NGO working in an Islamic context that similar to the Bonyads also aims to 
act as facilitator for al-Marja’iyya’s views being represented at the state level. The 
interviewees from the CDF gave some examples where they had brought to a 
 195 
number of ministries’ attention cases of corruption in their institution or had 
offered free training for statesmen and stateswomen, in particular, in their project 
to develop a mechanism of partnership between the Iraqi parliament, civil society, 
and state institutions.  
 
Following this discussion about the CDF as Quietist NGOs supporting the state 
beyond the elections, partnership with the state, and informing citizens political 
behaviour, now, I turn to al-Mehrab’s efforts to support the state, not only at the 
present time, but also in the future through building a new generation.  
 
8.9 The Shi’a NGOs strategic planning in protecting the future of the Shi’a-led 
State 
 
The intention to utilise education to influence the new generation ideologically and 
politically is not new in Iraq. In 1973, for instance, Saddam Hussein declared that 
the central task of national education was to defy the country’s traditional enemies 
and to teach children a hatred of imperialism (Bengio, 1993: 127). Before 2003, 
therefore, the most important task of education was to “raise sentiments of 
wataniyya” (patriotic sentiment) (ibid: 91). The previous regime adopted different 
strategies to achieve its aim, such as mobilising children in organisations that had 
military features. Pupils between the ages of 15 and 20 were trained in their schools 
to enhance their fighting character and “begin to implant the spirit of sacrifice for 
the sake of the homeland” (Al-Khaizaran 2007: 329). The ideoligisation and political 
influencing of children through education is therefore not unknown in Iraq, as 
education according to Murray “is never neutral, it is intrinsically ideological and 
political” (Murray, 2008: 39). al-Mehrab, as one of the largest education providers 
within the Shi’a community, seems to have adopted a similar strategy following the 
collapse of the Ba’ath Party in 2003. This was explained in these statements made 
by the interviewees from the organisation: 
 
SM M10: Education of young people is always an important issue. Do you 
remember how Saddam Hussein’s regime focused on youth? Do you 
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remember when he said; ‘win the youth today, you will secure the future’. 
The youth are very important and unless we teach them in their primary 
stages it will be difficult to win them over later on.   
 
al-Mehrab’s intention to utilise its education provision was explained by another 
respondent in this way:  
 
SM M7: If we build our children’s personalities in 5 to 8 years, we will have a 
new generation who will run the future state. This is our strategic plan. Our 
tactical actions are to run some projects for children since, as you can see, 
our parliament is not concerned with children’s issues. We consider 
education for children as a basic foundation which we have to rely on to 
build the future society. We want to build the personality of the Muslim and 
enable him to shoulder his responsibility towards his God, himself, his 
family, his society, and his nation. 
 
In a meeting held in Najaf city organised by al-Mehrab57, one of the speakers 
explained the importance of education of children by stating the following:  
 
 “The country [Iraq] is passing through a critical stage; we deal, more than 
any other group, with students from nurseries to universities so to bring 
people back to the righteous Islamic path. We have to take care of our 
children.  If Iraq is to become a true Islamic state in twenty years and be able 
to face various cultural assaults, we have to start with the education of 
children. 
 
al-Mehrab has a number of educational projects, such as Madares Imam Ali, the 
summer courses, Quranic classes, and also their linked NGOs that focus only on 
                                                 
57
 The meeting took place in Najaf city, in March 2013, and was held in one of the halls of the 
Women and Children’s Department of al-Mehrab. It was attended by at least two members of 
parliament, a representative of the city council, a representative of at least one of the Marja’iyya, 
the teachers union, the health authority and the education authority of the city. The meeting was 
broadcast on the ISCI TV channel (Al-Furat). 
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youth. In my interviews with a representative of a secular political party 
commented on the Islamic schools run by Shi’a NGOs:  
 
R PP:  Those graduated from these Madares form a new generation of 
religious politicians who will lead the state. It provides a new generation of 
preachers, army leaders, media professionals, educators, who are already 
taught the Shi’a doctrine.  
 
In general, the utilisation of education is one of the important areas of Islamic NGOs 
since their modern emergence with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, 
aimed at manufacturing the future men and women in accordance with Islamic 
values. The Sunni Islamic NGOs linked to oppositional social movements in the 
Middle East have used education as a tool to Islamise society and in turn the state, 
bottom up. By contrast, because the Shi’a are in power, these NGOs have been 
concerned with maintaining the status quo. Thus the Shi’a NGOs, as the case of al-
Mehrab shows, aim to build the new generation to rule the state and guide society 
in line with Islam. This intention can be understood as a key principle for a number 
of reasons: first, these NGOs are already linked to political parties or the religious 
establishment, who are both keen to protect and maintain the status quo. Thus, the 
use of education is an important and vital source for preparing a pool of human 
resources for the future state. 
 
Second, given the sectarian violent context in which the Shi’a NGOs operate, there 
would be no guarantees for this type of NGO to move freely and publicly, if they 
were ruled by a non-Shi’a state. It is possible that the very existence of the Shi’a 
NGOs would come under question amid the sectarian conflict that is currently 
sweeping the country. Hence, the best defence for the Shi’a NGOs is to protect the 
existence of the state at the present time and in the future, for this in turn, will 
ensure their survival.  al-Mehrab’s aim is to build an Islamic state through the 
Activist approach that calls for a powerful intervention of the religious leaders. This 
is promoted in the Madares, by organising outdoor activities, such as celebrating 
religious events at the national level, teaching children the Quran, Fiqh, or the 
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history of Shi’a as well as claiming their right to rule the Ummah. In sum, the Shi’a 
NGOs, whether they are linked to the Activists or the Quietists, are keen on 




This chapter has addressed the research question relating to understanding the 
political aspect of the Shi’a NGO activities. It has endeavoured to understand the 
motivations that underpin their activities, looked at the ways in which they have 
been striving to consolidate the role of the new reformed Shi’a led state by 
contributing to the reshaping of the state-society relations in line with their 
associated Shi’a political groups or the religious establishment. These issues have 
been covered by drawing on the experience of Shi’a NGOs, both of an Activist and 
Quietist nature. 
 
It has become clear from the above discussion that the Shi’a NGOs, like other 
Islamic NGOs, have worked to mobilise their service users and the wider public to 
vote in elections. Thus, at first glance, they appear not to differ from Islamic Sunni 
NGOs that consider voting, which is a political action, to be a religious duty as 
discussed in chapter 2 (Tugal, 2009). Given the higher religious establishment or al-
Marja’iyya was heavily engaged in the election process in 2005, the Shi’a NGOs 
worked hard to make this event a success for the Shi’a political parties. However, 
some were not only driven by the Fatwa or religious order, for those such as al-
Mehrab were linked to political parties and hence, had a direct interest in 
contesting in the elections.  
 
Given that the Quietist NGOs have no link to political parties nor do they accept that 
clergymen should occupy state office, the empirical work has shown that the CDF 
has the will to achieve a new form of political involvement as a formal partner to 
the state. To this end, it has not only gained access to the state institutions, but has 
also acted as a bridge between the Marja’iyya and the state. The conclusion has 
also been reached that the Shi’a NGOs are not lobbying the state to respond to 
their community’s needs, as the literature on NGOs has stated is their role (Hulme 
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and Edwards, 1997), but rather, they have been lobbying the citizens instead. In so 
doing, in particular as the case of the CDF shows, their aim is to limit their 
constituency of political choice, by narrowing it down to be used in elections and 
counselling against other forms of political expression. Moreover, since the vote 
itself has been informed by the tradition of Taqlid or emulation then any real 
political choice would appear to have already been compromised, as opposed to 
promoted, by the Shi’a NGOs. Further, while al-Mehrab supports the Shi’a state, it 
has been understandably supporting and empowering its own political party 
through promoting its candidates in the elections. In sum, the political efforts of the 
Shi’a NGOs, whether they are linked to the Activist trend or the Quietist Marja’iyya 
reveal that they have been acting as pro-state NGOs. However, the Activists have 
been doing so quite up front, whereas the Quietist CDF has been working more 
behind the scenes, by becoming an advisor to the state, thereby indirectly 




















Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter synthesises the main findings of this research and relates them back to 
literature concerned with NGOs. It explains the ways that NGOs are perceived in 
Western countries differ to those of Islamic ones, and hence, the literature 
pertaining to the former cannot much shed light on the experience of these 
organisations. Consequently, given the common feature of Islam in Shi’a and Sunni 
NGOs they would appear to be the closest in terms of their provision. That is, the 
multifaceted roles carried out by the Sunni Islamic NGOs in social services and their 
theological input, both contribute to achieving political aims, which is also the case 
for Shi’a NGOs, inside and outside Iraq, although as has been elicited in this work, 
for different aims and objectives. Thus, despite the fact that this is not a 
comparative case study between these two types of NGOs, the experience of Sunni 
Islamic NGOs is deemed a good starting point for providing understanding of the 
particularities of the activities and motivations of their Shi’a counterparts in Iraq. 
Moreover, this chapter considers the internal division between the two trends of 
the Islamic Shi’a NGOs within that country, namely Activists and Quietists by 
considering the differences and similarities in the provision and their overall 
mission. In so doing, the three research questions posed for guiding the analysis of 
this thesis are addressed.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 9.2 provides a brief overview of the 
differences between NGOs as defined in the Western literature and Shi’a NGOs, 
whereas 9.3 examines the similarities and differences between Islamic Sunni NGOs 
and Shi’a ones, as has appeared in extant work and in the research findings. Section 
9.4 considers the activities and mission of the two trends of Islamic Shi’a NGOs, 
Activists and Quietists, in relation to how these have impacted on the state and 
society at large. Section 9.5 puts forward a novel conceptualisation of the process 
that these NGOs have been participating in, namely Shi’aisation.  Section 9.6 
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discusses the research limitations and section 9.7 proposes avenues for further 
research. 
 
9.2 Shi’a NGOs in Iraq compared to NGOs in the Western context 
 
The flourishing of the Islamic Shi’a NGO phenomenon in Iraq did not happen 
spontaneously, or in the words of Hulme and Edwards was not an ‘accident’ 
(1997:5). The establishment of these NGOs was first of all made possible by the new 
political changes in this country. These Shi’a NGOs, unlike those in the Western 
context, did not mushroom as a result of the adoption of neoliberal policies nor as a 
result of the aim to reduce the role of the state in social welfare provision. Instead, 
they tasked themselves with the mission to contribute in the reforming of the state 
and society in line with either of the two trends that dominate the Shi’a doctrine.  
 
The literature relating to NGOs holds that they are independent from the state, but 
the experience of Shi’a NGOs refutes this notion. The Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq 
were initially established by political parties or the religious establishment to ensure 
that the state was ruled by a constitution based on Islam, and once the Shi’a came 
to power some, such as the CDF, had a direct input into the running of the state. 
Moreover, the Islamic NGO interest in the politics of the state has led them to focus 
on mobilising their followers for elections, which they justified as part of their 
efforts to raise societal awareness to create a good society that follows the rules of 
Islam.  
 
The empirical evidence from the Shi’a NGOs work during the elections of 2005 and 
the subsequent passing of the constitution have demonstrated the extent of the 
interest of Islamic Shi’a NGOs in the politics of the state. The CDF has up to this day 
provided training for members of parliament and other state officials on matters 
such as anti-corruption, effective budgeting and state building. Although al-Thabat 
is independent from the state, it uses its influence amongst its followers to 
encourage their supporting its reinforcement through the exercising of the Islamic 
constitution 
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Further assertions of the NGO literature in the Western context are that the NGOs 
are formed based on voluntary initiatives by citizens, they are self governed and 
they enjoy autonomous status. Clearly, the Islamic Shi’a NGO al-Mehrab having 
been established by a political leader, the head of the SCIRI, does not fit any of 
these categories. Similarly, the CDF was established by a representative of al-
Marja’iyya and as reported by interviewees from the organisation, they often seek 
guidance from him on religious and political matters. The grassroots NGO of those 
investigated for this thesis, which could be classed being a voluntary initiative, is the 
case of al-Thabat, for it was established by a group of pious of women wishing to 
conduct Shi’a rituals, who later on, were advised to turn their group into an NGO. 
However, its members did report that it worked in line with the instruction of al-
Sistani in fostering the development of good Muslim women and families, thus 
bringing into question the level of its autonomy.  
 
To summarise, the fundamental differences between the definitions and 
characterisation of the NGOs in the Western context and Shi’a ones in Iraq, means 
that they have taken on a completely different form to how they were originally 
perceived as functioning. Hence, to understand the nature of Shi’a NGOs it is more 
appropriate to examine them with their counterpart Islamic Sunni NGOs in relation 
to their motivations and operations, as covered next 
 
9.3 Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq and Sunni NGOs 
 
The Islamic NGOs from the Sunni and Shi’a sects share some objectives such as 
providing for the poor, which is a religious duty underpinned by the notion that 
Muslims are responsible for supporting those in need: it is one of the pillars of Islam 
and it is rewarded. Two of the Shi’a NGOs of the current research are engaged in 
social service provision, that is, al-Mehrab and al-Thabat. Each of these NGOs 
became involved in particular to provide for widows and orphan owing to the 
consequences of the post war era, occupation and internal conflict. The key 
objective of the social welfare of these two NGOs was to protect widowed families 
who had lost their male breadwinner, since this group was considered as vulnerable 
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to economic and social challenges. The loss of the male breadwinner was seen as 
important not only for economic reasons, but also because if it was not addressed 
could destroy families and hence threaten the fabric of society.  
 
The motivation for Islamic donors towards such provision is that those who 
contribute are considered to be serving a religious duty, which will meet with God’s 
satisfaction. That is, such actions will bring ‘Ajr’ and Thawab’ which convey the idea 
that God will witness their work and will bless them with better fortune in the 
present life as well as in the afterlife. In addition, she/he will be also blessed by 
Imams who will stand beside her/him in troubled times and will respond to their 
needs if the latter asks for their Shafa’ah or intercession. The fieldwork shows that 
the concept of Shafa’ah, and Ajr and Thawab are significant for the Shi’a NGOs, as 
well as their donors and recipients. In other words, seeking God and the Imams’ 
satisfaction is expressed through making religious donations to these NGOs. In sum, 
the key motivations for the social service provision by al-Mehrab and al-Thabat is to 
perform a religious duty and to protect the wider society from harm that can be 
caused through poverty. Regarding which, it should be noted that representatives 
from both organisations believed that the state was ultimately responsible for such 
provision and that they would reduce their involvement once it was in a financial 
position to meet its obligations. 
 
The Islamic NGOs objective influencing the moral and ethics of the society in a way 
that sacralises their community is common across the Middle East. al-Mehrab in 
Iraq has set up Madares and summer schools to teach young people the 
appropriate ways to behave in their quest to manufacture good Muslims and as 
such, has been working bottom up to ensure the Islamisation of society as whole. 
This project is also being pursued top down by their linked political party in 
parliament, which they work to keep in power by urging their constituency to do so. 
This they achieve not only through schools, but also through their Hijab ceremonies 
and by helping to pay for wedding ceremonies. Al-Thabat uses mourning rituals to 
introduce role models like Fatima to inform women about their moral duty to help 
spread Islamic values amongst their families, which all of the focal NGOs for this 
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research considered to be the building blocks of society. In sum, human building in 
terms of Islamising the way that Muslims think and act is an important objective 
shared by Islamic Shi’a and Sunni NGOs. 
 
In relation to the political involvement of NGOs, the political activities of Islamic 
NGOs in Iraq have been similar in that they have been geared towards state 
building. That is, quite soon after the formation of al-Mehrab and the CDF, Islamic 
parties were elected to government with the help of these organisations in addition 
to many other supporters and since then they have tasked themselves with 
ensuring that an Islamic state is put in place. However, unlike the Bonyads they 
have not set up large companies that act economically as parallel to state 
institutions. al-Thabat has only been involved in state building activities in an 
indirect and minor way through shaping the moral behaviour of widows. The 
empirical work has shown that the Shi’a NGOs have taken advantage of their social 
services by mobilising their service users to help fulfil their political agenda through 
a culture of clientelism.  
 
9.4 Shi’a NGOs in Iraq: Activism and Quietism 
 
Before focussing on the key findings regarding the three Shi’a NGOs investigated for 
this research, it is worth providing a brief recap of their operational status as 
elicited from the interviews. They are formal organisations that have a required 
organisational structure, which permits them to carry out their programmes, as 
stated in the general definition of such organisations (Martens, 2002: 282). They are 
registered with the directorate of the NGOs; work under Iraqi NGO law; are obliged 
to submit their annual financial and activities reports to the directorate and are 
required to maintain a formal organisational structure in order to be able to run 
their affairs legally. They have their own offices, sometimes based in religious 
places, such as Hussainaia. They employ volunteers or paid workers, although the 
salaries of the employees are often well below those they could earn in other 
sectors. Their sources of funding vary, with al-Mehrab, being financed by political 
parties, whilst the CDF is resourced by al-Marja’iyya and external donors. That is, 
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these large NGOs have access to state and international funding as well as pious 
Shi’a through Khums (religious tax). By contrast, small grassroots NGOs, like al-
Thabat, do not qualify for political funding and/or are not willing to accept 
international tied support that would compromise their mission, thus relying mostly 
on their own community’s resources.  
 
In general, the in depth investigation into the Shi’a NGOs has revealed that they 
function in accordance with the thesis analytical framework taken from Davis and 
Robinson (2012). That is, each use their social services to provide for the poor, 
engage in religious teaching and to a greater or lesser extent involve themselves in 
politics in an interconnected manner. Although the CDF does not directly contribute 
to provision for the poor, the fact that it is an umbrella organisation to which al-
Thabat is affiliated, means that it has a close connection with this form of 
programme delivery. Their overall mission is the sacralising of society and their key 
differences lie in the manner and extent to which they engage in the politics of the 
state. Whether linked to an Activist political party or the Quietist Marja’iyya, they 
have been state building as part of the Shi’s revival in order to enhance the position 
of that sect in the post war settlement. This is clearly apparent in the motives for 
their welfare provision, their education programmes and performance of their 
rituals. In the following subsections, the operations and motivations behind these 
are summarised for each of the focal organisations in order to address the three 
main research questions, which are:  
 
 
1. Why have Shi’a NGOs risen to prominence in social and political life in Iraq after 
the regime change in 2003?  
2. What are the main social services, religious, or political activities that they are 
engaged in?  





9.4.1 The Activist trend: al-Mehrab 
 
As pointed out above, al-Mehrab is linked to a political party, ISCI. This party, after 
the war, departed from its pre-war slogan to launch a revolution and establish an 
Islamic state in Iraq in the manner undertaken by Iran. Instead, the party 
established by the Activist religious Marja’iyya, was tasked with using its 
considerable power to intervene in politics of the state. al-Mehrab is also led by the 
leader of political group that this party belongs to and the boundaries between 
them are blurred. In fact, this political grouping acceded to government in 2005 and 
has held power ever since.  Hence, the NGO see its role as helping to strengthen the 
state and maintaining its associated party in power.  Moreover, it does not perceive 
itself as simply dealing with the problems faced in current society, for it structures 
its operations with the ultimate strategic goal of creating an Islamic state and 
society. This is witnessed in their programmes, in particular, those carried through 
their Madares al-Imam Ali, which are focused on manufacturing a new generation 
of Shi’a Muslims to lead the state and society. Their choice of programmes, such as 
Sin-al-Takleef al-Sha’rie, whereby girls are considered to be women at the age of 
nine and hence, should wear Hijab, is not accidental. For, the ceremonies of Hijab 
are addressed by the leader of al-Mehrab, and dignitaries, local government 
officials, as well as the families of the girls who are invited to these events. In other 
words, this activity for school girls is part of a wider strategy to Islamisize society 
through the work of the NGO. In this type of activity the political group and the 
NGO work together, driven by their aim to influence the community choice and 
make it more religious; more Islamic. 
 
Their provision for widowed families is explained, above anything else, as being for 
protecting the family, which is the basic cell of society and hence, maintaining 
cohesion in the latter. In general, the work of al-Mehrab is to help its associated 
political party maintain power, by helping those in need, influencing their way of 
thinking, and mobilising their votes. This type of grassroots social service provision 
is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood or Hezbollah, in terms of politicisation 
of their social welfare through establishing a clientelistic culture.  On the other 
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hand, the work of al-Mehrab aimed at integrating the religion into the state, which 
has manifested itself in the mobilisation of people to vote for the Shi’a candidates 
and the new Islamic constitution. Which means that they not only influence the 
politics of society bottom up by mobilising support for ISCI through their 
programmes, but have also exerted their influence top down by having directly 
been involved in the passing of Islamic law and ensuring that there is an Islamic 
government. Thus, it can be concluded that al-Mehrab’s positioning is somewhere 
in between being of the state and being separate form it, More specifically, despite 
the reality that it is working to support the state, it is not as privileged as the 
Bonyads who are exempt from the government surveillance that is carried by the 
directorate of the NGOs. In fact, it has to compete with others, including other 
Shi’a, for access to state public funding, because there are sectarian divisions within 
the Shi’a sect too.  
 
9.4.2 The Quietist trend: the CDF  
 
As has been pointed out previously, the CDF is not only an NGO, but is also an 
alliance of different Shi’a NGOs that are supporters of al-Sistani’s vision that the 
Ummah should lead itself. This is in contrast to the view of the higher authority in 
Iran, whereby the clergymen are considered to have a leading role in the state and 
hence, there is Welayat al-Faqif (Guardian of Jurists). Thus, this NGO, as a Quietist 
organisation rejects clergymen taking up state posts, but it does accept that they 
should have an advisory role. For this reason, it is not linked to any political party, 
but instead emulates al-Sistani and its link to the latter’s office is through his Wakil 
(representative or agent) who supervises their NGO work. 
 
The CDF’s influence on the state and society can be described as horizontal with 
two modes of operation, whereby it works with the state and with its own 
organisational members, one of which being al-Thabat. In terms of its work with the 
state, it puts itself forward as a twin or partner, trying to convince it to accept it as a 
fifth authority in addition to the parliament, government, judicial authority, and the 
media. To this end, it has carved out a role in the areas of: the surveillance of state 
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institutions’ performance; helping to build the state’s capacity to run its affairs; 
enabling the implementation of government programmes; fighting corruption; 
effective financial resources management and promoting the importance of high 
quality education. The self confidence that has led to the CDF putting itself forward 
as playing this twin to the state role is obviously driven by their close relation to al-
Sistani. In order to influence the state’s constitution they organised a conference 
attended by 600 representing NGOs as well representatives of state institutions 
where they put forward their desired articles for inclusion. It has engaged in training 
and manufacturing new statesmen and women to lead the state as well as 
nominating and supporting independent candidates consider as being of good 
Muslim character for parliament. Through its proposal to partner the state, the CDF 
has been positioning itself as an alternative to political parties as well as to 
clergymen’s rule, but still acts as a channel so that the views of al-Marja’iyya can 
have an impact on the state’s institutions. However, because it is not linked to a 
political party, it has to continually work to convince those in charge of the state 
that it has a useful role to play in state building at this level. 
 
The other arm of the CDF is its link to member organisations, through which it can 
put them in contact with statesmen and women. Although the CDF do not provide 
social assistance or financial support to those in need, they benefit from their linked 
NGOs who take an active role in mobilising people for elections, through their 
member organisations. In so doing, the CDF appear to take an indirect role in 
promoting clientelism through their sister organisations, such as al-Thabat. 
Educating citizens in line with Islam is a very important strategy for the Quietists, for 
they rely on the Muslim voters to ensure that Muslim Shi’a candidates are elected. 
In sum, although the CDF and through it the al-Marja’iyya, would appear on face 
value to be supporting the Shi’a-led state on a voluntary basis, they are motivated, 






9.4.3 The grassroots Quietist NGO: al-Thabat  
 
al-Thabat, as explained in chapter 3, began as a network of pious Shi’a middle class 
women who were eager to conduct Shi’a rituals. This group was turned into an NGO 
later on and then joined the CDF; the umbrella organisation. It joined the other 
Shi’a NGOs in CDF with the aim of achieving the shared goals with regards to politics 
and enhancing the devotion of the Shi’a. This NGO is linked also to the Wakil of al-
Sistani and has no links to any political party. Despite the fact that al-Thabat is a 
local, small NGO in comparison to others, such as al-Mehrab, it has emerged as 
being engaged, like other Islamic NGOs, in the three aforementioned connected 
roles: social service provision, by providing Khums to widows; influencing women 
service users’ religious devotion through mourning rituals and also having a political 
role, but not as explicit as the other two focal NGOs. The NGO’s main influence is 
through social services provision and weekly ritual sessions: Majalis al-Hussain. 
While the former plays the role of bringing widowed women to the organisation, 
the second has an impact in terms of shaping their attitudes regarding devotion to 
the Shi’a and Ahl-al-Bayt. 
 
Through the rituals, the NGO is able to inform the participants about the correct 
religious behaviour for it to fit with Islam.  Al-Thabat also uses the rituals to remind 
the participants about the historical oppression of the Shi’a and the importance of 
showing their devotion to the Imams, by supporting the sect against its enemies. At 
election times they tell the women that it is their duty to vote for Shi’a candidates. 
This political activity is important, because as Quietists they do not believe the 
clergy should govern, so they try to ensure the next best thing, the election of well 
respected Islamic Shi’a candidates. By mobilising their service users in this way, al-
Thabat is acting similarly to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, however, their 
preferred candidates have to be endorsed by al-Marja’iyya and are not simply voted 
for according to their political party. Because this NGO is not connected to the 
state, it receives no state funding and so far has refused tied international support 
that it believes would compromise its mission. Moreover, attempts to obtain other 
financial resources have failed and so it relies almost entirely on donors, Kofala 
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(plural Kafil) to make religious donations, such as Sadaqqa as well as the fees 
collected from the mourning sessions. Hence, this organisation can be described as 
a grassroots one with locally sourced funding and no political affiliation and yet, its 
operations still involve the interconnected roles, of social provision, religious 
dissemination and political persuasion, just like the other to NGOs in this research. 
Through its operations, al-Thabat has been developing a pattern of clientelism that 
involves seeking the votes of both poor widows and middle class women who 
attend their mourning sessions, in order to get their preferred candidates elected.  
 
From the above overview of the roles of the Activist and Quietist Shi’a NGOs, it can 
be concluded that they are all engaged in a political mission aimed at enhancing the 
role of the Shi’a, whether it be through their support for political parties or the 
backing of individual independent candidates who emulate al-Marja’iyya. They are 
keen to provide for the needs of their communities and influencing their religious 
behaviour. Some, like al-Mehrab and the CDF, have worked top down by involving 
themselves in such matters as the drawing up of the constitution and state building. 
Whilst others, such as al-Thabat, have used their charitable activities and rituals to 
become politically engaged bottom up through mobilisation of their constituency, 
to ensure that not only are appropriate Islamic candidates elected, but also that 
society’s morals and behaviour are brought in line with Islam. Despite the 
fundamental differences in the way the focal Shi’a NGOs operate when compared 
to religious NGOs in other settings, at the heart of their social welfare provision is 
the common aim of building support for their political objectives or ensuring that 
certain individuals and groups gain power.  
 
Moreover, the CDF has set it itself to work horizontally by influencing the state 
through its involvement in training of politicians and personnel in the government 
institutions, thereby trying to garner support for it becoming the fifth authority of 
the state. Whilst, al-Mehrab, through its education programmes is working to 
manufacture good Shi’a Moslems for tomorrow. In sum, all three of the focal NGOs 
are working to ensure the Shi’a retain power and although they employ different 
means to do so, there has quite clearly been a blurring of the boundaries between 
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the Activist and Quietist missions. Next, the idea of their being a process of 
Shi’aisation taking place in contemporary Iraqi society put forward using the 
evidence gathered for this research. 
 
9.5 Islamisation or Shi’aisation 
 
In order to serve their aims, the cultural framing of the Shi’a NGOs cause differs 
from that of Muslim Sunni organisations. The latter evolved around addressing the 
socioeconomic concerns of the poor; opposing a secular state; being against 
imperialism and vilifying Western culture (Wiktorowicz, 2004, Harmsen, 2008); 
proposing Islam as a solution to the economic, social and political challenges. By 
contrast, the Shi’a NGOs’ activities are underpinned by their perceived historical 
oppression of the Shi’a or Mathlomiyat al-Shi’a. As a result, addressing the social 
and economic challenges is not the main driver for mobilising support for their 
movement, but rather to create followers of Ahl-al-Bayt from amongst the people 
who were oppressed by the previous regime. That is, the Shi’a have striven for 
political power not to correct the economic system, but to bring justice for the 
Shi’a. Moreover, unlike Islamic Sunni NGOs they do not have the ultimate goal of 
creating Islamic Ummah for the entire world and instead limit their aspiration to 
protecting their denomination from religious and political oppression. The Shi’a 
historical grievances are centred on the murdering of their Imams; being banned 
from exercising their rituals and having to face severe religious and political 
oppression that lasted for centuries. Thus, the post war era has been seen as a 
historical moment by the Islamic Shi’a NGOs for them to serve their sect in the new 
political settlement. 
 
Drawing on the Islamisation concept and from the evidence gathered regarding the 
Islamic Shi’a NGOs’ work in their communities, it would appear that this does not 
capture completely the means by which they are trying to exert a profound 
influence on the state and society or the content of their programmes. For it fails to 
incorporate the distinct Shi’a aspects of promoting the Shi’a revival through ritual 
practice and awareness raising about Shi’a history. Thus, it is contended that the 
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notion of ‘Shi’aisation’ is better able to explain the political influence of these 
NGOs. Although this term has only been put forward on rare occasions in the 
literature58, I believe it is important because it refutes the perspective that there is 
only one version of Islam.  
 
Shi’aisation refers to a political process that has the aim of shaping the lay Shi’a’s 
social and political behaviour in line with the Shi’a doctrine. This is driven by the 
objective of deepening their adherence to their Imams, their religious teaching, 
their denomination and to supporting Shi’a political groups. It involves a gradual 
shift in ways of thinking and the state’s extant policies59 and laws away from any 
notion of secularism, with the ultimate goal of consolidating the Shi’a in the Islamic 
state apparatus. Political Shi’aisation has been promoted through the introduction 
of a constitution that permits the sect to follow its preferred practice in regard to 
family affairs and through ensuring that the Shi’a only vote for Islamic Shi’a political 
groups. In fact, it has been strongly advocated that voting for Shi’a political parties 
or individuals is an integral part of being a Shi’a60. The process has been enhanced 
through the implementation of Fatwa by al-Marja’iyya’s, which urge the 
manifestation of loyalty to the Shi’a Imams and Ahl-al-Bayt, when the religious 
authority deems it necessary, because it believes that political action is needed to 
protect the Ummah. Such action reveals that even the Quietist clergy are prepared 
to intervene indirectly so as to guide the Ummah towards the creation of an Islamic 
Shi’a state  
 
                                                 
58
 Jennifer Creasy (2009) has studied this concept in her research titled: “The religious identity of the 
Hazaras of Afghanistan and modern-day Pakistan”. 
59
 In 2014, the Ministry of Justice proposed the al-Jafari laws based on an idea articulated by the 
sixth Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, in the eighth century (Al-Qazwini, 2013: 5). This has the goal of replacing 
the personal statues code of Iraq, issued in 1958, that granted women better rights. The proposed 
law has provoked a lot of debate since it allows girls aged 9 to marry, as this age is considered to be 
the age of maturity. This law, if approved, will represent the success of a social policy driven by the 
Shi’a doctrine aimed at Shi’aising society. Islamic Shi’a NGOs, in particular women’s organisations 
have demonstrated in Basra and Baghdad in support of this law Cited on: (http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/iraq-jaafari-draft-law-human-rights.html#). Accessed on 08-
10-204] 
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 In my interview with a manager of a Shi’a school of al-Mehrab he expressed frustration that they 




The narrative employed to push Shi’aisation forward includes urging the lay Shi’a to 
show their love, and loyalty to Ahl-al-Bayt (descendent of Mohammad’s family); 
accepting adherence to the Imams and al-Marja’iyya, and having faith in the return 
of the hidden Imam, al-Mahdi; and seeking the Imams’ intercession to assist them 
in facing their difficulties in life, which will be granted if they follow a righteous 
path. Deepening loyalty to Imams is achieved through Shi’a rituals, such as 
attending mourning sessions of Majalis al-Hussain and participating in Muharram 
and Ashura, which demonstrate commitment to the memory of the Shi’a martyrs; 
an act that is seen as blessed and rewarded by God and the Imams. Through the 
widespread rolling out of these activities the martyrs’ tragedies are promoted all 
year long by the Shi’a NGOs, thus keeping them continually in the public’s memory.  
 
Shi’aisation is also promoted though limiting the social service distribution to Shi’a 
denomination members; the Khums collection is only redistributed to the followers 
of Imam Ali. Shi’a NGOs, such as al-Mehrab’s commitment to shaping the values 
and knowledge of the new generation from an early age by teaching about Ahl-al-
Bayt, providing religious advice and instructing them about their daily behaviour are 
also actions supporting this project.  These NGOs deter people from expressing their 
will through Western style protest by restricting their democratic input to voting in 
elections. However, because the Shi’a electorate are informed that it is their duty to 
vote for Islamic Shi’a parties or respected individuals from the sect, they are in 
essential cutting off any opposition to the Shi’aisation process.  
 
Finally, the Shi’aisation is not confined to the cultural and religious arena, for it also 
would appear to have the goal of creating a theocratic state, as in Iran. The 
difference, however, is that the religious and political organisations in Iraq did not 
choose to follow the path of Iran’s Activists, but rather, adopted al-Sistani’s Quietist 
strategy. That is, they did not aim to create as Islamic state top down by 
establishing Welayat al-Faqih, and instead engaged in a bottom up process through 
manufacturing Shi’a voters who would vote in a Shi’a government that supported 
the creation of a theocratic state.  
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To summarise, the Islamic Shi’a NGOs appear to represent a new phenomenon that 
has contributed to both human and state building in line with Shi’a teachings in Iraq 
post 2003, when new political opportunities were opened up for the sect. They 
have worked alongside political groups and/or the religious Marja’iyya to ensure the 
Shi’aisation of Iraq. Thus, their emergence post 2003 fits with the contention that 
NGOs in the Middle East have invariably been established during times of 
fundamental political change (Benedetti, 2006). However, they have added a new 
dimension to the concept of Islamisation by following a highly sectarian mission 
that favours the creation of a Shi’a Islamic state, which can best be described as the 




Given the novelty of this subject, there was a dearth of literature on this topic and 
that which was available came mainly from practitioners rather than from 
academia. This is despite the fact that there are a number of studies concerning the 
Activist and the Quietist trends within the Shi’a sect in Iraq, also some work has 
been carried out regarding the role of al-Marja’iyya and the role of political groups. 
However, no prior research has investigated Shi’a NGOs, or those linked to these 
two trends. As a result, no well developed theoretical model could be applied to the 
field, which meant I could only refer to indirectly related literature and the views of 
academics with some prior understanding, mainly in Western contexts, when 
deciding the most appropriate way to pursue the empirical work. Consequently, 
there is no way of verifying whether or not the adopted field work method and the 
chosen organisations were optimal for the inquiry, which is perhaps a key limitation 
of the research. However, from a different perspective I was presented with only a 
general perspective regarding how religious NGOs function through the 
interconnection of charitable donation, religion and politics, which left me with a 
significant degree of freedom in choosing my research trajectory. 
 
Although there are many Shi’a NGOs, time constraints and other logistical issues 
compelled me to focus only on three of them. Some of those not investigated have 
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considerable capacity to serve their community, such as al-Sadr linked NGOs, which 
are Activist and linked to the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, or another group of Husain al-
Sadr NGOs, which are linked to the Quietest Marja; the men are cousins. Had other 
NGOs, such as these been investigated, other aspects regarding Islamic NGO 
operations could have come to light and hence, it was not possible to claim that the 
findings were fully comprehensive.   
 
Given the post conflict setting when the field work took place, it was difficult to gain 
access to NGOs of interest. There was certainly a degree of mistrust by some, seeing 
me as an outsider. Moreover, there was a general atmosphere of fear, given the 
regular bombings and kidnappings across the country. Clearly, this limited the scope 
of the enquiry as well as the degree to which people felt safe to express themselves 
openly. In fact, at no time did the service users want me to be present during 
interactions with the NGOs. Despite these difficulties, I believe I navigated them to 
best of my ability and hence, vouch for the high quality of the data I collected.  
 
Finally, I only made informal contact with service users and with hindsight, I think it 
would have been beneficial to seek their views on the operations of the NGOs with 
which they were associated and their level of satisfaction with what was on offer. 
However, although this would have allowed for triangulation of the collected data, 
in the above described environment this would have been almost impossible to 
achieve. Also, honest views shared with a stranger were unlikely to be obtained in 
this cultural setting as Moslems would consider they were being ungrateful if they 
commented negatively about the service providers.  
 
9.7 Future research  
 
Given the limitations of this thesis, there are a number of aspects that need further 
investigation in future work, whether in regard to Islamic Shi’a NGOs in Iraq, or 
others related to the post war political settlement. In particular, issues relating to 
the role of women and Iran’s role in Shi’a NGOs in Iraq require further study.  
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This research has provided insights into Shi’a rituals in Iraq that are practised by 
women regarding how these are used to inform women religiously so as to 
Islamisize their behaviour. However, the function of rituals are almost absent in the 
literature on Iraq, despite the fact that they have attracted the attention of 
academia in many other places of the world. From my personal observation, 
practising Shi’a rituals is one of the demarcating features of the post war era that 
have been widely promoted by both the state and non-state organisations. The 
question as to whether this religious practice has contributed to post war state 
building on a massive scale is worth examining, for the findings from this research 
indicate that Shi’a rituals in Iraq are not purely religious devotional acts, but rather 
would appear to include a political aspect.  
 
Another group of Islamic NGOs that needs exploring is the Islamic Sunni ones in 
Iraq. From my visits to this country, I became aware of some aspects of their 
activities, but did not have the resources or time to probe their activities in the 
same way as for the focal Shi’a NGO. What would be particularly beneficial to 
examine in future work is how these NGOs have been operating in the era of the 
Shi’a revival and whether they are similar to their Shi’a counterparts or not. Such 
investigation would provide insights into how these NGOs act in a sectarian 
environment, in particular, regarding whether their modus operandi mirrors closely 
that of their Shi’a counterparts or not. 
 
One of the issues that was reported with some delicacy by representatives of some 
of the NGOs was the role of Iran and the degree to which it has been involved in 
supporting the Activist NGOs’ activities. The interviewees mentioned that Iranian 
Shi’a NGOs do operate in Iraq, such as al-Khomeini’s NGO in Najaf and so too, 
Lebanese affiliated ones, such the Marja’iyya Fadlullah, which runs a large health 
project. This provision of the Shi’a religious establishment from Iran or Lebanon 
requires exploration, but would require a lot of tact and diplomacy, for I found 
people quite reluctant to share their knowledge about such matter. However, 
comparative between Shi’a NGOs across the Middle East would be quite 
straightforward and would help elicit the degree to which others have employed 
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the historical oppression of the Shi’a to mobilise their constituency in era of the 
Arab spring that has resulted in an escalation of inter-sect and intra-sect conflict  
 
Finally, through this thesis I have reached a conclusion in line with Davis and 
Robinson (2012) that Islamic NGOs in the Middle East usually share three 
interconnected objectives, social, religious and political and consequently set up 
their activities so as to fulfil these. The question then arises as to whether Islamic 
Shi’a NGOs based in the West, exhibit a similar interconnected configuration in their 




This thesis has painted a picture of the main roles that are carried by the Shi’a 
NGOs. It has opened the door to the world of Islamic NGOs in Iraq and their 
relations with political and religious leaders in, a country that is permeated with 
religious conflict, wherein the Shi’a and Sunni have confronted each other not only 
politically but even militarily. The confrontation has currently reached its peak with 
ISIS, a Sunni group, fighting against the Shi’a government (Zassras, 2014), and al-
Sistani having issued a Fatwa for a Jihad (Islamic war) to confront them. Given the 
Shi’a NGOs investigated recognise that their fortune is closely linked to that of the 
Shi’a led state, they will no doubt use all their energy to mobilise the people in 
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Appendix 1: Iraqi national election results 2005, 2010 and 2014 
 
Table (1) shows the results of the first provisional elections for the assembly January 
200561. 
 
Name of the electoral 
bloc 
Seats won 
out of 275 
Affiliation 
United Iraqi Alliance 140 Shi’i alliance including SCIRI, Da’awa, 
Sadrists and Fadhila 
Kurdistan Alliance 75 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) 
Iraqiyah 40 Secular alliance including Allawi’s INA 
Others  20 Sunni tribal party, Independent Sadrist; 




Table (2) shows the results of the first national elections in December 2005. 
 
Name of the 
electoral bloc 





128 Shi’i alliance including SCIRI, Da’awa, 
Sadrists and Fadhila 
Kurdistan Alliance 53 KDP and PUK 
Twafiq 44 Secular alliance including Allawi’s INA 
Iraqi National List 25 Secular list including INA 
Hiwar 11 Sunni Arab list, ostensibly non-
sectarian 
Others  14 Kurdish Islamist; Independent Sadrist; 
Turkmen; and Christian 
 
Table (3) shows the results of the second elections in March 201062.  
 
Name of the 
electoral bloc 






91 A coalition of Shi’a, Sunni, secular and 
non-sectarian  
State of Law 
Coalition 
89 Predominantly Shi’a 
National Iraqi 
Alliance  
70 Shiite religious group that includes 
ISCI; Sadrists, breakaway Dawa party; 
the Islamic Virtue Party (Fadhilah), 
                                                 
61
 Independent High Electoral Commission, names of the winners of the first election, (in Arabic), 
IHEC, 2005, available online at <<http://www.ihec-iq.com/ftpar/election2004/other/name2.pdf>>, 
accessed on 30 November 2010. 
62
 Smith (2010: 8) 
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the Shi’a Turkmen Movement, and 
other parties63. 
Kurdistan Alliance  43 Consisted of PUK and KDP 
Others 32  
 
Table (4) shows the results of the third elections in April 2014 for 328 seats in 
parliament64. 
 
Name of the 
electoral bloc 
Seats won out of 
328 
Affiliation 
State of Law 92 Dawa Party led by the previous prime 
minster al-Maliki 
Sadrist Movement  34  
Kurdish Parties  62 (combined) KDP, PUK and Gorran 
Al-Ahrar 28 Sadrist and other Shi’a groups 
Muwatin (Citizen 
Bloc) 
29 ISCI list. including other Shi’a 
politicians 
Mutahidoun Bloc 23  Sunni Arab Speaker of Parliament, 
Osama al-Nujaifi,  
Wataniya list  21 Mixed list of secular and Sunni groups 
and individuals 




























                                                 
63 Smith, B. 2010, The parliamentary election in Iraq, March 2010 (p7).  
64
 Katzman, K., 2014. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights. Congressional Research Service7-
5700. [Online] Available from: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf [Accessed 11Oct 2014]. 
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Appendix 2: List of interviews used for this research 
 
First part of Code indicates position of interviewee: 
SM: Senior manager E: Employer    SU: Service user    PP: Political party   
R: representative  RA: Religious authority     L: Lecturer 
 
Second part of Code indicates name of organisation. 
 





      
1 SM M1 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 10 Jan 2013 Baghdad  
2 SM M2 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 10 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
3 RA M3 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 10 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
4 SM M4 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 11 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
5 SM M5 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 11 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
6 SM M6 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 12 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
7 SM M7 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 12 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
8 E    M8 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 13 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
9 SM M9 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 13 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
10 SM M10 Al-Mehrab Shi’a NGO 14 Mar 
2013 
Najaf 
11 SM I1 ISCI  Political Party 12 Jan 2013 Baghdad 










14 RA C3 Al-Marja’iyya 
Office 
Shi’a NGO 14 Oct 
2011 
Baghdad 
15 SM T1 Al-Thabat Shi’a NGO 24 Jan 2013 Baghdad 
16 SM T2 Al-Thabat Shi’a NGO 24 Jan 2013 Baghdad 
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17 SU T3 Al-Thabat Public 24 Jan 2013 Baghdad 
18 SM AM1 Ahali al-
Madina 
Assembly 
Shi’a NGO 26 Jan 2013 Baghdad- 
Al-Sadr City 

















21 SM A1  Al-Amal 
Association  
Secular NGO 18 Feb 
2013 
Baghdad 
22 SM CA Culture for All Secular NGO 20 Feb 
2013 
Baghdad 







31 Jan 2013 Baghdad 





31 Jan 2013 Baghdad 
























29 L PS1 Lecturer -
Political 
Sciences 
Academia  03Mar 
2013 
Baghdad 
30 R PP  A 
Representative 
of Iraqi secular 
party 










Appendix 3: Interview topic sheets 
 
1) Topic sheet with Shi’a NGOs  
 
• Historical Background 
- Personal Motivation 
- Year the organisations established 
- The founders, their educational and professional backgrounds 
- Institutional: Values, resources 
 
• Organisational information 
- Number of  people are employed 
- Number volunteers 
- The size of the organisation/  branches in other cities/ countries 
- The size of  yearly budget 
- The  main areas of action 
- The  professional and educational backgrounds of the employees, volunteers 
- The  professional and educational backgrounds 
- The main sources of funding? 
 
• Organisation’s Connections 
- Connections to national governement, governmental institutions 
- Work in partnership with the state 
- Connections to political parties/ religious, secular 
- Connections to Religious authorties 
- Connections to International organisations/ donors 
- Connections to local governments 
- Connections to peer organisaitons/ religious, secular 
- Local or central welfare administration offices? 
 
• The NGOs aims and motivations 
- The motivation of establishment of the NGO 
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- The mission and vision of the organisation 
- The role of NGO in the social welfare provision 
- The main concepts 
Solidarity 







Other concepts guide work of the organization? 
 
• Welfare/other provsions 
- The criteria of choosing who to help 
- The size of families or individuals the organisations suppports 
- The regularity of welfare provisions 
- Political representation 
- Elections and democratic proccess 
- Women 
- Equality 
- Wealth distribuion. 
 
• Operations and other activisim 
- Aids. Services/ goods distrbituion  
- Educational, Empowerment 
- Political activities 
- Religious activties 
- The organisations’ expcetions of the services users  




• The influence of the operaton and activisim 
- Satsify community’s needs 
- Raising awarness/ what issues 
- Incearsing membership 
- Monitored demands for the services 
- Advocacy 
 
• The ways to monitor the influence 
- Feedbacks collected/ verbal/ written/other methods 
- By who/ memebrs/ upper authorties/both? 
 
2) Topic sheet with the State organisations  
 
The government vision of social policies 
- The vision of government on human needs fulfilment  
- State responsibility/ which areas. 
- Government vision of state intervention:family, elderly, children- needs 
- Culture impact on social welfare 
- Tribes impact on social welfare 
 
• Definition of Key Concepts 
- NGOs 
- State responsibility of welfare provision 
- Human Needs 
- Represntation  
- Political awareness 
- Citizenship 
- Wealth Redistribution 
- Other concepts guide work of the governement 
 
• Government’s operations  
- Areas of  state intervention 
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- Family, elderly, children- needs 
- Education, Health, Social service, Housing, Employment 
 
• The finance of social policies 
- The resouce to finance social policies 
- The impact of oil on social policy in Iraq 
- Any plan to reduce reliance on oil? 
- International donors 
- Religious authrties 
- Private sector 
 
• The government vision of the  role of NGOs in welfare provision 
- Welfare provision, democratisations: good/bad 
- Nonreligious organisations intervewntion in welfare provision, 
democratisation: good/ bad 
- The role of IOs in funding social policies 
- The role of local governements, city counciles in welfare provisions 
- Religous instituions’ intervention  
- Relations between social welfare role and Islamic political parties 
- Other concepts guide govermental policies 
 
• The government coordination with NGOs 
- Relative/obslute importance for social policy  
- Government partnerships/contracts with NGOs  
- The criteria to select organisations to work with  
- The governments fund to the NGOs/criteria 
- NGOs role: implementation or partnering  state in delivering  policies   
 
• The impact of the operaton and activisim of NGOs 
- The impact of NGOs provision for those in need 
- Measurment of impacts 
- Forms of monitoring the NGOs performances 
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- Ways to correct NGOs behaviours 
 
3) Topic sheet with the Interantional Organisations  
 
• Historical Background 
- Personal Motivation  
- Institutional: Values, resources  
 
• Objectives and Present Role 
- IOs vision of Social Policies in Iraq 
- Definition of social policy by the organisation 
- Moral values underpinning the IOs vision of social policy  
- The IOs objectives of Social policies - aims 
- The main strategized changes in social policy after April 2003. 
- Main challenges in the present, and for the future 
- How are social policies designed and evaluated 
- The social security system in Iraq 
- The role of gender: in policy making and policy outcomes 
- The role of the family 
- Financing of social policy  
- The role of religion in social policies 
 
• NGOs Role in Social Policies 
- IOs proposition of the establishment of the NGOs 
- IOs current policies and programs towards the NGOs 
- The IOs expectations of the NGOs 
- The obstacles of the NGOs in Iraq 
- The strengths of these organisations  
- The priorities of NGOs 
Giving a voice for marganilsed groups 
Partnering up the state in welfare provision 
Democratisation of the society 
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Watching governmental preformnces, 
Accountability of the state’s institutions 
-  Patterns of actions: implementation state policies or partnering the state in 
delivering these policies.   
 
• How the IOs cooperate with the NGOs 
- Consultation with NGOs 
- The main areas that IOs empower NGOs 
- Partnerships: bring state and NGOs to work together 
- Partnering up with NGOs to implement policies 
- Other forms of cooperations 
- Relations with other local or national institutions 
- The perception of differences with non religious organisations in welfare 
provision 
- Perception and evalution of welfare provided by religious political parties 
- General role of religion: good/bad? 
 
• The influence of the operaton and activisim of NGOs 
- The impact of NGOs provision on those in needs 
- Measurment of impacts 
- Forms of monitoring the NGOs partners. 
 
4) Topic sheet with the Religious Estabilshment 
 
• Historical Background 
- Personal Motivation:   
- Institutional: Values, resources 
 
• Religious Authorties Vision and Practice 
- Human needs fulfilment  
- Religious institutons’s role 
- Influence, and role of Islamic values: e.g. zakat, waqf, other charties 
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- State’s role 
- NGO’s role 
 
• How concerned are Islamic teachings with issues of  
      -     Social welfare 
- Poverty 
- Social justice 
- Gender/family 
- Charity; volunteer/voluntary 
- Wealth distribution 
 
• What the RAs seek to achieve 
- Current services and functions 
- Welfare  provision for those in need 
- Other provisions they offer 
- Other concepts guide their work 
 
• Relations with other institutions in terms of welfare provision 
- International Organisations 
- Donors/secular, religious, local, International 
- Government (if any) 
- What shape/form? 
- Religious NGOs 
- Non Religious NGOs 
- Political parties?  
- Other religious groups in Iraq 
 








- Religious teachings 
- Political represntatation 
- Equality 
- Gender equality 
- Wealth distribution  
- Poverty relief 
 
• The impact of the operaton and activisim of NGOs 
 
- The impact of NGOs provision for those in need 
- Measurment of impacts 
- Forms of monitoring the NGOs prefromnces 
 
5) Topic sheet with service users  
 
• Personal needs  
- Kind of  needs  
- How often they need the organisation’s support; one off or repeated. 
- How they contact the organisation 
- How the organisation respond, by whom 
- Reasons to contact the organisation 
- The expectations of the organisaiton  
 
• The relation with the NGOs  
- Introduction and  contact with the organisation 
- Main services and/or goods received/how often 
- Political, religious, or other supply.  
- The beneficiaries involvement with the organisations  
- Obligations towards the organisation 
- The sustainability of relation with the organisation 
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• Service users’ perception  
- The role of NGOs in welfare provision 
- Areas and activities 
- Accountable to respond to their needs 
 
• NGOs welfare provision influence 
- On the beneficiary’s social life,  
- The human needs/which areas 
- Obligations attached to reception of the welfare provision 
- Feeling towards perceived goods/services, right or favour 
- Replacement of the state provision, 
- Satisfaction and fulfilling the urgent needs. 




















Appendix 4: Topic sheet about the research  
 
Title of Project:  
The Politics of Welfare Provisions of Religious NGOs in Iraq. 
 
Purpose of the Study:   
 
This study seeks to understand the role of religious, and non religious NGOs 
established after 2003 in providing welfare to those in need, and seeks to 
understand how these organisations contribute in  the new social policies. 
 
The aim of this study is to better understand the motivations of the three influential 
institutions: the International organisations, the Iraqi governments, the Religious 
authorities, in empowering NGOs role in social policies. This study aims to generate 
information on motivations and operations of the NGOs in the areas that defined as 
Shi’a populated, and Sunni populated areas.  
 
The research aims at studying the NGOs senior mangers, staff and volunteers’ 
understanding of this role in the society, whether it is charity organisations, 
religious, or political organisations, or combination of all these roles. 
  
This research aims also to scrutinize the activism of the NGOs and what impact does 
their work have on those in need.  To achieve this aims, the instrument that will be 
used consisted of two major researching activities: first studying and analyzing 
documents published by policy makers and second, interviewing those who are 
involved in different aspects of these organisations’ work.  
 
What the research involves:  
 
The first phase of data will be collected through studying related documents 
published by state and non state organisations, this include constitutions; laws, 
protocols, agreements, reports and other related documents.  
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The second phase of data collection will involve in depth interviews with 
representatives of the four groups mentioned above. This will be carried out with 
each participant who is selected purposively. The interviews will be taken in a safe 
environment, in a confidential manner.  Forms of consent will be submitted to 
participants for their signature. Verbal consent will be taken into consideration for 
those reluctant from giving their written signatures.  
 
The interviews will be held with: representatives of international organisations 
representatives; the government representatives; the local authorities’ 
representatives; the religious authorities’ representatives; the senior managers of 
NGOs; the staff and volunteers; and with a number of services users as it agrees 
with their managers. The researcher will code the data in order to analyse and 




The written, and recorded information rendered by interviewees will be kept in a 
safe confidential place.  They will be used only for research purposes. No names of 
the informants will be published, the anonymity of those provide information will 
be strictly protected. Audio tapes will be locked in a safe or carried on the 
researcher exclusively and not handled by any other persons related or unrelated to 
the project. Audio and subsequent transcripts will not be made available to anyone. 
The information will be coded, and only the researcher will be able to link the code 




All participants in this research are taking part by sharing their experiences with the 
researcher on voluntary basis. There will be no financial rewards or in kind and/ or 
in cash for these contribution. The interviews will be taken in suitable at convenient 
time for the interviewees.  The research once it’s conducted will be published and 
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the information that may help those who are working in this issue to have some 
knowledge and a better understanding of the role of these organisations in social 
policies.   
 
Right of participants:  
 
Participation is completely voluntary. If consent is given to take part, still the 
interviewees are able to stop the interview at any stage; they could, if they wish, to 
accompany other people to attend, if they decide to do so. There is an email 
address at the end of this sheet, if the participants wish to support their answers, or 
share any other information with the researcher. Whilst it would be most helpful to 
answer all the questions asked, however, if the participants feel strongly that they 
do not wish to answer any questions the researcher will move on to the next 
question.  
 
An introduction of the research will be given to the participants prior to the 
interviews take place. Audio record will be used in order to keep all given 
information stored. The researcher will use notes through the interviews. The 
researcher will seek the interviewees’ information and knowledge; yet, the 
interviewees could add or elaborate and share any information they think that 
could shed light on some aspects of the issue in question.  
 
The participants have all the right to ask any question prior to starting the 
recording, regarding this research, and they may   ask any question through out the 
process of the interviews. The aim is to have safe, and comfortable and confidential 
atmosphere to conduct the interviews. Any questions that participants have, or for 
any other information that could be rendered to the researcher this could be done 






 .cibarA ni hcraeser eht tuoba noitamrofnI :5 xidneppA
 
 ورقة معلومات عن البحث
 
 السياسات الاجتماعية.  -الموضوع: مشروع اطروحة لنيل شهادة الدكتوراه في العلوم الاجتماعية
 
في العراق بعد عام  56عنوان البحث: دور منظمات المجتمع المدني ذات الطابع الديني في السياسات الاجتماعية
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 قسم الدراسات الاجتماعية. -جهة البحث: جامعة باث
 
 . 3102الى اب  -0102تاريخ ومدة البحث: ايلول 
 
 .باث، و الدكتور جو دايفس محاضرة في جامعة -المشرفون على البحث: الدكتورة رنا جواد




 يسعى البحث الى:
  
ضمن   اولا:  فهم طبيعة و اغراض السياسات الاجتماعية في العراق المطروحة من قبل الدولة في العراق. ثانيا
هذا الاطار يسعى البحث الى فهم دور منظمات المجتمع المدني ذات الطابع الديني في تلك السياسات. و بهذا 
نظمات في تقديم الخدمات،الاسهام في صياغة و تنفيذ السياسات  الاجتماعية.  هذه الم اهم برامجيسعى الى فهم 
الذي احدثه هذا الدور على المواطنين المحتاجين الى مساعدة بشكل خاص، و على المجتمع  التاثيرثالثا: فهم 
 بشكل اعم. 
 
                                                 
56
جتماعية وتعني اهم الستراتيجيات والخط  التي تستهدف اشباع حاجات المواطن، والتي تشمل: التشييل، التعليم، السياسات الا 
الصحة، الاسكان، الرعاية الاجتماعية، و بشكل عام رفاه الانسان. والتي تساهم فيها الدولة، منظمات المجتمع المدني، القطاع الخاص، 
  و الاسرة  على تلبيتها.
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ين و المتطوعين، في يتوخي البحث الوصول هدفه عبر الحوار واللقاء مع العاملين من المدراء و الموظف
منظمات المجتمع المدني ومعرفة تصوراتهم وارائهم عن عن دور و وظيفة المنظمات التي يعملون فيها و 
دورها في المجتمع. سيتناول الحوار التعرف على فعاليات المنظمات و مدى تأثيرها على ذوي الحاجة، فيما اذا 
 تجيب لحاجاته كجزء من حقوقه كمواطن. كانت تستجيب لحاجاته المادية كشخص محتاج، ام تس
 
 ما الذي يتضمنه البحث:  
 
المرحلة الاولى تم التعرف على الوثائق الصادرة من قبل المنظمات غير الحكومية، القوانين و التشريعات  
الدستورية والصادرة من الجهات الرسمية في الدولة، وايضا التقارير والاصدارات الصادرة من قبل منظمات 
ولية مثل البنك الدولي. المرحلة الثانية من البحث  تتم عبر اجراء مقابلات معمقة مع ممثلي منظمات المجتمع د
المدني، الوزارات العراقية ذات الشأن، مثل وزارتي التخطي  والعمل والشؤون الاجتماعية. سيقدم طلب 
لمقابلة عبر توقيع ورقة القبول على اجراء الموافقة لكل مشارك من اجل الادلاء بموافقته/ا على المشاركة في ا
 مقابلة. الذين يفضلون اجراء المقابلة من غير توقيع، يمكن الاكتفاء باخذ موافقتهم بشكل شفهي فق . 
 
 موثوقية المعلومات: 
 
ابة التزاما بالتعهدات الاكاديمية، المعلومات المكتوبة و المسجلة المقدمة من قبل المشاركين ستستخدم فق  للاج
على اسئلة الاطروحة.  لن تنشر اسماء المشاركين، وستكون في حوزة الباحثة فق ، و سيؤمن عدم الوصول الى 
الاجابات، او معرفة الاشخاص الذي اجابوا على الاسئلة. التسجيلات الصوتية ستحفظ في مكان امين مع الباحثة 
خر سواء كان يمت او لا يمت بصلة للاطروحة. و لن يتم الاستماع اليها او الوصول اليها من قبل اي شخص ا
النصوص المكتوبة عن المقابلات لن يسمح لاي احد بالاطلاع عليها. المعلومات ستكون معنونة و فق  الباحثة 




معرفتهم و تجربتهم و رؤيتهم في المقابلات، على اساس تطوعي. ليست هنالك يشارك المساهمون في البحث، 
اي مكافأت او مردود مالي باي شكل من المشاركة في هذا البحث.  مواعيد المقابلات ستحدد في الاوقات التي 
امعة، سيتم يرتأيها المشاركون مناسبة و مريحة بالنسبة لهم. حال انجاز تقديم الاطروحة و قبولها من قبل الج
نشرها، حيث من المؤمل ان تقدم فائدة علمية لكل العاملين في هذا القطاع، بتزويدهم بمعرفة و برؤية علمية 
 حول دور هذه المنظمات في السياسات الاجتماعية.    
 حقوق المشاركين في البحث: 
ركين الانسحاب من المقابلة المشاركة في الاجابة على اسئلة الاطروحة عمل طوعي و بشكل تام. من حق المشا
في اي وقت يرغبون فيه، حتى وان كانو قد وقعوا بالموافقة على اجراء المقابلة. من حق المشاركين اصطحاب 
او استضافة اشخاص اخرين الى المقابلة اذا كانوا يرغبون بذلك. يمكن للمشاركين في حالة رغبتهم في  تدعيم 
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ة جديدة الى البحث الاتصال بالباحثة خارج نطاق المقابلة عبر الاتصال الاجابات التي قدموها او اضافة معرف
الالكتروني.  رغم انه سيكون من المفيد جدا الاجابة على كل الاسئلة المطروحة، الا  -الهاتفي او الاتصال البريد
الباحث الى  ان المشاركين يمتلكون الحق في عدم الاجابة على اي سؤال لا يريدون الاجابة عليه، و سينتقل
 طرح اسئلة اخرى.
 
ستقوم الباحثة بتقديم نبذة عن البحث لكل المشاركين قبل الشروع باجراء المقابلة. سيجري استخدام جهاز تسجيل 
من اجل حفظ كل الاجوبة المقدمة الى الباحثة، كذلك ستدون الملاحظات خلال فترة المقابلة. الباحثة ستقوم 
ن، الا ان بامكانهم اضافة او التوسع او التطرق الى مواضيع اخرى لم تقم الباحثة بتوجية الاسئلة الى المشاركي
 بالتطرق اليها، مما يروه قد يقدم خدمة للبحث و يلقى الضوء على جوانب اخرى من الاسئلة المطروحة. 
 
توجيه الاسئلة  من حق المشاركين توجيه اية اسئلة لديهم قبل الشروع باجراء المقابلة تتعلق بالبحث و يمكنهم
خلال اي وقت في فترة اجراء المقابلات. الهدف هو ايجاد اجواء من الراحة و الثقة لاجراء المقابلة يجري فيها 
اشراك الباحثة بالمعرفة و التجربة التي يمتلكها المشارك في ميدان عمله،  و التي تشكل الهدف الذي تسعى  
 الباحثة الى التعرف عليه. 
 
و التقدير لموافقتكم في المساهمة في تدعيم البحث العلمي  لدراسة ظاهرة منظمات المجتمع  مع خالص الشكر
المدني في العراق،  والذي يصب في خدمة معرفة طبيعة واغراض السياسات الاجتماعية في العراق بعد 
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